Analysis of longitudinal earning data indicates higher earnings growth for scientists of the same experience but more recent vintage. Theoretical justification for such a relation is suggested, and the implied biases in cross-section data are noted. Because of a basic identification problem, an alternative interpretation, time-experience interaction, is also considered. The general conclusion is that earning growth is not uniform or neutral. There is no simple mechanical method by which lifetime profiles can be inferred from single cross-section data.

The joint determination of work and investment in human capital over the life cycle is analyzed. At low rates of impatience investment is decreasing throughout life, as in simpler models which assume hours of work to be fixed. The demand for leisure over the life cycle is "U shaped." Wages rise to a single peak which occurs after the peak in hours of work. Distinctly different patterns arise when the rate of impatience is high. Such individuals may prefer an increasing hours of work profile, and schooling need not be concentrated at the beginning of life. Conditions are provided to determine a critical level of time preference which is sufficient to induce a "normal" life-cycle pattern for investment and work.

We present a model in which investment in schooling generates two kinds of returns: the labor-market return, resulting from higher wages, and a marriage-market return, defined as the impact of schooling on the marital surplus share one can extract. Men and women may have different incentives to invest in schooling because of different market wages or household roles. This asymmetry can yield a mixed equilibrium with some educated individuals marrying uneducated spouses. When the labor-market return to schooling rises, home production demands less time, and the traditional spousal labor division norms weaken, more women may invest in schooling than men.

We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage, divorce, and remarriage using panel data on two cohorts of Danish men and women. The marital surplus is identified from the probability of divorce and the surplus shares of husbands and wives from their willingness to enter marriage. We find that the educations of husbands and wives are complements. Education raises the share of the marital surplus for men but not for women. As men and women get older, husbands receive a larger share of the marital surplus. The estimated costs of divorce are high both early and late in marriage.

We construct a model of household decision-making in which agents consume a private and a public good, interpreted as children's welfare. Children's utility depends on their human capital, which depends on the time their parents spend with them and on the parents' human capital. We first show that as returns to human capital increase, couples at the top of the income distribution should spend more time with their children. This in turn should reinforce assortative matching, in a sense that we precisely define. We then embed the model into a transferable utility matching framework with random preferences, à la Choo and Siow (2006), which we estimate using US marriage data for individuals born between 1943 and 1972. We find that the preference for partners of the same education has significantly increased for white individuals, particularly for the highly educated. We find no evidence of such an increase for black individuals. Moreover, in line with theoretical predictions, we find that the “marital college-plus premium” has increased for women but not for men.

This paper investigates the implications of social rewards on the allocation of talent in society and consequently on the process of economic growth. The authors consider two sources of heterogeneity among workers: nonwage income and innate ability. A greater emphasis on status may induce the 'wrong' individuals, that is, those with low ability and high wealth, to acquire schooling, causing workers with high ability and low wealth to leave the growth-enhancing industries. This crowding-out effect, taken alone, discourages growth. Growth may be enhanced by a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, which reduces the demand for status.