Using confidential firm-level panel data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, we examine how the bilateral trade flows of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) and their Canadian affiliates responded to U.S.-Canadian tariff reductions from 1983 to 1992. We find that Canadian affiliate sales to the United States are negatively correlated with Canadian tariffs, but U.S. parent sales to Canadian affiliates have little association with Canadian tariffs. These results contradict the notion that Canadian tariff reductions would lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of Canadian manufacturing. We also find substantial heterogeneity in MNC responses to tariff changes within narrowly defined manufacturing industries. Overall, bilateral trade liberalization is trade-creating, as U.S. MNCs integrated their North American production such that Canadian affiliates increased sales to the United States and reduced domestic sales.

We model owners as solving a multidimensional problem when taking their firms public. Owners can affect the level of underpricing through the choices they make in promoting an issue, such as which underwriter to hire or on what exchange to list. The benefits of reducing underpricing in this way depend on the owners’ participation in the offering and the magnitude of the dilution they suffer on retained shares. We argue that the extent to which owners trade off underpricing and promotion is determined by the minimization of their wealth losses. Evidence from a sample of U.S. initial public offering confirms our empirical predictions.

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes (e.g., three percent per year) of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund's style characteristics differ from those of the value‐weighted market portfolio. Power can be substantially improved, however, using event‐study procedures that analyze a fund's stock trades. These procedures are feasible using time‐series data sets on mutual fund portfolio holdings.

This paper reports experiments designed to measure strategic sophistication, the extent to which players' behavior reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to look up hidden payoffs as often as desired, one at a time, while automatically recording their look-ups. Monitoring information search allows tests of game theory's implications for cognition as well as decisions, and subjects' deviations from search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions.

This paper analyzes institutional investors' demand for stock characteristics and the implications of this demand for stock prices and returns. We find that "large" institutional investors nearly doubled their share of the stock market from 1980 to 1996. Overall, this compositional shift tends to increase demand for the stock of large companies and decrease demand for the stock of small companies. The compositional shift can, by itself, account for a nearly 50 percent increase in the price oflarge-company stock relative to small-company stock and can explain part of the disappearance of the historical small-company stock premium.

We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong ‘perturbation implies efficiency’ results require that the perturbations must include strategies that are ‘draconian’ in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a draconian strategy whose presence in the perturbations guarantees that any equilibrium is efficient. We also argue that the results of Anderlini and Sabourian (1995) using perturbation strategies that are cooperative (and hence nondraconian) are not due to computability per se but to the further restrictions they impose on allowable beliefs.

A new method is proposed for constructing confidence intervals in autoregressive models with linear time trend. Interest focuses on the sum of the autoregressive coefficients because this parameter provides a useful scalar measure of the long-run persistence properties of an economic time series. Since the type of the limiting distribution of the corresponding OLS estimator, as well as the rate of its convergence, depend in a discontinuous fashion upon whether the true parameter is less than one or equal to one (that is, trend-stationary case or unit root case), the construction of confidence intervals is notoriously difficult. The crux of our method is to recompute the OLS estimator on smaller blocks of the observed data, according to the general subsampling idea of Politis and Romano (1994a), although some extensions of the standard theory are needed. The method is more general than previous approaches in that it works for arbitrary parameter values, but also because it allows the innovations to be'-a martingale difference sequence rather than i.i.d .. Some simulation studies examine the finite sample performance.

In a privatization competition, private contractors bid against an in-house team to perform a governmental function that is currently performed by the in-house team. The Department of Defense initiated 3,500 privatization competitions from 1978 to 1994, generating estimated annual savings of $1.46 billion. We estimate a reduced-form model of the savings from these competitions that takes into account the premature cancellation of some competitions and the censoring of the in-house bid at current cost. The Department of Defense maintains a list of candidates for future privatization competitions. Using our model, we forecast annual savings of $5.74 billion if privatization competitions were completed for all functions on this list.

The theory of intertemporal choice predicts that the cross-sectional variance of the marginal utility of consumption is equal to its own lag plus a constant and a random component. Using general preference specifications and some assumptions about the nature of the random component, we provide an explicit test of this hypothesis. Our approach circumvents the necessity to identify a pure age profile of the cross-sectional variance of consumption and yields a well-specified statistical test. This test is applied to data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The results are remarkably consistent with the restrictions implied by the theory of intertemporal consumption choices.

This paper uses data from a randomized housing-mobility experiment to study the effects of relocating families from high- to low-poverty neighborhoods on juvenile crime. Outcome measures come from juvenile arrest records taken from government administrative data. Our findings seem to suggest that providing families with the opportunity to move to lower-poverty neighborhoods reduces violent criminal behavior by teens.