We investigate whether short sellers and analysts differ in their use of information that is predictive of future returns. We find that short interest is significantly associated in the expected direction with all 11 variables examined. In contrast, analysts tend to positively recommend stocks with high growth, high accruals, and low book-to-market ratios, despite these variables having a negative association with future returns. We then investigate the profitability of using short interest in trading. We find abnormal returns (1.11 percent per month) from a zero-investment strategy that (1) shorts firms with highly favorable analyst recommendations (buy signal) but high short interest (sell signal), and (2) buys firms with highly unfavorable analyst recommendations (sell signal) but low short interest (buy signal). Short interest, therefore, appears to capture predictive information that can be used by investors in trading against analysts’ recommendations to increase returns.

Accounting researchers (and potentially others) generally select rather simple, lower-order, time-series models to develop proxies for earnings persistence. However, measures of persistence produced by such models are not related to characteristics of the firm's economic environment that are expected to influence earnings persistence. Using a sample of 162 calendar year-end New York Stock Exchange firms, we document the cross-sectional relations between a set of relatively constant, firm-specific, economic characteristics that are theoretical determinants of persistence and measures of earnings persistence derived from both lower-order and higher-order Autoregressive, Integrated, Moving-Average (ARIMA) models. When lower-order ARIMA models are used to generate measures of earnings persistence, the cross-sectional regression models measuring the association between persistence and economic determinants of persistence yield very low adjusted R2s. In sharp contrast, when differenced, higher-order ARIMA models are used to measure earnings persistence, adjusted R2s are in the 10–12 percent range. Moreover, independent variables such as capital intensity, barriers-to-entry, and product-type are all significant in the directions suggested by economic theory. Our results are consistent with Lipe and Kormendi (1994) who argue that higher-order ARIMA models do a better job of capturing the valuerelevance of current period earnings than lower-order models.

The annual proportion of U.S. public firms that reported a financial covenant violation fell roughly 70% between 1997 and 2019. To understand this trend, we develop an estimable model of covenant design that depends on the ability to differentiate between distressed and nondistressed borrowers and the relative costs associated with screening incorrectly. We find that the drop in violations is best explained by an increased willingness to forgo early detection of distressed borrowers in exchange for fewer inconsequential violations, which we attribute largely to a shift in the composition of public borrowers and partly to heightened investor sentiment during the 2010s.

Using exogenous liquidity windfalls from oil and natural gas shale discoveries, we demonstrate that bank branch networks help integrate U.S. lending markets. Banks exposed to shale booms enjoy liquidity inflows, which increase their capacity to originate and hold new loans. Exposed banks increase mortgage lending in nonboom counties, but only where they have branches and only for hard‐to‐securitize mortgages. Our findings suggest that contracting frictions limit the ability of arm's length finance to integrate credit markets fully. Branch networks continue to play an important role in financial integration, despite the development of securitization markets.

This paper provides a rational explanation for the apparent ability of managers to successfully time the maturity of their debt issues. We show that a structural break in excess bond returns during the early 1980s generates a spurious correlation between the fraction of long‐term debt in total debt issues and future excess bond returns. Contrary to Baker, Taliaferro, and Wurgler (2006) , we show that the presence of structural breaks can lead to nonsense regressions, whether or not there is any small sample bias. Tests using firm‐level data further confirm that managers are unable to time the debt market successfully.

Previous studies have found that the proportion of equity in total new debt and equity issues is negatively correlated with future equity market returns. Researchers have interpreted this finding as evidence that corporate managers are able to predict the systematic component of their stock returns and to issue equity when the market is overvalued. In this article we show that the predictive power of the share of equity in total new issues stems from pseudo‐market timing and not from any abnormal ability of managers to time the equity markets.

We document a striking positive stock price reaction to the announcement of corporate name changes to Internet‐related dotcom names. This “dotcom” effect produces cumulative abnormal returns on the order of 74 percent for the 10 days surrounding the announcement day. The effect does not appear to be transitory; there is no evidence of a postannouncement negative drift. The announcement day effect is also similar across all firms, regardless of the firm's level of involvement with the Internet. A mere association with the Internet seems enough to provide a firm with a large and permanent value increase.

Our examination of the cross‐section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time‐series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book‐to‐market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book‐to‐market results using COMPUS‐TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

Our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9% per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equal-weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker than that in Fama and French (1992a). We conjecture that book-to-market results using COMPUSTAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

The ratio of the yields on short‐term tax‐exempt and taxable bonds exhibits a sawtooth pattern that is consistent with the impacts of tax deferments from dates on which interest payments are received to dates on which the resulting tax payments are paid. The effect of the tax deferment at turns of calendar years does not differ appreciably from the effect at the turn of any other tax quarter. Investors with tax payment schedules that differ from that of the investor that is indifferent between investing in taxable and tax‐exempt bonds may benefit from tax‐related timing strategies for investing in these bonds. Issuers may benefit from tax‐related timing strategies for scheduling interest payments.