We study the effect of financial market frictions on managerial compensation. We embed a market microstructure model into an otherwise standard contracting framework, and analyze optimal pay-for-performance when managers use information they learn from the market in their investment decisions. In a less frictional market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions and thereby necessitates lower-powered compensation. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we document evidence that pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reduced market frictions. Firm investment also becomes more sensitive to stock prices during the experiment, consistent with increased managerial learning from the market. (JEL D83, G12, G14, G32, G34, M12, M52)

Abstract We examine the information asymmetry between local and nonlocal investors with a large dataset of stock message board postings. We document that abnormal relative postings of a firm, that is, unusual changes in the volume of postings from local versus nonlocal investors, capture locals' information advantage. This measure positively predicts firms' short‐term stock returns as well as those of peer firms in the same city. Sentiment analysis shows that posting activities primarily reflect good news, potentially due to social transmission bias and short‐sales constraints. We identify the information driving return predictability through content‐based analysis. Abnormal relative postings also lead analysts' forecast revisions. Overall, investors' interactions on social media contain valuable geography‐based private information.

We use lottery jackpot winnings in a neighborhood as an exogenous shock to investing in stocks. We find that retail investors whose brokerages are near the stores that sell winning tickets buy more stocks than their counterparts after the shock. These purchases lead to lower returns. We use a survey to identify the behavioral factors like regretfulness and probability weighting that are the main drivers of our findings. Moreover, these investors tend to buy more lottery-like stocks, but the shock does not affect their selling decisions. Finally, we perform several falsification tests and robustness checks and find consistent results.

Abstract We show that attention constraints on decision-makers create barriers to financial inclusion. Using administrative data on retail loan-screening processes, we find that attention-constrained loan officers exert less effort reviewing applicants of lower socioeconomic status (SES) and reject them more frequently. More importantly, when externally imposed increases in loan officers’ workloads tighten attention constraints, loan officers are even more prone to quickly reject low-SES applicants but quickly accept very high-SES applicants without careful review. Such selective attention allocation further widens the approval rate gap between high- and low-SES applicants—a unique prediction of this attention-based mechanism.

This paper utilizes receipt lotteries in Taiwan, along with comprehensive administrative data, to examine the effect of cash windfalls on stock market participation and portfolio diversification, which can help us understand whether wealth levels serve as the explanation for the limited participation and under-diversification puzzles in stock markets. The results indicate that each million TWD (approximately 33,000 USD) windfall gain from winning receipt lotteries increases the probability of stock market participation by 1.09 percentage points. This effect is primarily driven by individuals who were not participating in the stock market prior to winning. For existing participants, each million TWD windfall increases the total value of stocks by 142,552 TWD, attributed to both an increase in their number of shares and higher average prices of the stocks they hold. Additionally, we find that individuals do not significantly diversify their portfolios after winning the lottery, suggesting that wealth level is not the primary reason for under-diversification.