Integrated GDP-Productivity Accounts by Michael J. Harper, Brent R. Moulton, Steven Rosenthal and David B. Wasshausen. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 74-79 of American Economic Review, May 2009

Technology Improves Learning in Large Principles of Economics Classes: Using Our WITS by Sheryl B. Ball, Catherine Eckel and Christian Rojas. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 442-446 of American Economic Review, May 2006

Toward National Well-Being Accounts by Daniel Kahneman, Alan B. Krueger, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz and Arthur Stone. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 429-434 of American Economic Review, May 2004

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999) . Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long‐term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long‐term price reversals but play little role in driving short‐term momentum.

Acquiring‐firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition announcements per dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001, whereas they lost $7 billion in all of the 1980s, or 1.6 cents per dollar spent. The 1998 to 2001 aggregate dollar loss of acquiring‐firm shareholders is so large because of a small number of acquisitions with negative synergy gains by firms with extremely high valuations. Without these acquisitions, the wealth of acquiring‐firm shareholders would have increased. Firms that make these acquisitions with large dollar losses perform poorly afterward.

We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed “watchdogs” can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes.

This paper develops a model of bond prices and yield spreads that incorporates the effect of both taxes and differences in default probabilities. The tax loss consequences of default are recognized. Traditionally, tax‐free (municipal) bond yields have been viewed as linearly related to taxable yields with a slope coefficient equal to one minus the tax rate and the intercept representing differences in default risk. While our model supports the linearity assumption, it implies that the slope and intercept are both functions of both the break‐even tax rate and the default probability(ies). Clientele effects among both municipal and taxable bonds are demonstrated. Finally, the implied marginal tax rates and the implied default probabilities are estimated for different categories of municipal bonds.

In this paper we extend the recent work on the choice of input mix under uncertainty. In particular, we demonstrate that the qualitative nature of the disturbance term, along with the decision sequence, is a crucial determinant of the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal input mix of a firm. Using general demand and production functions in conjunction with a mean-variance framework for financial valuation, we demonstrate the differential effects of systematic and non-systematic risk on the firm's choice of an optimal input mix. Consistent with earlier work in economics, this analysis demonstrates that uncertainty, regardless of the source, has important implications for the firm's choice of technology.

In this paper we extend the recent work on the choice of input mix under uncertainty.In particular, we demonstrate that the qualitative nature of the disturbance term, along with the decision sequence, is a crucial determinant of the overall effect of uncertainty on the optimal input mix of a firm.Using general demand and production functions in conjunction with a mean-variance framework for financial valuation, we demonstrate the differential effects of systematic and non-systematic risk on the firm's choice of an optimal input mix.Consistent with earlier work in economics, this analysis demonstrates that uncertainty, regardless of the source, has important implications for the firm's choice of technology.