The 1987 market crash was associated with a dramatic and permanent steepening of the implied volatility curve for equity index options, despite minimal changes in aggregate consumption. We explain these events within a general equilibrium framework in which expected endowment growth and economic uncertainty are subject to rare jumps. The arrival of a jump triggers the updating of agents' beliefs about the likelihood of future jumps, which produces a market crash and a permanent shift in option prices. Consumption and dividends remain smooth, and the model is consistent with salient features of individual stock options, equity returns, and interest rates.

Whether campaign advertising influences election outcomes is an open question; a paradox given the amount spent on campaigning in general and TV advertising in particular. We argue that such “absence of documentation” is due to the focus of the empirical literature on the United States, in which the allocation of campaign spending and advertising is decentralized. We explore a quasinatural experiment that enables us to mitigate the omitted variables and reverse causality problems caused by decentralized allocation. In Brazil, gubernatorial elections work in a two-round system. In the first round, candidates’ TV time shares are determined by their coalitions’ share of seats in the National Parliament. In the second round, TV time is split equally between the first-round winner and runner-up. Using differences between rounds as a source of variation, we find a large causal effect of TV advertising on election outcomes.

This article endogenizes information acquisition and portfolio delegation in a one-period strategic trading model. We find that, when the informed portfolio manager is relatively risk tolerant (averse), price informativeness increases (decreases) with the amount of noise trading. When noise trading is endogenized, the linear equilibrium in the traditional literature breaks down under a wide range of parameter values. In contrast, a linear equilibrium always exists in our model. In a conventional portfolio delegation model under a competitive partial equilibrium, the manager's effort of acquiring information is independent of a linear incentive contract. In our strategic trading model, however, a higher-powered linear contract induces the manager to exert more effort for information acquisition. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

[This article endogenizes information acquisition and portfolio delegation in a one-period strategic trading model. We find that, when the informed portfolio manager is relatively risk tolerant (averse), price informativeness increases (decreases) with the amount of noise trading. When noise trading is endogenized, the linear equilibrium in the traditional literature breaks down under a wide range of parameter values. In contrast, a linear equilibrium always exists in our model. In a conventional portfolio delegation model under a competitive partial equilibrium, the manager's effort of acquiring information is independent of a linear incentive contract. In our strategic trading model, however, a higher-powered linear contract induces the manager to exert more effort for information acquisition.]

I present a model of optimal learning for creativity generation in a field. The field is defined as a knowledge structure. A creative contribution is based on combining two previously unconnected elements, generating a new element. Individuals may possess private information/intuition about new combinations. Individuals contribute the maximum creative contribution they are able to produce based on the set of elements they have learned. In equilibrium individuals learn different elements, with some degree of overlap, effectively pursuing distinct creative interests. The model illustrates a general approach for analyzing the creative development of fields and, in a broader sense, cultural innovation.

We examine the application of real options within two contexts of motion picture investment decisions by studio executives. The first is whether to continue marketing a film following its initial release in theaters (an abandonment option). The second centers on the decision to produce a sequel to an original film (a growth option). Few accounting studies have examined the use of real options but they are of considerable importance to companies managing risk through their cost structure and capital investment decisions. Specifically, a real option allows decision makers to postpone further expenditure commitment until a substantial portion of the uncertainty surrounding the investment has been resolved. Our evidence from the motion picture industry indicates that studios leave a portion of their marketing budget uncommitted until its spending is warranted. We also show that studios invest more in original films that they believe will lead to a sequel. Specifically, we find that studios spend higher production and marketing costs on films with sequels than those without, and that sequels generate higher returns on investment than non-sequels. Overall, our results suggest that the real options framework has applications for accounting research and practice by providing a basis for studying and understanding cost commitments in product or project-based settings.

This paper shows that the semiparametric efficiency bound for a parameter identified by an unconditional moment restriction with data missing at random (MAR) coincides with that of a particular augmented moment condition problem. The augmented system consists of the inverse probability weighted (IPW) original moment restriction and an additional conditional moment restriction which exhausts all other implications of the MAR assumption. The paper also investigates the value of additional semiparametric restrictions on the conditional expectation function (CEF) of the original moment function given always observed covariates. In the program evaluation context, for example, such restrictions are implied by semiparametric models for the potential outcome CEFs given baseline covariates. The efficiency bound associated with this model is shown to also coincide with that of a particular moment condition problem. Some implications of these results for estimation are briefly discussed.

This paper studies the cross-currency and temporal variations in the random walk behavior in exchange rates. We characterize currencies with relatively large investment flows as investment intensive and conjecture that the more investment intensive a currency is, the closer its exchange rate adheres to random walk. Using 29 floating bilateral USD exchange rates, we find that the higher the investment intensity, the less likely it is to reject random walk and the smaller the deviation from random walk is. However, the effect of investment intensity is non-monotonic. Application of threshold models shows that after investment intensity reaches the estimated thresholds, the level of investment intensity has no further effect on the deviation from random walk. These findings help reconcile the previous conflicting results on the random walk in exchange rates by focusing on the effect of cross-currency and temporal variations in investment intensity.

This paper provides cross‐sectional evidence of convenient prices—prices that simplify and expedite transactions, reducing the time costs from physically making a transaction. Firms may wish to set convenient prices for items that are typically purchased with cash, are sold alone or with a few similar items, and are high‐traffic transactions, that is, that require queuing or are frequently purchased. I collect a new data set and find broad support for the use of convenient prices in locations where making a rapid transaction is important. Convenience also appears to predominantly affect goods and services with above‐average price rigidity.