We apply the concept of carry, which has been studied almost exclusively in currency markets, to any asset. A security’s expected return is decomposed into its “carry,” an ex-ante and model-free characteristic, and its expected price appreciation. Carry predicts returns cross-sectionally and in time series for a host of different asset classes, including global equities, global bonds, commodities, US Treasuries, credit, and options. Carry is not explained by known predictors of returns from these asset classes, and it captures many of these predictors, providing a unifying framework for return predictability. We reject a generalized version of Uncovered Interest Parity and the Expectations Hypothesis in favor of models with varying risk premia, in which carry strategies are commonly exposed to global recession, liquidity, and volatility risks, though none fully explains carry’s premium.

This paper explores the dynamics of unsecured credit supply over the recent credit cycle and around the passage of the CARD Act. We examine a unique data set of over 200,000 credit card mail solicitations to a representative sample of households and introduce credit card offers as a direct, informative measure of supply of such credit. Contrasting personal credit card offer dynamics before and after the passage of the CARD Act with those of personal loans, auto loans, and corporate credit cards, we find that lenders reduced credit supply of personal credit cards to nonprime borrowers in response to the CARD Act. Our analysis highlights the importance of separately examining supply and demand responses to assess the unintended consequences of regulation. Received January 30, 2016; editorial decision August 9, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

This paper explores the dynamics of unsecured credit supply over the recent credit cycle and around the passage of the CARD Act. We examine a unique data set of over 200,000 credit card mail solicitations to a representative sample of households and introduce credit card offers as a direct, informative measure of supply of such credit. Contrasting personal credit card offer dynamics before and after the passage of the CARD Act with those of personal loans, auto loans, and corporate credit cards, we find that lenders reduced credit supply of personal credit cards to nonprime borrowers in response to the CARD Act. Our analysis highlights the importance of separately examining supply and demand responses to assess the unintended consequences of regulation.

We study the effect of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) on innovation. To establish causality, we use a regression discontinuity approach that relies on locally exogenous variation generated by shareholder proposal votes. We find a positive, causal effect of ATPs on innovation. This positive effect is more pronounced in firms that are subject to a larger degree of information asymmetry and operate in more competitive product markets. The evidence suggests that ATPs help nurture innovation by insulating managers from short-term pressures arising from equity markets. Finally, the number of ATPs contributes positively to firm value for firms involved in intensive innovation activities.

We examine career outcomes of CEOs subsequent to turnover. CEOs often resurface after turnover, but they secure positions that are inferior to their prior posts. Success in the retread market is unrelated to prior employer performance and board composition. CEOs who were particularly attached to their prior employer tend to have the poorest subsequent job prospects. These results suggest a generally efficient CEO turnover process in which firms dismiss CEOs of low ability. As CEOs acquire specific human capital over time, their outside options and bargaining power appear to diminish, offering a potential explanation for the specialist CEO compensation discount.

The authors have been editors of the Journal of Corporate Finance for nineteen years and are now stepping down. Here we offer some observations from our years as editors of the Journal. We hope they are useful to the new editors, the publisher, referees and authors. Thank you to all those who helped us in our task as editors.

We use corporate jet flight patterns to identify private meetings with investors that are ex ante unobservable to non-participants. Using approximately 400,000 flights, we proxy for private meetings with “roadshows,” defined as three-day windows that include flights to money centers and to non-money centers in which the firm has high institutional ownership. Roadshows exhibit greater abnormal stock reactions, analyst forecast activity, and absolute changes in local institutional ownership than other flight activity. We also find positive trading gains in firms with more complex information and infrequent private meetings, suggesting that roadshows provide participating investors an advantage over non-participating investors.

The usage of performance-vesting (p-v) equity awards to top executives in large U.S. companies has grown from 20 to 70 percent from 1998 to 2012. We measure the effects of p-v provisions on value, delta, and vega of equity-based compensation. We find large differences in the value of p-v awards reported in company disclosures versus economic value. We also find that equity-based grants continue to convey significant compensation convexity (vega) after ASC 718 (2005) and that, counter to recent claims in the literature, our analysis empirically reaffirms the presence of a causal relation between compensation convexity (vega) and firm risk.

We exploit a 2013 Delaware law that reduces the shareholder support threshold for two-step tender offers to investigate the impact of differing levels of shareholder support on deal structures and outcomes. After the legal change, Delaware acquisitions, as opposed to other states, are more likely to be completed via tender offer, and Delaware targets collectively receive greater acquisition premiums and returns relative to firms incorporated in other states. Our results caution that supermajority shareholder approval thresholds can increase the risk of shareholder holdup and have little (if any) effect on managerial self-dealing.