ABSTRACT This study examines whether auditors can effectively use nonfinancial measures (NFMs) to assess the reasonableness of financial performance and, thereby, help detect financial statement fraud (hereafter, fraud). If auditors or other interested parties (e.g., directors, lenders, investors, or regulators) can identify NFMs (e.g., facilities growth) that are correlated with financial measures (e.g., revenue growth), inconsistent patterns between the NFMs and financial measures can be used to detect firms with high fraud risk. We find that the difference between financial and nonfinancial performance is significantly greater for firms that committed fraud than for their nonfraud competitors. We also find that this difference is a significant fraud indicator when included in a model containing variables that have previously been linked to the likelihood of fraud. Overall, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that NFMs can be effectively used to assess fraud risk.

Relatively few studies have examined the audit committee oversight process--the activities that link audit committee inputs and financial reporting outcomes. To study this process, we conducted extensive interviews with 42 U.S. public company audit committee members. We explore six audit committee process areas, offer insights into the state of audit committee processes in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) environment, and consider our results in light of agency theory and institutional theory; We find that many audit committee members strive to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees, but within each of the six process areas we find evidence of both substantive monitoring and ceremonial action, such that neither agency theory nor institutional theory fully explains our results. We also find that many responses vary with personal and company characteristics, with particularly notable differences related to audit committee members' accounting expertise and time of appointment to the audit committee (pre-SOX versus post-SOX). We discuss implications and directions for future research and theory development.

We examine the short-term price reaction of 424 UK stocks to large one-day price changes. Using the GJR-GARCH(1,1), we find no statistical difference amongst the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the Single Index, the Fama–French and the Carhart–Fama–French models. Shocks ⩾5% are followed by a significant one-day CAR of 1% for all the models. Whilst shocks ⩽−5% are followed by a significant one-day CAR of −0.43% for the Single Index, the CARs are around −0.34% for the other two models. Positive shocks of all sizes and negative shocks ⩽−5% are followed by return continuations, whilst the market is efficient following larger negative shocks. The price reaction to shocks is unaffected when we estimate the CARs using the conditional covariances of the pricing variables.

The motivation for mergers in the credit union industry differs from the commercial bank industry due to the lack of residual claimants to benefit from wealth gains. In the cooperative ownership environment of credit unions, the owners/members gain utility via the rates offered for loans and deposits. Credit union regulators also gain utility when mergers remove risky credit unions from the industry. We measure these utility gains using the event study method of Bauer [Bauer, K., 2008. Detecting abnormal credit union performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 32, 573–586] employing quadrant tests based on a multivariate test of equality of centroids. We find gains to the owners/members of the target credit union and to the regulators but not to the acquiring firm. We posit that the acquiring credit unions may encounter regulatory pressure to merge. In addition, the owners/members of the acquiring firm may avoid potential disutility in the cooperative insurance environment were the target firm allowed to fail.

Using data for North Carolina public school students in grades 3 to 8, we examine achievement gaps between white students and students from other racial and ethnic groups. We focus on cohorts of students who stay in the state's public schools for all six years. While the black-white gaps are sizable and robust, both Hispanic and Asian students tend to gain on whites as they progress in school. Beyond simple mean differences, we find that the racial gaps in math between low-performing students have tended to shrink as students progress through school, while those for high-performing students have generally widened.

ABSTRACT: Prior research documents that CEOs respond to transient ownership preferences by choosing actions to meet short-term earnings targets. This study examines whether contract designers anticipate these actions and respond by adjusting explicit CEO compensation contracts. We find that, in determining CEO cash bonuses, firms with high levels of transient investors, on average, place a relatively low weight on earnings and a relatively high weight on annual returns. Additionally, both the likelihood of granting equity and the magnitude of annual equity grants to CEOs are higher with a higher level of transient investors, after controlling for previously studied determinants of equity grants. The results suggest transient-owner trading behavior creates implicit incentives for CEOs to take actions that increase current earnings, and firms take these implicit incentives into account in the design of explicit CEO compensation contracts.

In this study, we examine whether government regulatory initiatives in China involving IPO by SOEs may have contributed to opportunistic behaviors by the issuer. We focus on two sets of IPO regulations issued between January 1, 1996 and February 11, 1999: pricing regulations, which stipulate that IPO prices be a function of accounting performance, and penalty regulations, which penalize IPO firms for overly optimistic forecasts. We find that IPO firms that report better pricing-period accounting performance have larger declines in post-IPO profitability, lower first-day stock returns and worse long-run post-IPO stock performance. Furthermore, IPO firms that make overoptimistic forecasts also have lower first-day returns and worse post-IPO stock performance. Using non-core earnings as the proxy for earnings management, we document some evidence that IPO firms that report higher pricing-period accounting performance have engaged in more income-increasing earnings management. Hence, pricing regulations may have induced IPO firms to inflate pricing-period earnings and affect the post-IPO performance negatively. On the other hand, penalty regulations have deterred IPO firms from making overoptimistic earnings forecast and therefore have a positive impact on the behavior of IPO firms.

We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.

Using a large sample of director elections, we document that shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and voting mechanisms. However, most variables, except meeting attendance and ISS recommendations, have little economic impact on shareholder votes—even poorly performing directors and firms typically receive over 90% of votes cast. Nevertheless, fewer votes lead to lower “abnormal” CEO compensation and a higher probability of removing poison pills, classified boards, and CEOs. Meanwhile, director votes have little impact on election outcomes, firm performance, or director reputation. These results provide important benchmarks for the current debate on election reforms.

This paper tests two explanations for apparent undersaving in life cycle models: bounded rationality and a preference for immediacy. Each was addressed in a separate experimental study. In the first study, subjects saved too little initially—providing evidence for bounded rationality—but learned to save optimally within four repeated life cycles. In the second study, thirsty subjects who consume beverage sips immediately, rather than with a delay, show greater relative overspending, consistent with quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. The parameter estimates of overspending obtained from the second study, but not the first, are in range of several empirical studies of saving (with an estimated β = 0.6–0.7).