Previous studies have identified a negative relation between firms’ hiring rates and future stock returns in the cross-section. We document that this relation is significantly steeper in industries that rely relatively more on high-skill workers than low-skill workers. A long-short portfolio sorted on firm-level hiring rate earns an average annual return of 8.6% in high-skill industries, and only 0.9% in low-skill industries. Moreover, this pattern is not explained by the standard CAPM. These findings are consistent with a neoclassical model with labor force heterogeneity and labor market frictions if it is more costly to replace high-skill than low-skill workers. Received August 14, 2015; editorial decision December 31, 2016 by Editor Leonid Kogan.

We develop econometric tools for studying jump dependence of two processes from high-frequency observations on a fixed time interval. In this context, only segments of data around a few outlying observations are informative for the inference. We derive an asymptotically valid test for stability of a linear jump relation over regions of the jump size domain. The test has power against general forms of nonlinearity in the jump dependence as well as temporal instabilities. We further propose an efficient estimator for the linear jump regression model that is formed by optimally weighting the detected jumps with weights based on the diffusive volatility around the jump times. We derive the asymptotic limit of the estimator, a semiparametric lower efficiency bound for the linear jump regression, and show that our estimator attains the latter. The analysis covers both deterministic and random jump arrivals. In an empirical application, we use the developed inference techniques to test the temporal stability of market jump betas.

We examine the impact of corporate board reforms on firm value in 41 countries. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that board reforms increase firm value. Reforms involving board and audit committee independence, but not reforms involving separation of chairman and chief executive officer positions, drive the valuation increases. In addition, while comply-or-explain reforms result in a greater increase in firm value than rule-based reforms, the effects of reforms are similar across civil law and common law countries. Further investigation shows that the subsequent change in board independence plays an important role in explaining the effectiveness of the reforms.

This study explores how the violation of free short selling assumption affects the performance of CAPM and the Fama-French three-factor model, as existing studies show that short-sales constraints affect asset pricing of the stocks. Using data from the Hong Kong Stock Market which has unique regulations on short selling, we conduct both time-series and cross-sectional regression analyses to evaluate the performance of the two models under the short-sales-constraints and the no-constraints market environment. The two models perform much worse in the former environment than in the latter, indicating a significant impact of the short sales constraints on the explanatory power of the models. We then augment the two models with a shortability-mimicking factor. Our results show that the factor has a significant power in explaining both time-series and cross-sectional variation in the size-B/M portfolio returns. The addition of the factor to the two models considerably increases their overall performance.

Kolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)

Hayek (1945) argues that local information is key to understanding the efficiency of alternative economic systems and whether production should be centralized or decentralized. The Chinese experience of decentralizing SOEs confirms this insight: when the distance to the government is farther, the SOE is more likely to be decentralized, and this distance-decentralization link is more pronounced with higher communication costs and greater firm-performance heterogeneity. However, when the Chinese central government oversees SOEs in strategic industries, the distance-decentralization link is muted. We also consider alternative agency-cost-based explanations, and do not find much support.

The 2012 Dividend Tax Reform in China ties individual investors’ dividend tax rates to the length of their shareholding period. We find that firms facing a reduction (increase) in their individual investors’ dividend tax rates are more (less) likely to increase dividend payout. Such an effect is concentrated in firms where incentives of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, investors respond to this tax law change by reducing trading activities before the cum-dividend day and successfully lower their dividend tax penalty. Overall, our evidence enhances the notion that individual investors’ tax profiles shape firms’ payout policies.

We construct a unique political connection index to capture variations in the strength of firm political relations in China. The index incorporates various channels through which a firm's executives, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers are politically connected with government officials and bureaucrats. Overall, there is a negative relation between our index and firm value for the full sample, but such negative relation mainly exists for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and it becomes positive for non-SOEs. Furthermore, close examination shows an inverted U-shaped relation between political connections and firm value for the full sample in general and for non-SOEs in particular: Firm value increases initially at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level. The findings are consistent with the different business objectives and motivations of SOEs and non-SOEs in seeking political connections. Finally, our findings are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity and using an alternative headcount index construction method.

This study examines the relation between the audit failures of individual auditors and the quality of other audits performed by these same auditors. Employing a Chinese setting where audit reports reveal the identities of engagement auditors, we find that auditors who have performed failed audits also deliver lower-quality audits on other audit engagements, with this “contagion” effect spreading both over time and to other audits performed by these same auditors in the same year. However, we find little evidence that an audit failure also casts doubt on the quality of audits performed by “non-failed” auditors who are same-office colleagues of a “failed” auditor. We further discover that the contagion effect is attenuated for female auditors, auditors holding a master's degree, and auditors with more auditing experience. Our results underscore the usefulness of disclosing the identity and personal characteristics of individual auditors to investors and regulators.