This paper explores implications of weak identification in common ‘long memory’ and recent ‘rough’ approaches to modeling volatility dynamics of financial assets. We unveil an asymptotic near-observational equivalence between a long memory model with weak autoregressive dynamics and a rough model with a near-unit autoregressive root. Standard methods struggle to distinguish them, and conventional asymptotics are invalid. We propose an identification-robust approach to construct confidence sets that reveal the uncertainty and aid inference. Empirical studies based on realized volatility and trading volume often fail to statistically reject either model, thereby providing evidence of their potential coexistence.

This study examines the impact of local corruption on firms' narrative research and development (R&D) disclosures in the United States. We find that firms in more corrupt areas include fewer R&D sentences in their 10-K filings, and these sentences contain less numerical and forward-looking information. Our results hold across various measures of local corruption and R&D disclosures and remain robust after controlling for firms' R&D activities, implementing fixed effects, using difference-in-differences tests, and applying instrumental variable analysis. Additionally, the effects are more pronounced for firms with concentrated operations in their headquarters states and for firms whose R&D disclosures closely relate to future earnings. However, they are less pronounced for firms with CEOs politically aligned with the state's incumbent party and when the benefit of resolving market dispersion from firms' R&D disclosure is high. Overall, our findings indicate that local corruption adversely affects firms' narrative R&D disclosures.

Managers often overreact to revenue fluctuations, leading to unnecessary workforce adjustments and increased training costs. This study examines how board governance influences firms’ employment sensitivity to revenue fluctuations. Analyzing global board reforms, we find that board reforms significantly reduce managerial overreaction to revenue fluctuations. Utilizing recent difference-in-differences estimators that address heterogeneous treatment effects, we ensure the robustness of our results. The reduction in employment sensitivity is more pronounced when board reforms strengthen the independence of boards and audit committees, particularly in jurisdictions with weaker board efficacy, shareholder, and employment protection legislation. Enhanced effects are observed in firms with initially lower board independence and rapid reform compliance, in entities experiencing greater information asymmetry, marked by higher labor intensity, higher pre-reform agency costs and financial constraints, and in firms led by less experienced CEOs or boards with higher male representation.

We highlight a lesser-known consequence of China’s integration into the world economy: the rise of services trade. We demonstrate how the United States’ trade deficit in goods cycles back as a surplus in U.S. exports of education services. Focusing on China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, we show that Chinese cities more exposed to trade liberalization sent more students to U.S. universities. Growth in housing income and wealth allowed Chinese families to afford U.S. tuition, and more students financed their studies using personal funds. Our estimates suggest that recent trade wars could cost U.S. universities around $1.1 billion in annual tuition revenue.

Open banking (OB) empowers bank customers to share their financial transaction data with fintechs and other banks. New cross-country data shows 49 countries adopted OB policies, privacy preferences predict policy adoption, and adoption spurs fintech entry. UK microdata shows that OB enables: (i) consumers to access both financial advice and credit; (ii) SMEs to establish new lending relationships. In a calibrated model, OB universally improves welfare through entry and product improvements when used for advice. When used for credit, OB promotes entry and competition by reducing adverse selection, but higher prices for costlier or privacy-conscious consumers partially offset these benefits.