In a dual-currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.

In a dual-currency, flexible exchange rate model, both nominal and real foreign exchange premia depend on investor risk attitudes, consumption parameters, and the stochastic structure of currency and commodity supplies. When supplies are random, their joint correlation structure determines the sign of the premia. If the money supplies are identically distributed, then all foreign exchange premia, regardless of the currency of denomination, are zero. A positive correlation between the value of a country's currency and its nominal interest rate need not indicate real interest rate movements. Relative bond prices can be negatively correlated with the terms of trade.

A monetary model of asset pricing is used to explain observed correlations between money velocity and stock prices. Output stocks cause velocity and nominal stock prices to move in opposite directions but may cause velocity and deflated stock prices to move in the same direction. Although monetary shocks are neutral, changes in monetary expectations have real effects because of their impact on the expected purchasing power of money balances carried into the future. Thus changes in expected monetary growth alter expected real equity returns and inflation, and changes in monetary uncertainty alter the equity risk premium.

A monetary model of asset pricing is used to explain observed correlations between money velocity and stock prices. Output stocks cause velocity and nominal stock prices to move in opposite directions but may cause velocity and deflated stock prices to move in the same direction. Although monetary shocks are neutral, changes in monetary expectations have real effects because of their impact on the expected purchasing power of money balances carried into the future. Thus changes in expected monetary growth alter expected real equity returns and inflation, and changes in monetary uncertainty alter the equity risk premium.

This paper uses a national survey of 3,119 individuals to examine the effect of lung cancer risk perceptions on smoking activity. Both smokers and nonsmokers greatly overestimate the lung cancer risk of cigarette smoking, and the extent of the overestimation is much greater than the extent of underestimation. These risk perceptions in turn significantly reduce the probability of smoking, as suggested by an economic model of risky consumption decisions. Cigarette excise taxes in effect endow individuals with additional risk perceptions comparable to their current assessed lung cancer risks.

We investigate the underlying causes and the announcement effects of plant closings. The closing in our sample do not appear related to takeover activity. Instead, they appear motivated by declining firm profitability. Firms announcing closings have lower earnings than market or industry medians; earnings typically improve slightly after the announcement. We find a negative stock-market reaction to plant-closing announcements.

This paper describes a new approach to normative economics, combining the theory of social choice with econometric modeling of aggregate consumer behavior. The author first derives a system of aggregate demand functions by exact aggregation over individual demand functions. He then constructs measures of individual welfare from systems of individual demand functions. Finally, the author incorporates these measures into a social welfare function, introducing ethical assumptions based on horizontal and vertical equity. To illustrate the application of this approach, he considers the U.S. standard of living and its cost over the period 1947-85. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.

Non-cooperative bidding theory for sealed-bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents. Received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects. Those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to risk or are all risk neutral. This paper constructs an explicit Bayesian prior distribution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsiders the experimental results. It finds that observed bidding behavior is still inconsistent with the Nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk attitudes. Thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes. Non-cooperative bidding theory for sealed-bid auctions generally implies testable predictions that are conditioned on the risk attitudes of agents. Archetypical of this result is the Nash Equilibrium prediction for First Price auctions for an object that is valued by agents in an independent and private manner. Received laboratory experiments that purport to test this theory do not generally control for the risk attitudes of subjects. Those experiments exhibit behavior inconsistent with popular bidding models that assume that agents have the same aversion to riskor are all risk neutral. In this paper we construct an explicit prior distrlbution for the risk attitudes of experimental subjects and reconsider the experimental results. We find that observed bidding behavior is indeed consistent with the Nash predictions when explicit prior weights are attached to alternative assumptions about subject risk aversion. However, when one allows for risk loving subjects as well, observed behavior is inconsistent with Nash predictions. Thus one cannot account for observed bidding anomalies by appealing to uncontrolled nuisance variables such as risk attitudes. In section I we consider a specific Nash Equilibrium (NE) bidding model due to Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) that clearly illustrates the risk-sensitivity of the theoretical predictions. In section II we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by Harrison (1986a). This evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of (constant relative) risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section I. In section III we reconsider the evidence from the First Price (FP) experiments reported in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1983a, 1983b). I. A Specific Bidding Model Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982), hereafter CRS, present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i: Ui(y) y= (1) Received for publication August 31, 1987. Revision accepted for publication December 18, 1989. * University of South Carolina. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for helpful comments, although they are not responsible for my conclusions.

Tests of financial asset pricing models may yield misleading inferences when properties of the data are used to construct the test statistics. In particular, such tests are often based on returns to portfolios of common stock, where portfolios are constructed by sorting on some empirically motivated characteristic of the securities such as market value of equity. Analytical calculations, Monte Carlo simulations, and two empirical examples show that the effects of this type of data snooping can be substantial.