This paper reexamines the dynamic relation between intraday trading volume and return volatility of large and small NYSE stocks in two partitioned samples, with and without identifiable public news. We argue that the sequential information arrival hypothesis (SIAH) can be tested only in periods containing public news. After partitioning the sample into periods with and without public news, we find bi-directional Granger-causality between volume and volatility in the presence of public information as hypothesized by the SIAH. Our analysis further suggests that return volatility is higher in the periods with public news, while trading volume is significantly higher in the no-news period; perhaps owing to the importance of private information for trading stocks. Using the sample without public news, we find evidence that volume Granger-causes volatility without feedback. These results are broadly consistent with behavioral models like the overconfidence and biased self-attribution model of [Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., 1998. Investor psychology and security market under- and over-reactions. Journal of Finance 53, 1839–1885]. It appears that overconfident investors overrate the precision of their private news signals and therefore trade too aggressively in the absence of public news; when public news arrives, investors’ biased self-attribution triggers excessive return volatility.

This paper examines whether open market share repurchases deter takeovers. We model pre‐repurchase takeover probability as a latent variable and examine its impact on the firm's decision to repurchase shares. Given specification tests reject the Tobit model, we turn to the censored quantile regression method of Powell (1986, Journal of Econometrics 32, 143–155). We find a significantly positive relation between open market share repurchases and takeover probability, and we reconcile empirical findings in previous studies that contradict predictions. Repurchase activity is inversely related to firm size, consistent with smaller firms having greater information asymmetry, and is related to temporary, but not permanent, cash flows.

This paper considers the estimation of the expected rate of return on a set of risky assets. The approach to estimation focuses on the covariance matrix for the returns. The structure in the covariance matrix determines shared information which is useful in estimating the mean return for each asset. An empirical Bayes estimator is developed using the covariance structure of the returns distribution. The estimator is an improvement on the maximum likelihood and Bayes–Stein estimators in terms of mean squared error. The effect of reduced estimation error on accumulated wealth is analyzed for the portfolio choice model with constant relative risk aversion utility.

Because sell-side analysts are dependent on institutional investors for performance ratings and trading commissions, we argue that analysts are less likely to succumb to investment banking or brokerage pressure in stocks highly visible to institutional investors. Examining a comprehensive sample of analyst recommendations over the 1994–2000 period, we find that analysts’ recommendations relative to consensus are positively associated with investment banking relationships and brokerage pressure but negatively associated with the presence of institutional investor owners. The presence of institutional investors is also associated with more accurate earnings forecasts and more timely re-ratings following severe share price falls.

In this paper, we ask whether the Bundesbank, prior to the European Central Bank taking responsibility for monetary policy in 1999, reacted systematically to stock price movements. In contrast to the results for the US, our empirical findings show a generally weak relationship between German stock returns and short-term interest rates at the daily and the monthly frequency. The results are extremely robust to alternative model specifications. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of a systematic reaction of the Bundesbank to German stock prices. However, we do find that, as in the US, the Bundesbank may have reacted to the stock market crash of 1987 by loosening monetary policy.

We examine the relation between accruals quality and internal controls using 705 firms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August 2002 to November 2005 and find that weaknesses are generally associated with poorly estimated accruals that are not realized as cash flows. Further, we find that this relation between weak internal controls and lower accruals quality is driven by weakness disclosures that relate to overall company-level controls, which may be more difficult to “audit around.” We find no such relation for more auditable, account-specific weaknesses. We find similar results using four additional measures of accruals quality: discretionary accruals, average accruals quality, historical accounting restatements, and earnings persistence. Our results are robust to the inclusion of firm characteristics that proxy for difficulty in accrual estimation, known determinants of material weaknesses, and corrections for self-selection bias.

Because of upward trends in research and development activity, accounting measures of financial distress have become less accurate. We document that (1) higher research and development spending increases the likelihood of misclassifying solvent firms, (2) adjusting for conservative accounting of research and development increases the number of correctly identified distressed firms, and (3) adjusted measures of distress alleviate previously documented anomalously low returns of large, high distress risk, low book‐to‐market firms. The results hold after updating stale parameters and under various tax assumptions. Our evidence raises concerns about interpretation of extant literature that relies on accounting measures of distress.

Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response by James T. E. Chapman, David McAdams and Harry J. Paarsch. Published in volume 97, issue 2, pages 455-458 of American Economic Review, May 2007

We investigate the effect of growth opportunities in a firm's investment opportunity set on its joint choice of leverage, debt maturity, and covenants. Using a database that contains detailed debt covenant information, we provide large‐sample evidence of the incidence of covenants in public debt and construct firm‐level indices of bondholder covenant protection. We find that covenant protection is increasing in growth opportunities, debt maturity, and leverage. We also document that the negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities is significantly attenuated by covenant protection, suggesting that covenants can mitigate the agency costs of debt for high growth firms.