Medicare Part D relies upon drug plan competition. Plans have enormous scope to design benefits and to set premiums, but they may not charge differential premiums based on risk. We use the formulary and benefit design of all Medicare prescription drug plans and pharmacy claims data to construct a simulation model of out-of-pocket drug spending. We use this simulation model to examine individual incentives in Medicare Part D for adverse selection. We find that high drug users have much stronger incentives to enroll in generous plans than do low users, thus there is significant scope for adverse selection.

This paper establishes a basic framework to study three different variants of Participating Mortgages (PMs). We obtain results for Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs), Shared Income Mortgages (SIMs) and Shared Equity Mortgages (SEMs) in closed-form. We illustrate our findings with examples that show PMs are also attractive in an environment where prepayment can occur. Finally we conclude with the public policy implications of employing PMs as workout loans, especially post sub-prime crisis. We argue that by facilitating better risk sharing, PMs offer a means to enhance the efficiency and resiliency of the financial system.

This paper examines the intersection between two aspects of climate policy design. The first is the point of regulation: should it be placed on pollution sources, carbon-rich inputs, or consumers? The second aspect concerns the external effects of a local climate policy. Leakage occurs when partial regulation results in an increase in emissions in unregulated parts of the economy. Our model demonstrates how directly regulating polluters can increase foreign emissions while indirect regulation (either upstream or downstream of the pollution source) will decrease foreign emissions. The net effect on combined domestic and foreign emissions will depend on market elasticities.

We use a laboratory experiment to examine whether corporate giving to charity motivates employees. We find a strong altruism effect. Even when employees cannot be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions to employers significantly increase as the level of corporate giving increases. We also find a signaling effect. When employees can be remunerated for their actions, employee contributions initially increase as the level of corporate giving increases. Thus, even though corporate giving to charity decreases the amount that can be shared between employees and employers, employees behave as if more charitable employers will return proportionally more to employees. It is not until relatively high levels of corporate giving that employee contributions to employers eventually decrease. Collectively, our results suggest that corporate giving is an effective lever for motivating employee effort and contributions to organizational endeavors. Corporate giving can increase the efficacy of implicit (relational) contracts and reduce the need for formal accounting-based reward systems and controls.

A risk‐averse manager's overconfidence makes him less conservative. As a result, it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects. When compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects. Still, too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk.

We examine changes in subjective probabilities regarding retirement between the 2006 and 2008 waves of the Health and Retirement Study. Using a first-difference approach to eliminate individual heterogeneity, we find that the steep drop in asset prices in 2008 increased the reported probability of working at age 62 during the Great Recession. Increasing unemployment at least partly attenuated this effect, but subjective probabilities of working did not respond to changes in housing markets. Older workers' probabilities of working were more sensitive to fluctuations in the stock market, but less responsive to changes in labor market conditions.

We analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase insurance premiums (enough to transfer 13.2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers—approximately $34.4 billion in 1997); and increase insurance turnover (by 64 percent for the average policy). This rent transfer harms consumers and—when combined with heightened turnover—reduces incentives to invest in future health. We also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search friction induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts.

This paper presents a list of the top 20 articles published in the American Economic Review during its first 100 years. This list was assembled in honor of the AER's one-hundredth anniversary by a group of distinguished economists at the request of AER's editor. A brief description accompanies the citations of each article.