[One-step efficient GMM estimation has been developed in the recent papers of Back and Brown (1990), Imbens (1993), and Qin and Lawless (1994). These papers emphasized methods that correspond to using Owen's (1988) method of empirical likelihood to reweight the data so that the reweighted sample obeys all the moment restrictions at the parameter estimates. In this paper we consider an alternative KLIC motivated weighting and show how it and similar discrete reweightings define a class of unconstrained optimization problems which includes GMM as a special case. Such KLIC-motivated reweightings introduce M auxiliary "tilting" parameters, where M is the number of moments; parameter and overidentification hypotheses can be recast in terms of these tilting parameters. Such tests are often startlingly more effective than their conventional counterparts. These differences are not completely explained by differences in the leading terms of the asymptotic expansions of the test statistics.]

This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve-outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve-outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve-outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve-outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve-outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.

Implicit in the prices of traded financial assets are Arrow–Debreu prices or, with continuous states, the state-price density (SPD). We construct a nonparametric estimator for the SPD implicit in option prices and we derive its asymptotic sampling theory. This estimator provides an arbitrage-free method of pricing new, complex, or illiquid securities while capturing those features of the data that are most relevant from an asset-pricing perspective, for example, negative skewness and excess kurtosis for asset returns, and volatility “smiles” for option prices. We perform Monte Carlo experiments and extract the SPD from actual S&P 500 option prices.

This paper provides new empirical evidence on the relationship between personal commitments and the allocation of small business credit. The data suggest that personal commitments are important for firms seeking certain types of loans. Guarantees are more prevalent than collateral and organization type (corporate versus noncorporate status) appears to be particularly important in determining commitment use. No systematic relationship is observed between commitment use and owner wealth. Personal commitments appear to be substitutes for business collateral, at least for lines of credit, while personal collateral and personal guarantees do not seem to substitute for each other. Personal commitments have generally become more important to small business lending since the late 1980s.

Using survey data on consumer product purchases, this paper introduces an approach to estimate jointly individual utility functions and risk perceptions implied by their decisions. The behavioral risk beliefs reflected in consumers' risky decisions differ from the stated probabilities given to them in the survey. These results are not consistent with a Bayesian learning model in which the information respondents utilize is restricted to what the survey presents. The results are, however, potentially consistent with models in which prior risk information is influential or models in which people do not act in a fully rational manner.

This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set in which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of "lowball" pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.

[This study tests the competitive equilibrium predictions of a multi-period model of audit pricing and independence in two sets of laboratory markets: a control set consisting of human subjects in the role of auditors contracting with robot clients, and a treatment set in which both auditors and clients are human subjects. The results in all the control-set markets and some of the treatment markets support the predictions of "lowball" pricing and that heterogeneous beliefs among auditors regarding the treatment of a client-reporting issue is a necessary condition for independence impairment. By contrast, several treatment-set markets exhibit cooperative behavior between auditors and clients to achieve jointly beneficial outcomes. This behavior deviates from the price-independence relationship predicted in the competitive equilibrium, exhibiting instead a price-independence relationship that is characterized by an absence of lowballing and frequent independence impairment, even when auditors have homogeneous beliefs.]

In this paper we consider how the presence of private information may explain the failure of the private sector to provide unemployment insurance. In particular, we show how the interaction of private information regarding employees' preferences for work with the unobservable level of effort exerted on the job may explain the absence of private unemployment insurance. We also reflect on the implications of our findings for the role of the public sector in providing unemployment insurance.

This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve‐outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve‐outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve‐outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve‐outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve‐outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.

ABSTRACT Implicit in the prices of traded financial assets are Arrow–Debreu prices or, with continuous states, the state‐price density (SPD). We construct a nonparametric estimator for the SPD implicit in option prices and we derive its asymptotic sampling theory. This estimator provides an arbitrage‐free method of pricing new, complex, or illiquid securities while capturing those features of the data that are most relevant from an asset‐pricing perspective, for example, negative skewness and excess kurtosis for asset returns, and volatility “smiles” for option prices. We perform Monte Carlo experiments and extract the SPD from actual S&P 500 option prices.