The existing literature typically does not differentiate between security returns and the returns of investors in these securities. This study clarifies that investor and security returns differ because of the timing and magnitude of investor capital flows into and out of these securities. The empirical results indicate that actual investor returns are systematically lower than buy-and-hold returns for nearly all major international stock markets. These results imply that the historical equity premium and the cost of equity capital are likely lower than previously thought.

This article studies the impact of modeling time-varying covariances/correlations of hedge fund returns in terms of hedge fund portfolio construction and risk measurement. We use a variety of static and dynamic covariance/correlation prediction models and compare the optimized portfolios’ out-of-sample performance. We find that dynamic covariance/correlation models construct portfolios with lower risk and higher out-of-sample risk-adjusted realized return. The tail-risk of the constructed portfolios is also lower. Using a mean-conditional-value-at-risk framework we show that dynamic covariance/correlation models are also successful in constructing portfolios with minimum tail-risk.

We examine Enron's collapse to provide insights as to the efficacy of recent governance reforms. In doing so, we explore two main issues. First, if recently mandated governance changes had been in place earlier, would they have constrained actions by Enron's management? Second, and more generally, which of the recent governance changes might act to constrain governance failures going forward? Although many aspects of corporate governance failed at Enron, the firm's viability ultimately rested on an inherently risky business strategy, a strategy that the board and others apparently failed to understand. However, it is not apparent that increasing board independence would have changed Enron's strategic direction, or prevented the firm's collapse. From this perspective, many recent reforms, including those mandating specific board structures likely move firms away from their optimal governance structure and are tantamount to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. We assert that, ceteris paribus, stronger internal controls coupled with reduced potential for conflicts of interest on the part of the external auditor might have constrained management's ability to hide the firm's true financial condition and are likely to constrain aspects of fraudulent behavior going forward.

We study the effects of antitrust policy in industries with continual innovation. Antitrust policies that restrict incumbent behavior toward new entrants may have conflicting effects on innovation incentives, raising the profits of new entrants, but lowering those of continuing incumbents. We show that the direction of the net effect can be determined by analyzing shifts in innovation benefit and supply, holding the innovation rate fixed. We apply this framework to analyze several specific antitrust policies. We also show that, in some cases, the tension does not arise, and policies that protect entrants necessarily raise the rate of innovation.

We examine the importance of agency considerations for the mix of salary and performance-based compensation in member-owned medical practices. Performance-based pay increases with the informativeness of clinical productivity measures, and declines with greater reimbursement from capitation contracts. Inexperienced physicians receive more compensation from salary, but compensation mix does not change as physicians near retirement. Larger practices and practices using outside management companies place more weight on performance-based compensation. However, when more physicians in the group practice the same specialty, less emphasis is placed on performance-based compensation. Finally, the presence of an executive partner has no influence on compensation mix.

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.

This paper exploits a new source of variation in Head Start funding to identify the program's effects on health and schooling. In 1965 the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) provided technical assistance to the 300 poorest counties to develop Head Start proposals. The result was a large and lasting discontinuity in Head Start funding rates at the OEO cutoff for grant-writing assistance. We find evidence of a large drop at the OEO cutoff in mortality rates for children from causes that could be affected by Head Start, as well as suggestive evidence for a positive effect on educational attainment.