I discuss changes to bank supervision and regulation since the financial crisis. Microprudential supervision promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, while macroprudential supervision focuses on emerging risks to financial system stability. I highlight tools for implementing this macroprudential approach to promoting financial stability, and discuss the interactions and proper relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. While macroprudential tools should be the first line of defense against emerging financial imbalances, in cases where those tools proved to be inadequate to limit risks to financial stability, monetary policy should be considered as a possible defense.

This paper introduces two methods of hiding loan losses and analyzes how they affect a bank's loan interest income, payments on deposits, liquidity and moral hazard. The analysis reveals that a hiding method represents a Ponzi scheme. Contrary to classic theory, e.g. Diamond (1984), moral hazard may arise even though a bank's loan portfolio is diversified. Alternative instruments to eliminate hiding are investigated. Under specific circumstances, a Ponzi scheme may provide a socially optimal method to create liquidity and prevent a failure of a solvent but illiquid bank.

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.

Basel II attempts to eliminate incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage and align capital regulation with best practices in credit risk management. Despite the imposition of very heavy compliance costs, it is unlikely to succeed in achieving either goal. This paper describes an alternative approach, based on mandatory issues of subordinated debt, which makes use of market discipline to achieve these goals at much lower cost.

We develop a model in which individual and institutional reputation concerns conflict with one another to study why investment bank reputation concerns may have diminished in recent years. Unproven but talented bankers have incentive to signal their ability through actions that may or may not best serve their clients. In the spirit of Kreps (1990), we treat the bank as a hierarchical firm whose only asset is its institutional reputation for curbing behavior that is suboptimal for the client. The conflict between individual and institutional reputation concerns is more likely to resolve in favor of institutional reputation when firms recruit only the most talented people, and less so when unique ability is especially valuable. We discuss how technological change has contributed to a “star” culture that is unfavorable toward preservation of institutional reputation.

We investigate an asset pricing model with preferences cycling between high risk aversion and low EIS in fall/winter and the reverse in spring/summer. Calibrating to consumption data and allowing plausible preference parameter values, we produce returns that match observed equity and Treasury returns across the seasons: risky returns are higher and risk-free returns are lower or stable in fall/winter, and they reverse in spring/summer. Further, risky returns vary more than risk-free returns. A novel finding is that both EIS and risk aversion must vary seasonally to match observed returns. Further, the degree of necessary seasonal change in EIS is small.

We develop a model in which it is predicted that more resources will be devoted to safety in a workers' compensation system with experience-rated premiums than in one with flat-rated premiums. We test this model by observing the effect on fatality rates of the move from flat rating to experience rating in the forestry and construction industries of Ontario, Canada. The evidence provides strong confirmation of the theory.

We use party-identifying language—like “liberal media” and “MAGA”—to identify Republican users on the investor social platform StockTwits. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that partisan Republicans remain relatively unfazed in their beliefs about equities during the COVID-19 pandemic, while other users become considerably more pessimistic. In cross-sectional tests, we find Republicans become relatively more optimistic about stocks that suffered the most during the COVID-19 crisis, but more pessimistic about Chinese stocks. Finally, stocks with the greatest partisan disagreement on StockTwits have significantly more trading in the broader market, explaining 28% of the increase in stock turnover during the pandemic.

We construct a simple measure of the aggregate illiquidity of hedge fund portfolios, based on the cross-sectional average first-order autocorrelation coefficient of hedge fund returns, and show that it has strong and robust in- and out-of-sample forecasting power for 72 portfolios of international equities, U.S. corporate bonds, and currencies over the 1994 to 2013 period. The forecasting ability of hedge fund illiquidity for asset returns is in most cases greater than, and provides independent information relative to, well-known predictive variables. We rationalize these findings using a simple equilibrium model, in which hedge funds provide liquidity in asset markets.

Donald Trump’s 2016 election and his nomination of climate skeptic Scott Pruitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations about U.S. policy toward climate change. Joseph Biden’s 2020 election shifted them dramatically upward. We study firms’ stock-price movements in reaction to these changes. As expected, the 2016 election boosted carbon-intensive firms. Surprisingly, firms with climate-responsible strategies also gained, especially those firms held by long-run investors. Such investors appear to have bet on a “boomerang” in climate policy. Harbingers of a boomerang appeared during Trump’s term. The 2020 election marked its arrival.