Does Europe offer lessons for the consolidation in US banking? In this paper, it is argued that the political dimension in Europe has led to the protection of national flagships and consolidation mainly on a national scale. Lessons for the US are limited. Rather, the regional expansion observed in US banking may offer valuable lessons for imminent cross-border mergers in European banking.

We propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes.

We propose new tests to examine whether stock index futures affect stock market volatility. These tests decompose spot portfolio volatility into the cross-sectional dispersion and the average volatility of returns on the portfolio's constituent securities. Our tests show that for Nikkei stocks spot portfolio volatility increased and cross-sectional dispersion decreased compared with average volatility when Nikkei futures began trading on the Osaka Securities Exchange, but not on the Singapore International Monetary Exchange. For non-Nikkei stocks, no shift occurred when futures trading began on either exchange. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses that futures trading increases spot portfolio volatility but that there is no volatility “spillover” to stocks against which futures are not traded. However, the increase in volatility attributable to futures trading is small compared with volatility shifts induced by changes in broad economic factors.

We present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public goods the city supplies. We test the implications of the model with three related data sets: U. S. cities, U. S. metropolitan areas, and U. S. urban counties. Results show that the shares of spending on productive public goods—education, roads, sewers and trash pickup—in U. S. cities (metro areas/urban counties) are inversely related to the city's (metro area's/county's) ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. We conclude that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of local public finances.

We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.

This paper examines how market prices, volume, and traders' dividend expectations respond to public information releases in laboratory markets for a long‐lived financial asset. The objective is to study deviations from the symmetric information risk‐neutral rational expectations (RE) benchmark, which predicts no trade in such settings. The results of a series of double‐auction and call markets are reported in which traders manage a portfolio of cash and asset shares over 15 rounds of trading. A public signal regarding the value of the liquidating dividend is released every third round, and traders' subjective expectations of the liquidating dividend are elicited each round as cash‐motivated forecasts. We find that, despite the public dividend signal, traders' dividend forecasts are heterogeneous. Forecasts and prices both underreact to the public signals, with prices under‐reacting more than forecasts. In general, price changes are not closely associated with public signals, and there is greater excess price volatility in double auctions than in call markets. Forty‐three percent of trades are inconsistent with the trader's forecasts, and inconsistent trades occur more frequently in the double‐auction markets. On average, approximately 10 percent of the outstanding shares are traded in each round, and trading volume is increasing in the mean absolute forecast revision and decreasing in the contemporaneous dispersion in forecasts. These results suggest that differential processing of the public signal and/or speculative trading for short‐term gain may help to explain why symmetric information RE predictions are often not supported in empirical and experimental settings. They also suggest that market reactions to public information releases may be influenced by market microstructure.

In this paper we analyze the estimation of coefficients in regression models under moment restrictions in which the moment restrictions are derived from auxiliary data. The moment restrictions yield weights for each observation that can subsequently be used in weighted regression analysis. We discuss the interpretation of these weights under two assumptions: that the target population (from which the moments are constructed) and the sampled population (from which the sample is drawn) are the same, and that these populations differ. We present an application based on omitted ability bias in estimation of wage regressions. The National Longitudinal Survey Young Men's Cohort (NLS)—in addition to containing information for each observation on wages, education, and experience—records data on two test scores that may be considered proxies for ability. The NLS is a small dataset, however, with a high attrition rate. We investigate how to mitigate these problems in the NLS by forming moments from the joint distribution of education, experience, and log wages in the 1% sample of the 1980 U.S. Census and using these moments to construct weights for weighted regression analysis of the NLS. We analyze the impacts of our weighted regression techniques on the estimated coefficients and standard errors of returns to education and experience in the NLS controlling for ability, with and without the assumption that the NLS and the Census samples are random samples from the same population.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive‐feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean‐reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.