This address reviews macrofinance from the perspective of resilience. It argues for a shift in mindset, away from risk management toward resilience management. It proposes a new resilience measure, and contrasts micro‐ and macro‐resilience. It also classifies macrofinance models in first‐ (log‐linearized) and second‐generation models, and links the important themes of macrofinance to resilience.

Conditional skewness of Treasury yields is an important indicator of the risks to the macroeconomic outlook. Positive skewness signals upside risk to interest rates during periods of accommodative monetary policy and an upward‐sloping yield curve, and vice versa. Skewness has substantial predictive power for future bond excess returns, high‐frequency interest rate changes around Federal Open Market Committee announcements, and survey forecast errors for interest rates. The estimated expectational errors, or biases in beliefs, are quantitatively important for statistical bond risk premia. These findings are consistent with a heterogeneous‐beliefs model in which one of the agents is wrong about consumption growth.

We study the impact of rising mortgage rates on mobility and labor reallocation. Using individual‐level credit record data and variation in the timing of mortgage origination, we show that a 1 percentage point decline in the difference between mortgage rates locked in at origination and current rates reduces moving by 9% overall and 16% between 2022 and 2024, and this relationship is asymmetric. Mortgage lock‐in also dampens flows in and out of self‐employment and the responsiveness to shocks to nearby employment opportunities that require moving, measured as wage growth within a 50‐ to 150‐mile ring and instrumented with a shift‐share instrument.

The U.S. dollar appreciates in the run‐up to foreign exchange (FX) fixes and depreciates thereafter, tracing a W ‐shaped return pattern around the clock. Return reversals for the top nine traded currencies over a 21‐year period are pervasive and highly statistically significant, and they imply daily swings of more than one billion U.S. dollars based on spot volumes. Using natural experiments, we document the existence of a published reference rate determines the timing of intraday return reversals. We present evidence consistent with an inventory risk explanation whereby FX dealers intermediate unconditional demand for U.S. dollars at the fixes.

We study when preferences for competition are a positive economic trait among high earners and the extent to which this trait can explain the gender gap in income among a master's degree in business administration (MBAs). Consistent with the experimental evidence, preferences for competition are a positive economic trait only for individuals who are not overconfident. Preferences for competition correlate with income only at graduation when bonuses are guaranteed and not a function of performance. Overconfident competition‐loving MBAs observe lower compensation and income growth, and experience greater exit from high‐reward industries and more frequent job interruptions. Preferences for competition do not explain the gender pay gap among MBAs.

We propose a novel factor model for option returns. Option exposures are estimated nonparametrically, and factor risk premia can vary nonlinearly with states. The model is estimated using regressions with minimal assumptions on factor and option return dynamics. We estimate the model using index options to characterize the conditional risk premia for factors of interest, such as the market return, market variance, tail and intermediary risk factors, higher moments, and the VIX term structure slope. Together, market return and variance explain more than 90% of option return variation. Unconditionally, the magnitude of the variance risk premium is plausible. It displays pronounced time variation, spikes during crises, and always has the expected sign.

We analyze a principal‐agent model in which an effort‐averse agent can manipulate a publicly observable performance report. The principal cannot observe the agent's cost of effort, her effort choice, and whether she manipulated the report. An optimal contract links compensation to the realized output and the (possibly manipulated) report. Manipulation can be beneficial to the principal because it can make the report more informative about the agent's effort choice, thereby reducing the agent's information rent. This is achieved through a contract that incentivizes the agent to selectively engage in manipulation based on her effort choice.

We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision, and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.

Using Swedish administrative panel data, we document that workers facing higher left‐tail income risk when equity markets perform poorly have lower portfolio equity share. In line with theory, the relationship between cyclical skewness and stock holdings increases with the share of human capital in a worker's total wealth and vanishes as workers get closer to retirement. Cyclical skewness also predicts portfolio differences within pairs of identical twins. Our findings show that households hedge against correlated tail risks, an important mechanism in asset pricing and portfolio choice models.

We analyze a setting in which a board must hire a chief executive officer (CEO) after exerting effort to learn about the quality of each candidate. Optimal effort is asymmetric, implying asymmetric likelihoods of each candidate being chosen. If the board has an infinitesimal bias in favor of one candidate, it allocates effort to maximize the likelihood of that candidate being chosen. Even when the board's prior is that its preferred candidate is inferior, she may still be chosen most often. A glass ceiling can also arise whereby the tendency to hire favored candidates increases as the importance of the position increases.