We quantify the importance of collateral versus taxes for firms' capital structures. We estimate a dynamic model in which a taxable firm seeks financing for investment, and a dynamic contracting environment motivates endogenous collateral constraints. Optimal leverage stays a safe distance from the constraint, balancing the tax benefit of debt with the cost of lost financial flexibility. We estimate this flexibility cost to be 7.2% of firm assets, a percentage that is comparable to the tax benefit. Models with different tax rates fit the data equally well, and leverage responds to the tax rate only when taxes are low.

We consider the link between parents’ influence over the preferences of children, parental investments in children’s human capital, and children’s support of elderly parents. It may pay for parents to spend resources to “manipulate” children’s preferences in order to induce them to support their parents in old age. Since parents invest more in children when they expect greater support, manipulation of child preferences may end up helping children and parents. A new result, which we call the “Rotten Parent Theorem,” demonstrates that if children are altruistic, then even selfish parents will make the optimal investment in their children’s human capital.

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) awards rise during recessions. If marginal applicants are able to work but unable to find jobs, countercyclical Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit extensions may reduce SSDI uptake. Exploiting UI extensions in the Great Recession as a source of variation, we find no indication that expiration of UI benefits causes SSDI applications and can rule out effects of meaningful magnitude. A supplementary analysis finds little overlap between the two programs' recipient populations: only 28% of SSDI awardees had any labor force attachment in the prior calendar year, and of those, only 4% received UI.

We show that R&D investment explains a significant portion of the increase in the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. firms, which more than doubled between 1980 and 2012. In 1980, an average firm held $0.04 in cash for $1.00 of R&D spending, but this had increased to $0.60 by 2012. The increasing sensitivity of cash holdings to R&D investment and the increase in R&D spending of the typical firm explain over 20% of the increase in aggregate cash holdings. Intensified domestic and global competition appears to be an important explanation for the increased propensity of R&D-intensive firms to hoard cash.

Since 2012, all European Union countries have required disclosure of large short positions. This reduces short interest, bid-ask spreads, and the informativeness of prices. After specific disclosures, short-run abnormal returns are insignificantly negative, but 90-day cumulative abnormal returns are a statistically significant −5.23%. We find disclosures are likely to be followed by other disclosures, especially when the initial discloser is large or centrally located. However, there is no subsequent increase in short interest, and prices do not subsequently reverse. These results indicate that large short sellers are well informed, and that disclosures are not being used to coordinate manipulative attacks.

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage, while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust-preferred securities issuance, a form of regulatory arbitrage available to almost all U.S. banks from 1996 to Dodd-Frank. We also find support for predictions that constrained banks are riskier, perform worse during the crisis, and use multiple forms of regulatory arbitrage. We show that neither too-big-to-fail incentives nor misaligned managerial incentives are first-order determinants of this type of regulatory arbitrage.

Empirical research has struggled to show that variation in corporate capital structure arises from variation in estimated corporate income tax rates. We argue that, in previous studies, both the tax rates applied to multinational corporations and the taxable income earned have been mismeasured. Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis annual survey sample combined with each firm's income and country specific tax rate, we find that firms do have higher leverage ratios and lower interest coverage ratios when they operate in countries with higher tax rates, as theory would suggest. The trade-off theory of capital structure continues to have empirical support.

In this paper, we examine whether managers time their debt-equity choices to exploit market mispricing. Controlling for the level of external financing and corporate investment activities, we find evidence consistent with the market timing hypothesis. We find managers issue more equity relative to debt when analysts are relatively optimistic about firms’ long-term growth prospects. Moreover, equity issuers earn lower returns than debt issuers at subsequent earnings announcements. Controlling for research and development (R&D) investment, we find that, consistent with the market timing hypothesis and inconsistent with the extant empirical literature, the debt-equity composition of external financing predicts year-ahead stock return.

We consider the revision properties of Federal Reserve Board staff estimates of the output gap after the mid-1990s and examine the usefulness of these estimates for inflation forecasting. Over this period, we find that the Federal Reserve's output gap is more reliably estimated in real time than previous studies have documented for earlier periods and alternative estimation techniques. In contrast to previous work, we also find no deterioration in forecast performance when inflation projections are conditioned on real-time rather than on final estimates of the output gap.