We show that gender diversity in corporate boards could improve firm value because of the contributions that women make to the board. Prior studies examine valuation effects of gender-diverse boards and reach mixed conclusions. To help resolve this conundrum, we consider how gender diversity could affect firm value, that is, what mechanisms could explain how female directors benefit corporate board performance. We hypothesize and provide evidence that women directors contribute to boards by offering specific functional expertise, often missing from corporate boards. The additional expertise increases board heterogeneity which Kim and Starks (2015) show can increase firm value.

We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth-oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid-year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid-year winners. Further, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth‐oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid‐year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid‐year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.

In an effort to better understand the dynamic market price adjustment process, this paper develops a model which describes the impact of new information on a financial market. The primary emphasis is on the price change‐volume relationship in the presence of a margin requirement. We find that the margin requirement significantly affects the relation of price change to volume. Furthermore, this relationship is shown to be affected by the number of investors in the market, the degree of information dissemination, differences in interpretation of information and the implicit cost of the margin requirement.

Although institutional investors have a preference for large capitalization stocks, over time they have shifted their preferences toward smaller, riskier securities. These changes in aggregate preferences have arisen primarily from changes in the preferences of each class of institution, rather than changes in the importance of different classes. Evidence also suggests that recent growth in institutional investment combined with this shift in preferences helps explain why markets in general, and smaller stocks in particular, have exhibited greater firm-specific risk and liquidity in recent years. Additional analyses suggest that institutional investors moved toward smaller securities because such securities offer “greener pastures.”

This study evaluates the tax-loss-selling hypothesis against the window-dressing hypothesis as explanations for the turn-of-the-year return anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January, stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect.

This article evaluates the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis against the window‐dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn‐of‐the‐year anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn‐of‐the‐year effect.

Using a cross-country sample, we examine the chief executive officer (CEO) tournament structure (measured alternatively as the ratio and the difference of pay between the CEO and other top executives within a firm). We find the tournament structure to vary systematically with firm and country cultural characteristics. In particular, firm size and the cultural values of power distance, fair income differences, and competition are significantly associated with variations in tournament structures. We also establish support for the primary implication of tournament theory in that tournament structure tends to be positively related to firm value, even after controlling for endogeneity.

We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.