We examine the effect of foreign institutional investors on firm innovation. Using firm-level data across 26 non-U.S. economies between 2000 and 2010, we show that foreign institutional ownership has a positive, causal effect on firm innovation. We further explore three possible underlying mechanisms through which foreign institutions affect firm innovation: Foreign institutions act as active monitors, provide insurance for firm managers against innovation failures, and promote knowledge spillovers from high-innovation economies. Our article sheds new light on the real effects of foreign institutions on firm innovation.

We show that global political uncertainty, measured by the U.S. election cycle, on average, leads to a fall in equity returns in fifty non-U.S. countries. At the same time, market volatilities rise, local currencies depreciate, and sovereign bond returns increase. The effect of global political uncertainty on equity prices increases with the level of uncertainty in U.S. election outcomes and a country’s equity market exposure to foreign investors, but does not vary with the country’s international trade exposure. These findings suggest that global political uncertainty increases investors’ aggregate risk aversion, leading to a flight to safety.

This article proposes an innovative method to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness in consumer credit markets by conducting machine-learning-based analyses on real-time video information that records borrowers’ behavior during the loan application process. We find that the extent of borrowers’ micro-facial expressions of happiness is negatively associated with loan delinquency likelihood, while the degree of fear expressions is positively associated with delinquency risk. These results are consistent with two economic channels relating to the adequacy and uncertainty of borrowers’ future income, drawn from the extant psychology and economics literature. Our study provides important practical implications for fintech lenders and policymakers.

Motivated by ongoing debates on investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) and its documented decline and disappearance in the U.S., we investigate the determinants of ICFS. Using firm-level data across 41 countries for the 1993–2013 period, we document an important role of asset tangibility in explaining the patterns in ICFS. Asset tangibility affects ICFS through two channels: investment intensity and cash flow persistence. As the share of tangible capital, investment and cash flow persistence has fallen in developed economies, ICFS has declined. In contrast, as developing economies operate with more tangible capital, have higher investment rates and more persistent cash flows, their ICFS is more stable. The results support our explanation of ICFS as a reflection of capital (investment) intensity and income predictability, rather than a measure of financial constraints.

This paper investigates the impact of international political risk on government bond yields in 34 debtor countries using a comprehensive database of 109 international political crises from 1988 through 2007. After employing the total number of international political crises as a proxy for political risk and controlling for country-specific economic conditions, we establish a positive and significant link between international political risk and government bond yields. This is consistent with global bond investors demanding higher returns at times of high political uncertainty. In addition, we show that international political risk has a reduced adverse effect on bond prices when the debtor country has a stable political system and strong investor protection.

We examine the impact of the media on firms’ leverage adjustments. Using a comprehensive sample of global news across 33 countries, we find that greater news coverage and more positive news sentiment are associated with greater leverage adjustment speeds. This finding is consistent with the argument that media coverage and content help lower the cost of firms’ adjustment toward target leverage. We further find evidence supporting two mechanisms through which the news media affects leverage adjustments: information dissemination and monitoring. Overall, our results are consistent with the dynamic trade-off theory of capital structure.

Using the Regulation SHO program as a quasi-experiment, we document that the threat of short selling has a negative effect on the volume of opportunistic insider selling and a positive effect on its profitability for each transaction. These effects are stronger among firms with higher litigation risk, greater media coverage, and executives who have more of their firms' stock-related holdings. We further find robust evidence when we extend the analyses to short selling deregulations in the Chinese and Hong Kong stock exchanges. Overall, our findings suggest that short sellers play a disciplinary role in opportunistic insider selling. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.