Kenneth D. Garbade, William L. Silber, Lawrence J. White, Market Reaction to the Filing of Antitrust Suits: An Aggregate and Cross-Sectional Analysis, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Nov., 1982), pp. 686-691

In this paper, we empirically estimate the costs of delay in the FDIC's closures of 433 commercial banks between 2007 and 2014 based upon a counterfactual closure regime. We find that the costs of delay could have been as high as 18.5 billion, or 37% of the FDIC's estimated costs of closure of 49.8 billion. We think that these findings call for a more aggressive stance by bank regulators with respect to the provisions for loan losses and write-downs of banks’ non-performing assets. More aggressive (and earlier) provisions and write-downs, or adoption of a capital ratio that penalizes nonperforming loans, would allow the concept of “prompt corrective action” (PCA) to play the role that it was meant to play in reducing FDIC losses from insolvent banks.

This paper investigates the pricing of insolvent banks in the U.S. that are sold under the purchase and assumption resolution method of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). We consider quarterly data for 444 acquisitions of insolvent U.S. banks between 2009 and 2016. We find that acquirers not only pay higher prices for insolvent banks with larger core deposits, as has been highlighted by the literature (and is consistent with the FDIC’s beliefs), but also for those banks with larger branch networks that are less dispersed geographically. When the acquirers bid (separately) for the assets of the insolvent banks, they place a positive value on the number of branches of the insolvent bank, but appear to be insensitive to geographic dispersion. Acquirers also pay more for banks with a national charter. The results additionally show that failed banks are most likely to be acquired by relatively large and highly capitalized banks whose organic growth is not affected in the years following the acquisition. Overall, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the implications of the purchase and assumption resolution method for the FDIC and for the banking industry.

A monopolist that sells in a market in which consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality will distort and enlarge the range of products offered for sale. We examine the positive and normative impacts of remedies used to counteract such distortions. For the case of a price ceiling, the monopolist improves quality at the low quality end of the market, offsetting the distortion induced by the unregulated exercise of monopoly power. Social welfare can be shown to increase for a sufficiently slight degree of price regulation. For minimum quality standards, the social welfare implications are ambiguous because the standards may exclude some consumers from the market.

The informational opacity of small businesses makes them an interesting area for the study of banks' lending practices and procedures. We use data from a survey of small businesses to analyze the micro level differences in the loan approval processes of large and small banks. We provide evidence that large banks ($1 billion or more in assets) employ standard criteria obtained from financial statements in the loan decision process, whereas small banks rely to a greater extent on information about the character of the borrower. These cookie-cutter and character approaches are compatible with the incentives and environments facing large and small banks.

This paper examines how bank loans evolve following unexpected deposit flows. Using bank-level U.S. commercial banks' data, we show that while large banks' lending is largely unaffected, loans at small banks significantly change after deposit shocks. Furthermore, the extent of this change among small banks depends on their exposure to off-balance-sheet liquidity risk, proxied by the level of unused commitments. Small banks with higher off-balance sheet exposures tend to extend fewer new loans following positive deposit shocks, suggesting that liquidity absorbed from the failure of other banks or market disruptions might not as easily be lent again to borrowers. Overall, these findings emphasize how off-balance-sheet risks can constrain the credit supply channel, even in the presence of liquidity surpluses.

This paper addresses the relationship between the aging process at new and relatively young banks and the tendency of banks to make loans to small businesses. Defining small business loans as C&I loans that are under $1 million in size, we analyze a sample of banks that had assets of less than $500 million in assets for the years 1993–1996 and that were 25 years of age or younger. We find, as have earlier studies, that banks' proclivities for small business lending are negatively related to their age and to their size. We proceed much farther, however, by introducing a number of additional explanatory variables, including the start-up year of the bank. We find that small business lending is negatively related to its being part of a MBHC. Also, small business lending is positively related to higher concentration rates in urban areas but is negatively related to higher concentration in rural areas. Despite the inclusion of these additional variables and a number of alternative specifications, the negative effects of a bank's age on its small business lending persist.