This paper analyzes the optimal investment strategy for loss averse investors, assuming a complete market and general Ito processes for the asset prices. The loss-averse investor follows a partial portfolio insurance strategy. When the investor's planning horizon is short (less than 5 years), he or she considerably reduces the initial portfolio weight of stocks compared to an investor with smooth power utility. The empirical section of the paper estimates the level of loss aversion implied by historical U.S. stock market data, using a representative agent model. We find that loss aversion and risk aversion cannot be disentangled empirically.

Institutions and Democratic Invention in 19th-Century America: Evidence from "Great Inventors," 1790-1930 by Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 395-401 of American Economic Review, May 2004

This paper provides a case study of the effect of labor relations on product quality. We consider whether a long, contentious strike and the hiring of replacement workers at Bridgestone/Firestone’s Decatur, Illinois, plant in the mid‐1990s contributed to the production of defective tires. Using several independent data sources and looking before and after the strike and across plants, we find that labor strife at the Decatur plant closely coincided with lower product quality. Monthly data suggest that defects were particularly high around the time concessions were demanded and when large numbers of replacement workers and returning strikers worked side by side.

The question of whether individual judgment errors survive in market equilibrium is an issue that naturally lends itself to experimental analysis. Here, the Monty Hall problem is used to detect probability judgment errors both in a cohort of individuals and in a market setting. When all subjects in a cohort made probability judgment errors, market prices also reflected the error. However, competition among two bias‐free subjects was sufficient to drive prices to error‐free levels. Thus, heterogeneity in behavior can be an important factor in asset pricing, and further, it may take few bias‐free traders to make asset prices bias‐free.

We compare forecasts of the realized volatility of the pound, mark and yen exchange rates against the dollar, calculated from intraday rates, over horizons ranging from one day to three months. Our forecasts are obtained from a short memory ARMA model, a long memory ARFIMA model, a GARCH model and option implied volatilities. We find intraday rates provide the most accurate forecasts for the one-day and one-week forecast horizons while implied volatilities are at least as accurate as the historical forecasts for the one-month and three-month horizons. The superior accuracy of the historical forecasts, relative to implied volatilities, comes from the use of high frequency returns, and not from a long memory specification. We find significant incremental information in historical forecasts, beyond the implied volatility information, for forecast horizons up to one week.

This paper examines the relation between net buying pressure and the shape of the implied volatility function (IVF) for index and individual stock options. We find that changes in implied volatility are directly related to net buying pressure from public order flow. We also find that changes in implied volatility of S&P 500 options are most strongly affected by buying pressure for index puts, while changes in implied volatility of stock options are dominated by call option demand. Simulated delta‐neutral option‐writing trading strategies generate abnormal returns that match the deviations of the IVFs above realized historical return volatilities.

Using a common agency model, we investigate the interactions of a utility-maximizing auditor (the agent) with managers (who hire the agent for nonaudit services) and shareholders (who hire the agent for conducting an audit) of the same firm. In a single-period model, managerial discretion over consulting and other nonaudit service fees can influence auditors to issue unqualified opinions on reports that are more favorable than warranted. Shareholders, represented by an audit committee, cannot recover truth-telling. Removing the current restriction on contingent audit fees allows audit committees to offset the incentives provided by management and instead provide the auditor incentives to accept only truthful reports. Extending the model to a multiperiod framework, the audit committee can motivate truth-telling by making retention decisions that are contingent on outcome. Auditors will consider the impact of overreporting on their ability to generate future audit fees from the same client.

We analyse the entry decisions of competing firms in a two-player stochastic real option game, when rivals earn different but correlated uncertain profitabilities from operating. In the presence of entry costs, decision thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing in the correlation between competing firms. A measure of the expected time of each firm being active in the market and the probability of both rivals entering within a finite time are explicitly calculated. The former (latter) is found to decrease (increase) with the volatility of relative firm profitabilities implying that market leadership is shorter-lived the more uncertain the industry environment. In an application of the model to the aircraft industry, we find that Boeing’s optimal response to Airbus’ launch of the A380 super carrier is to accommodate entry and supplement its current product line, as opposed to the riskier alternative of committing to the development of a corresponding super jumbo.

have provided us with a wealth of information about the newest products of U.S. Ph.D. programs. Among the notable facts are the continuing decline in the share of U.S. natives among these new graduates, their continued success at landing academic and other professional jobs, and their high level of professional fulfillment, in terms of both job satisfaction and outcomes measuring up to expectations. There are also a variety of intriguing results. For example, (from their table 5) students completing the top Ph.D. programs were younger, less likely to be married, and more likely to be foreign than those in the overall sample. Perhaps most disturbing, (from their table 6) median starting full-time academic salaries were lowest in public economics, a result that cannot be accounted for in salary regressions with other covariates. This clearly is an inversion of the appropriate ranking. In my comments, I will focus on two selected aspects of Ph.D. programs and the Ph.D. job market.

We propose a model of addiction based on three premises: (i) use among addicts is frequently a mistake; (ii) experience sensitizes an individual to environmental cues that trigger mistaken usage; (iii) addicts understand and manage their susceptibilities. We argue that these premises find support in evidence from psychology, neuroscience, and clinical practice. The model is tractable and generates a plausible mapping between behavior and the characteristics of the user, substance, and environment. It accounts for a number of important patterns associated with addiction, gives rise to a clear welfare standard, and has novel implications for policy.