When a homeowner uses an agent to sell his property, he may have less information than his agent and be disadvantaged in price setting and negotiating. This study examines whether the percentage commission structure in real estate brokerage creates agency problems. We investigate whether agents are able to use their information advantage to either sell their own property faster or for a higher price than their clients’ properties. The empirical results confirm our theoretical predictions of agency problems, as we find that agent-owned houses sell no faster than client-owned houses, but they do sell at a price premium of approximately 4.5%.

We develop a simple model of international outsourcing and apply it to processing trade in China. Export processing involves a foreign firm contracting with a Chinese factory manager to assemble intermediate inputs into a final product. Whether the same or different parties should have ownership of the processing factory and control over input purchases depends on parameters of the model, which we estimate. We find that multinational firms engaged in export processing in China tend to split factory ownership and input control with local managers: the most common outcome is to have foreign factory ownership but Chinese control over input purchases. Consistent with our model, this pattern is especially prevalent in the southern coastal provinces, where export markets are thickest and contracting costs are lowest.

This paper studies large private banks in 21 major emerging markets in the 1990s. It first demonstrates that bank failures are very common in these countries: about 25 percent of these banks failed during the seven-year sample period. The paper also shows that political concerns play a significant role in delaying government interventions to failing banks. Failing banks are much less likely to be taken over by the government or to lose their licenses before elections than after. This result is robust to controlling for macroeconomic and bank-specific factors, a new party in power, early elections, outstanding loans from the IMF, as well as country-specific, time-independent factors. This finding implies that much of the within-country clustering in emerging market bank failures is directly due to political concerns.

We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder–bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.

We investigate a consumption-based present-value relation that is a function of future dividend growth and find that changing forecasts of dividend growth are an important feature of the post-war U.S. stock market, despite the failure of the dividend–price ratio to uncover such variation. In addition, dividend forecasts are found to covary with changing forecasts of excess stock returns over business cycle frequencies. This covariation is important because positively correlated fluctuations in expected dividend growth and expected returns have offsetting effects on the log dividend–price ratio. The market risk premium and expected dividend growth thus vary considerably more than is apparent using the log divided–price ratio alone as a predictive variable.

To learn about investors' information processing, we examine the issuances of trust preferred stock, a leverage-neutral hybrid security. Specific benefits of trust preferred stock issuance have become focal points for issuers. These focal benefits include tax and financial distress avoidance, for example. We find these benefits are associated with short-run stock price misreactions. For those issuers that do not have a focal issuance benefit, mean short-run abnormal returns tend to be negative but long-run abnormal returns tend to be positive. Unanticipated changes in long-run profit opportunities, not short-run operating profits, appear to be the key to the misreaction.

We propose the parametric Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Regression (DSUR) estimator for simultaneous estimation of multiple cointegrating regressions. DSUR is efficient when the equilibrium errors are correlated across equations and is applicable for panel cointegration estimation in environments where the cross section is small relative to the available time series. We study the asymptotic and small sample properties of the DSUR estimator for both heterogeneous and homogeneous cointegrating vectors. We then apply the method to analyse two long-standing problems in international economics. Our first application revisits the estimation of long-run correlations between national investment and national saving. Our second application revisits the question of whether the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate.

Lockups are agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue. Brav and Gompers (2003) suggest that lockups are a bonding solution to a moral hazard problem and not a signaling solution to an adverse selection problem. We challenge this conclusion theoretically and empirically. In our model, insiders of good firms signal by putting and keeping (locking up) their money where their mouths are. Our model yields two comparative statics: lockups should be shorter when a firm is i) more transparent and/or ii) more risky. Using a sample of 4,013 initial public offerings and 3,279 seasoned equity offerings between 1988 and 1999, we find empirical support for our theoretical predictions.

This paper analyzes the conditions under which consistent estimation can be achieved in instrumental variables (IV) regression when the available instruments are weak and the number of instruments, Kn, goes to infinity with the sample size. We show that consistent estimation depends importantly on the strength of the instruments as measured by rn, the rate of growth of the so-called concentration parameter, and also on Kn. In particular, when Kn→∞, the concentration parameter can grow, even if each individual instrument is only weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables, and consistency of certain estimators can be established under weaker conditions than have previously been assumed in the literature. Hence, the use of many weak instruments may actually improve the performance of certain point estimators. More specifically, we find that the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator and the bias-corrected two-stage least squares (B2SLS) estimator are consistent when , while the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator is consistent only if Kn/rn→0 as n→∞. These consistency results suggest that LIML and B2SLS are more robust to instrument weakness than 2SLS.

Modigliani and Cohn hypothesize that the stock market suffers from money illusion, discounting real cash flows at nominal discount rates. While previous research has focused on the pricing of the aggregate stock market relative to Treasury bills, the money-illusion hypothesis also has implications for the pricing of risky stocks relative to safe stocks. Simultaneously examining the pricing of Treasury bills, safe stocks, and risky stocks allows us to distinguish money illusion from any change in the attitudes of investors toward risk. Our empirical results support the hypothesis that the stock market suffers from money illusion.