Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the link between real exchange rates and sectoral TFP for eurozone countries. We show that real exchange rate variation, both cross-country and time-series, closely accords with an amended Balassa-Samuelson interpretation, incorporating sectoral productivity shocks and a labor market wedge. We construct a DSGE model to generate a cross section and time series of real exchange rates to compare to data. Estimates from simulated regressions are very similar to estimates for eurozone data. Our findings contrast with previous studies that have found little relationship between productivity and real exchange rates among high-income countries that have floating nominal exchange rates. (JEL E12, E23, E24, F31, F33, F43)

This paper examines whether and how market competition affected the political bias of government-owned newspapers in China from 1981 to 2011. We measure media bias based on coverage of government mouthpiece content ( propaganda) relative to commercial content. We first find that a reform that forced newspaper exits (reduced competition) affected media bias by increasing product specialization, with some papers focusing on propaganda and others on commercial content. Second, lower-level governments produce less-biased content and launch commercial newspapers earlier, eroding higher-level governments’ political goals. Third, bottom-up competition intensifies the politico-economic trade-off, leading to product proliferation and less audience exposure to propaganda. (JEL D72, L31, L82, O14, O17, P26, P31)

This paper estimates the incidence of corporate taxes on wages using a 20-year panel of German municipalities exploiting 6,800 tax changes for identification. Using event study designs and difference-in-differences models, we find that workers bear about one-half of the total tax burden. Administrative linked employer-employee data allow us to estimate heterogeneous firm and worker effects. Our findings highlight the importance of labor market institutions and profit-shifting opportunities for the incidence of corporate taxes on wages. Moreover, we show that low-skilled, young, and female employees bear a larger share of the tax burden. This has important distributive implications. (JEL H25, H31, H71, J16, J24, J31)

We analyze bidding data from uniform price auctions of US Treasury bills and notes between July 2009 and October 2013. Primary dealers consistently bid higher yields compared to direct and indirect bidders. We estimate a structural model of bidding that takes into account informational asymmetries introduced by the bidding system employed by the US Treasury. While primary dealers' estimated willingness-to-pay is higher than direct and indirect bidders’, their ability to bid-shade is even higher, leading to higher yield/lower price bids. Total bidder surplus averaged to about three basis points across the sample period along with efficiency losses around two basis points. (JEL D44, E63, H63)

We build a model of firm-level innovation, productivity growth, and reallocation featuring endogenous entry and exit. A new and central economic force is the selection between high- and low-type firms, which differ in terms of their innovative capacity. We estimate the parameters of the model using US Census microdata on firm-level output, R&D, and patenting. The model provides a good fit to the dynamics of firm entry and exit, output, and R&D. Taxing the continued operation of incumbents can lead to sizable gains (of the order of 1.4 percent improvement in welfare) by encouraging exit of less productive firms and freeing up skilled labor to be used for R&D by high-type incumbents. Subsidies to the R&D of incumbents do not achieve this objective because they encourage the survival and expansion of low-type firms. (JEL D21, D24, H25, L52, O31, O34)

After World War II, international capital flowed into slow-growing Latin America rather than fast-growing Asia. This is surprising as, everything else equal, fast growth should imply high capital returns. This paper develops a capital flow accounting framework to quantify the role of different factor market distortions in producing these patterns. Surprisingly, we find that distortions in labor markets, rather than domestic or international capital markets, account for the bulk of these flows. Labor market distortions that indirectly depress investment incentives by lowering equilibrium labor supply explain two-thirds of observed flows, while improvement in these distortions over time accounts for much of Asia's rapid growth. (JEL E22, E24, E32, F21, F32, O16, O47)

We present a novel empirical benchmark for analyzing credit risk using “pseudo firms” that purchase traded assets financed with equity and zero-coupon bonds. By no-arbitrage, pseudo bonds are equivalent to Treasuries minus put options on pseudo firm assets. Empirically, like corporate spreads, pseudo bond spreads are large, countercyclical, and predict lower economic growth. Using this framework, we find that bond market illiquidity, investors' overestimation of default risks, and corporate frictions do not seem to explain excessive observed credit spreads but, instead, a risk premium for tail and idiosyncratic asset risks is the primary determinant of corporate spreads. (JEL E23, E32, E44, G13, G24, G32)

Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare coordinated rules, chosen jointly by a group of countries, to uncoordinated rules. If governments’ present bias is small, coordinated rules are tighter than uncoordinated rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, coordinated rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits enhance welfare, and increased savings by some countries or outside economies can hurt the rest. (JEL D82, E43, E62, H62)