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338 results

Information Provision and Search Frictions: Evidence from the Taxi Industry in Singapore

Sumit Agarwal; Shih-Fen Cheng; Jussi Keppo; Long Wang; Yang Yang
The Review of Economics and Statistics 2025
Search frictions and misallocation are common in decentralized transportation markets. Using novel trip-level data of taxis in Singapore, this paper examines the impactof real-time demand information at airport terminals on search frictions. The in-formation reduces taxi supply misallocation, increasing deadheading speed by 16.3%and decreasing deadheading time by 10.77%, benefiting both passengers and drivers.It raises daily earnings by $3.70 USD and adds 6.2 minutes of operational time perairport-trip taxi. Spatial spillovers are primarily observed among drivers in adjacentdistricts. Taxis from the Budget Terminal and drivers with fewer prior airport pickups benefit more from this information.

The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance

C. S. Agnes Cheng; Henry He Huang; Yinghua Li; Jason Stanfield
The Accounting Review 2012 87(5), 1493-1526
ABSTRACT This paper examines the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate tax avoidance. We find that relative to matched control firms, businesses targeted by hedge fund activists exhibit lower tax avoidance levels prior to hedge fund intervention, but experience increases in tax avoidance after the intervention. Moreover, findings suggest that the increase in tax avoidance is greater when activists have a successful track record of implementing tax changes and possess tax interest or knowledge as indicated by their Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 13D filings. We also find that these greater tax savings do not appear to result from an increased use of high-risk and potentially illegal tax strategies, such as sheltering. Taken together, the results suggest that shareholder monitoring of firms, in the form of hedge fund activism, improves tax efficiency. JEL Classifications: G32; G34; H26. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text.

Windfall gains and stock market participation: Evidence from shopping receipt lottery

Tzu-Chang Forrest Cheng; Hsuan-Hua Huang; Tse-Chun Lin; Tzu-Ting Yang; Jian-Da Zhu
Journal of Banking & Finance 2025 172, 107378 open access
This paper utilizes receipt lotteries in Taiwan, along with comprehensive administrative data, to examine the effect of cash windfalls on stock market participation and portfolio diversification, which can help us understand whether wealth levels serve as the explanation for the limited participation and under-diversification puzzles in stock markets. The results indicate that each million TWD (approximately 33,000 USD) windfall gain from winning receipt lotteries increases the probability of stock market participation by 1.09 percentage points. This effect is primarily driven by individuals who were not participating in the stock market prior to winning. For existing participants, each million TWD windfall increases the total value of stocks by 142,552 TWD, attributed to both an increase in their number of shares and higher average prices of the stocks they hold. Additionally, we find that individuals do not significantly diversify their portfolios after winning the lottery, suggesting that wealth level is not the primary reason for under-diversification.

EDGAR Implementation, Unionization, and Strategic Disclosure

Daniel Aobdia; Lin Cheng; Qin Tan; Xuan Wu
The Accounting Review 2025 100(3), 1-34
ABSTRACT This study focuses on the effect of disclosure processing frictions in labor markets. We go back in time 30 years ago and examine whether firms facing strong organized labor strategically responded to the implementation of the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system, which substantially reduced labor unions’ information processing costs. Consistent with firms having incentives to maintain an information advantage over unions for bargaining purposes, we find that they reduce financial statement disaggregation, the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts, and the proportion of good news forecasts. Our study is the first to investigate the implications of information processing costs for labor markets and suggests that an SEC mandate intended to reduce disclosure processing costs for investors caused unintended strategic responses by firms facing proprietary cost of disclosures in other markets. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: M40; M41; J51; J52.

Ending at the Wrong Time: The Financial Reporting Consequences of a Uniform Fiscal Year-End

Zhe Li; Kangtao Ye; Cheng Zeng; Bo Zhang
The Accounting Review 2023 98(3), 367-396
ABSTRACT There is an ongoing debate over uniformity versus flexibility in accounting regulation. This study examines the financial reporting consequences of a rigid accounting rule in China under which the fiscal year-end is uniform for all companies. Using extensive interviews together with large-sample archival analyses, we find that “mismatched” firms—those whose mandated financial reporting cycles are not aligned with their business cycles—exhibit higher levels of absolute abnormal accruals than their nonmismatched counterparts. Further analyses suggest that the negative association between mismatching and financial reporting quality is mainly driven by unintentional estimation errors rather than intentional earnings manipulation. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M41; M48; K22.

CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism

Xia Chen; Qiang Cheng; Alvis K. Lo; Xin Wang
The Accounting Review 2015 90(5), 1871-1906
ABSTRACT How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms. JEL Classifications: G32; M40

Financial Reporting Quality of Chinese Reverse Merger Firms: The Reverse Merger Effect or the Weak Country Effect?

Kun-Chih Chen; Qiang Cheng; Ying Chou Lin; Yu-Chen Lin; Xing Xiao
The Accounting Review 2016 91(5), 1363-1390 open access
ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine why Chinese reverse merger (RM) firms have lower financial reporting quality than U.S. IPO firms. We find that the financial reporting quality of U.S. RM firms is similar to that of matched U.S. IPO firms, but Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than Chinese ADR firms. We also find that Chinese RM firms exhibit lower financial reporting quality than U.S. RM firms. These results indicate that the use of the RM process is associated with poor financial reporting quality only in firms from China, where legal enforcement and investor protection are weak. In addition, we find that compared with Chinese ADR firms, Chinese RM firms have weaker bonding incentives (as measured by CEO turnover-performance sensitivity) and poorer corporate governance. These factors, in turn, contribute to the lower financial reporting quality of Chinese RM firms. Overall, our results suggest that the less scrutinized RM process allows the Chinese firms with weak bonding incentives and poor governance to gain access to U.S. capital markets, resulting in poor financial reporting quality. JEL Classifications: G15; G24; G34; G38.

Nonstandard Errors

Albert J. Menkveld; Anna Dreber; Felix Holzmeister; Jürgen Huber; Magnus Johannesson; Michael Kirchler; SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß; Michael Razen; Utz Weitzel; DAVID ABAD-DÍAZ; Menachem Abudy; Tobias Adrian; Yacine Aït-Sahalia; Olivier Akmansoy; Jamie Alcock; Vitali Alexeev; Arash Aloosh; LIVIA AMATO; Diego Amaya; James J. Angel; ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN; AMADEUS BACH; EDWIN BAIDOO; GAETAN BAKALLI; LI BAO; Andrea Barbon; OKSANA BASHCHENKO; Parampreet Christopher Bindra; Geir Høidal Bjønnes; Jeffrey R. Black; Bernard S. Black; DIMITAR BOGOEV; SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA; Oleg Bondarenko; CHARLES S. BOS; Ciril Bosch-Rosa; ELIE BOURI; Christian T. Brownlees; ANNA CALAMIA; Viet Nga Cao; Gunther Capelle-Blancard; LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO; Massimiliano Caporin; Allen Carrion; TOLGA CASKURLU; Bidisha Chakrabarty; Jian Chen; Mikhail Chernov; WILLIAM CHEUNG; LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI; Tarun Chordia; SHEUNG-CHI CHOW; BENJAMIN CLAPHAM; Jean-Edouard Colliard; Carole Comerton-Forde; EDWARD CURRAN; THONG DAO; WALE DARE; Ryan J. Davies; RICCARDO DE BLASIS; GIANLUCA F. DE NARD; Fany Declerck; OLEG DEEV; Hans Degryse; SOLOMON Y. DEKU; CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE; Mathijs A. van Dijk; Chukwuma Dim; Thomas Dimpfl; YUN JIANG DONG; PHILIP A. DRUMMOND; Tom L. Dudda; TEODOR DUEVSKI; Ariadna Dumitrescu; Teodor Dyakov; Anne Haubo Dyhrberg; Michał Dzieliński; ASLI EKSI; Izidin El Kalak; Saskia ter Ellen; Nicolas Eugster; Martin D. D. Evans; Michael Farrell; ESTER FELEZ-VINAS; Gerardo Ferrara; EL MEHDI FERROUHI; Andrea Flori; JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY-JAIDEE; Sean Foley; Kingsley Y. L. Fong; Thierry Foucault; TATIANA FRANUS; Francesco A. Franzoni; Bart Frijns; MICHAEL FRÖMMEL; SERVANNA M. FU; Sascha Füllbrunn; BAOQING GAN; GE GAO; Thomas Gehrig; ROLAND GEMAYEL; DIRK GERRITSEN; Javier Gil-Bazo; Dudley Gilder; Lawrence R. Glosten; THOMAS GOMEZ; Arseny Gorbenko; Joachim Grammig; Vincent Grégoire; Ufuk Güçbilmez; Björn Hagströmer; JULIEN HAMBUCKERS; ERIK HAPNES; Jeffrey H. Harris; Lawrence Harris; SIMON HARTMANN; JEAN-BAPTISTE HASSE; Nikolaus Hautsch; XUE-ZHONG (TONY) HE; Davidson Heath; SIMON HEDIGER; Terrence Hendershott; Ann Marie Hibbert; Erik Hjalmarsson; Seth A. Hoelscher; Peter Hoffmann; Craig W. Holden; Alex R. Horenstein; Wenqian Huang; DA HUANG; Christophe Hurlin; KONRAD ILCZUK; ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO; Subramanian R. Iyer; Hossein Jahanshahloo; NAJI JALKH; Charles M. Jones; SIMON JURKATIS; Petri Jylhä; ANDREAS T. KAECK; GABRIEL KAISER; ARZÉ KARAM; Egle Karmaziene; BERNHARD KASSNER; Markku Kaustia; EKATERINA KAZAK; Fearghal Kearney; Vincent van Kervel; SAAD A. KHAN; MARTA K. KHOMYN; Tony Klein; OLGA KLEIN; Alexander Klos; Michael Koetter; Aleksey Kolokolov; Robert A. Korajczyk; Roman Kozhan; Jan P. Krahnen; PAUL KUHLE; Amy Kwan; QUENTIN LAJAUNIE; F. Y. Eric C. Lam; Marie Lambert; Hugues Langlois; JENS LAUSEN; Tobias Lauter; Markus Leippold; VLADIMIR LEVIN; YIJIE LI; Hui Li; CHEE YOONG LIEW; THOMAS LINDNER; Oliver Linton; JIACHENG LIU; Anqi Liu; Guillermo Llorente; Matthijs Lof; ARIEL LOHR; FRANCIS LONGSTAFF; Alejandro Lopez-Lira; Shawn Mankad; NICOLA MANO; ALEXIS MARCHAL; Charles Martineau; Francesco Mazzola; Debrah Meloso; MICHAEL G. MI; Roxana Mihet; Vijay Mohan; Sophie Moinas; David Moore; Liangyi Mu; Dmitriy Muravyev; Dermot Murphy; GABOR NESZVEDA; CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER; Ulf Nielsson; Mahendrarajah Nimalendran; Sven Nolte; LARS L. NORDEN; Peter O’Neill; Khaled Obaid; BERNT A. ØDEGAARD; Per Östberg; EMILIANO PAGNOTTA; Marcus Painter; Stefan Palan; IMON J. PALIT; Andreas Park; Roberto Pascual; Paolo Pasquariello; Ľuboš Pástor; VINAY PA℡; Andrew J. Patton; Neil D. Pearson; Loriana Pelizzon; MICHELE PELLI; Matthias Pelster; Christophe Pérignon; CAMERON PFIFFER; Richard Philip; TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL; PUNEET PRAKASH; OLIVER-ALEXANDER PRESS; TINA PRODROMOU; Marcel Prokopczuk; Talis Putnins; YA QIAN; GAURAV RAIZADA; David Rakowski; Angelo Ranaldo; Luca Regis; Stefan Reitz; Thomas Renault; REX W. RENJIE; Roberto Renò; Steven J. Riddiough; Kalle Rinne; PAUL RINTAMÄKI; Ryan Riordan; THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER; IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA; Dominik Roesch; LAVINIA ROGNONE; Brian Roseman; Ioanid Roşu; Saurabh Roy; NICOLAS RUDOLF; STEPHEN R. RUSH; Khaladdin Rzayev; ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK; Anthony Sanford; Harikumar Sankaran; Asani Sarkar; Lucio Sarno; Olivier Scaillet; STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI; KLAUS R. SCHENK-HOPPÉ; ANDREA SCHERTLER; MICHAEL SCHNEIDER; FLORIAN SCHROEDER; Norman Schürhoff; Philipp Schuster; MARCO A. SCHWARZ; Mark S. Seasholes; Norman J. Seeger; Or Shachar; Andriy Shkilko; JESSICA SHUI; MARIO SIKIC; Giorgia Simion; Lee A. Smales; Paul Söderlind; Elvira Sojli; Konstantin Sokolov; JANTJE SÖNKSEN; Laima Spokeviciute; Denitsa Stefanova; Marti G. Subrahmanyam; BARNABAS SZASZI; Oleksandr Talavera; Yuehua Tang; Nick Taylor; Wing Wah Tham; Erik Theissen; Julian Thimme; Ian Tonks; Hai Tran; Luca Trapin; Anders B. Trolle; M. ANDREEA VADUVA; Giorgio Valente; Robert A. Van Ness; Aurelio Vasquez; Thanos Verousis; Patrick Verwijmeren; ANDERS VILHELMSSON; Grigory Vilkov; Vladimir Vladimirov; SEBASTIAN VOGEL; Stefan Voigt; Wolf Wagner; THOMAS WALTHER; Patrick Weiss; Michel van der Wel; Ingrid M. Werner; P. Joakim Westerholm; Christian Westheide; HANS C. WIKA; Evert Wipplinger; Michael Wolf; Christian C. P. Wolff; LEONARD WOLK; WING-KEUNG WONG; Jan Wrampelmeyer; Zhen-Xing Wu; Shuo Xia; Dacheng Xiu; KE XU; CAIHONG XU; Pradeep K. Yadav; JOSÉ YAGÜE; Cheng Yan; Antti Yang; Woongsun Yoo; WENJIA YU; YIHE YU; Shihao Yu; Bart Z. Yueshen; Darya Yuferova; MARCIN ZAMOJSKI; Abalfazl Zareei; STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER; LU ZHANG; S. Sarah Zhang; Xiaoyu Zhang; LU ZHAO; Zhuo Zhong; Z. IVY ZHOU; Chen Zhou; XINGYU S. ZHU; Marius Zoican; REMCO ZWINKELS
Journal of Finance 2024 79(3), 2339-2390 open access
ABSTRACT In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.