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Control-ownership wedge and investment sensitivity to stock price

Journal of Banking & Finance 2011 35(11), 2856-2867
This study examines whether insiders’ incentives for private control benefits affect investment sensitivity to stock price. While Chen et al. (2007) link stock price informativeness to firms’ learning from the stock market, we offer an alternative agency-cost based explanation. Using a total of 2822 firms from 22 countries in East Asia and Western Europe, we document a strong negative association between control-ownership wedge and investment-q sensitivity, suggesting that insiders’ incentives for private control benefit reduce their propensity to listen to the market. Furthermore, the negative impact of wedge on investment-q sensitivity is primarily driven by sub-optimal investments. Overall, we provide evidence that agency problem is an important factor that determines the learning from the stock market in capital allocation.

Seeing is believing? Executives' facial trustworthiness, auditor tenure, and audit fees

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2020 69(1), 101260
Psychology and neuroscience studies document that facial trustworthiness perceptions may affect observers' decision-making process. Our study examines whether auditors' perceptions of client executives' facial trustworthiness are associated with their audit fee decisions. We employ a machine-learning-based face-detection algorithm to measure executives' facial trustworthiness. We find that auditors charge 5.6% less audit fee to firms with trustworthy-looking CFOs than to those with untrustworthy-looking CFOs in initial audit engagements. Auditor tenure weakens the negative association between CFOs' facial trustworthiness and audit fee. Further evidence shows that CFO's facial trustworthiness is associated with neither financial reporting quality nor litigation risk.

Special purpose entities and bank loan contracting

Journal of Banking & Finance 2017 74, 133-152
In this study, we show that a firm's use of special purpose entities (SPEs) is associated with unfavorable loan contract terms, including higher loan rates, collateral requirements, and restrictive covenants. Further analyses suggest that the association between the use of SPEs and unfavorable loan contract terms is primarily due to the increase in the information risk faced by lenders, as firm managers can easily use SPEs to manipulate earnings and hide losses. Specifically, we find that the use of SPEs has a more pronounced effect on increasing the cost of loans and causing more stringent non-price loan terms when managers have a stronger incentive to manipulate earnings and when banks have less knowledge about the SPE sponsor firms due to the lack of prior lending relationship. In addition, we find that the use of SPEs is associated with a greater likelihood of accounting restatements and greater information asymmetry between inside managers and outside capital suppliers.

Earnings performance of major customers and bank loan contracting with suppliers

Journal of Banking & Finance 2015 59, 384-398
Using a sample of 3725 loan facility–years for supplier firms that have financial data on their major customers during the period 1995–2011, this study investigates whether the earnings performance of major customers has effect on the price and nonprice terms of loans to the supplier firms. We find that various contracting terms are more favorable for loans to supplier firms whose major customers have higher return on assets (ROA). More importantly, we find that the effect of major customers’ earning performance on loan contracting terms is weaker for the borrowers with prior loan relationships with banks, while it is stronger for the borrowers that are highly dependent on their major customers. Our results suggest that banks take into account major customers’ earnings performance when contracting with their supplier firms, and the informativeness of customer earnings varies with the nature and strength of the customer–supplier relationships.

Audit Pricing, Legal Liability Regimes, and Big 4 Premiums: Theory and Cross‐country Evidence*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2008 25(1), 55-99
In this paper, we first develop a model in which national legal environments play a crucial role in determining auditor effort and audit fees. Our model predicts that: (1) audit fees increase monotonically with the strength or strictness of a country’s legal liability regime; (2) given a legal liability regime, Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees than non-Big 4 auditors; and (3) the Big 4 fee premium decreases as a country’s legal regime shifts from a weak to a strong regime. We then test the model’s predictions using a large sample of audit clients from 15 countries with different legal regimes where audit fee data are publicly available. The results of our cross-country regressions strongly support the above three predictions, and are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks. Furthermore, we find that the effects of a legal regime on audit pricing and the Big 4 premium are more salient for the small client segment than for the large client segment. Overall, our regression results indicate that a country’s legal environment plays an important role in determining both audit fees and the fee spread between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.

Analyst Coverage and Expected Crash Risk: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage

The Accounting Review 2019 94(4), 345-364
Using brokerage mergers and closures as two sources of exogenous shock to analyst coverage, this study explores the causal effect of analyst coverage on ex ante expected crash risk as captured by the options implied volatility smirk. We find a significant increase in a firm's ex ante expected crash risk subsequent to an exogenous drop in analyst coverage; this positive effect is stronger for firms initially receiving less coverage. Further, we find analysts' ability matters to investors' assessment of future crash risk. Specifically, we find the impact is more pronounced for the coverage terminations of analysts with more firm-specific or general experience, with greater access to resources, or whose prior forecasts are more accurate than those of their peers. Overall, our results suggest that investors in the options market do recognize analysts as important information intermediaries and monitors and, thus, that analyst coverage influences the underlying stock's expected crash risk.

Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures

The Accounting Review 2011 86(4), 1157-1188 open access
Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.