Knowledge that Transforms

We study the observability of investors’ information-acquisition activities in financial markets. Improving observability leads to two strategic effects on information acquisition: (1) the pricing effect, which arises from interactions between investors and the market maker and can encourage or discourage information acquisition, and (2) the competition effect, which concerns interactions among investors and always encourages information acquisition. We apply our theory to study voluntary and mandatory disclosures of corporate site visits. When the competition effect dominates, investors voluntarily disclose their visits. When the pricing effect dominates, mandatory disclosure is effective. Our analysis sheds novel light on Regulation Fair Disclosure.

We study capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. A novel general equilibrium channel that operates through firms deposits mitigates the cost of increasing capital requirements. In the calibrated model, (a) the optimal capital requirement is 7.3 percentage points higher than in a comparable model in which all the deposits are held by households, and (b) setting the capital requirement higher than the true optimum is not as costly as one would gauge from the comparable model. We also provide some independent evidence that supports our novel channel.

Many of the Federal Reserve’s (the Fed’s) monetary policy operations involve trading with primary dealers. We find that, for agency MBS, dealers charge 2.5 cents (per $100 face value) higher selling to the Fed than to non-Fed customers. Controlling for the same dealer, same security, and same trading time, this discriminatory pricing likely arises from dealers’ market power rather than inventory costs. Further, matching trade size reduces the price differential by more than half, implying that dealers’ market power greatly relates to the Fed’s purchases in large amounts, whereas the Fed’s limited breadth of counterparty choice also plays some role.

Following the onset of COVID-19, research production in economics and finance (measured by the posting of working papers) increased by 29%. Production increases were widespread across geographies, job titles, departments, and ages with larger increases in top departments and for people under the age of 35. Men and women both experienced production increases with the exception of women between the age of 35 and 49, who experienced no production gains despite large increases for men in the same age group. COVID-19 increased reliance on past coauthorship networks, with larger production gains for authors that are more central to the network.

Homeowners who originally bought when marketwide price levels were high (low) fetch high (low) sales prices and rents, even decades later. We study the propagation of reference-dependence to neighboring listings. The “spillover” reference point effect is about one-half as large as the “own” reference point effect. Neither house quality nor location appears capable of explaining the result. Using a simple model to provide empirical predictions, we find support for a competition-based mechanism. We quantify the aggregate effect of own and spillover reference point effects on aggregate prices and/or rents at the ZIP code level.

A repurchase agreement (repo) is a source of cash and collateral. We document that the money market is more segmented when the collateral motive prevails. Two crucial aspects of the central bank framework lead to this disconnect: banks’ access to the central bank’s deposit facility and assets’ eligibility for quantitative easing (QE). We show that repo rates lent by banks with access to the deposit facility and secured by QE eligible assets are more collateral-driven and disconnected from funding-based money market rates. Our results are relevant for different monetary policies and have suggestive implications for the monetary policy pass-through.

Using regulatory data, we study German bank lending in countries targeted by financial sanctions. We find that domestic banks in Germany reduce lending in sanctioned countries, whereas their foreign bank affiliates outside Germany increase lending. In some cases, this is because the bank affiliates’ host countries have not imposed sanctions themselves. However, even German bank affiliates in host countries that enact sanctions like Germany increase lending if these host countries lack strong institutions and anticrime policies. These findings suggest that even universally adopted sanctions distort bank capital flows and competition if the level of their enforcement varies across bank locations.

Benchmarking incentivizes fund managers to invest a fraction of their funds’ assets in their benchmark indexes, and such demand is inelastic. We construct a measure of inelastic demand a stock attracts, benchmarking intensity (BMI), computed as its cumulative weight in all benchmarks, weighted by assets following each benchmark. Exploiting the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff, we show that changes in stocks’ BMIs instrument for changes in ownership of benchmarked investors. The resultant demand elasticities are low. We document that both active and passive fund managers buy additions to their benchmarks and sell deletions. Finally, an increase in BMI lowers future stock returns.

Open-end mutual funds can use redemption in kind to satisfy investor redemptions by delivering securities instead of cash. We find that funds that reserve their rights to redeem in kind experience less redemption after poor performance. Evidence from actual in-kind transactions reveals several unique mechanisms for redemption in kind to mitigate fund runs, including the delivery of more illiquid stocks and stocks with greater tax overhang. Funds suffer less from the adverse impact of outflows on their performance. However, redeeming investors bear significant liquidation costs when they sell securities, costs associated with destabilization in the prices of these securities.

Going public by merging with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company (SPAC) is much more expensive than conducting a traditional IPO. We rationalize why some companies merge with a SPAC by listing the potential benefits. We analyze the agency problems that certain SPAC features address. SPAC IPO investors and deal sponsors have earned remarkably high annualized average returns, although we warn that recent deals are likely to disappoint. Public investors in the merged companies have earned very low market-adjusted returns on an equally weighted basis, although high redemptions on the worst deals have limited the amount of money that they lost.