We study firms’ decisions to provide non-GAAP income statements and the information environment consequences of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters directing them to stop disclosing such statements. We find firms voluntarily disclose non-GAAP income statements when firm and disclosure complexity, analyst following, and institutional ownership are higher. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, after firms stop disclosing full non-GAAP income statements at the direction of the SEC, the informativeness of non-GAAP earnings and overall earnings announcements decreases, information asymmetry increases, and analyst forecasts become less accurate and more disperse. We also find that firms not receiving a comment letter are more likely to stop providing non-GAAP income statements after an industry peer receives a non-GAAP income statement comment letter. Overall, our evidence suggests SEC comment letters about non-GAAP income statements appear to worsen the information environment for firms previously providing those statements. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Most research on non-GAAP financial measures focuses on earnings or earnings per share, although non-GAAP revenue disclosure has recently attracted SEC scrutiny. It is unclear ex ante what non-GAAP adjustments could improve revenue's usefulness because, unlike earnings, revenue is a top-line number related primarily to core (i.e., persistent) business activities. We present the first archival analysis of non-GAAP revenues using a large, hand-collected sample of disclosures from 2015 to 2018. Approximately one in five earnings announcements contains a non-GAAP revenue disclosure, focused on revenue growth. Our evidence suggests that firms disclose non-GAAP revenue when GAAP revenue is incomparable with prior periods, and not to compensate for poor GAAP performance. Furthermore, non-GAAP revenue growth predicts future revenue growth better than GAAP revenue growth, and the market responds to this information. Overall, non-GAAP revenue disclosures are motivated by economic fundamentals rather than opportunism, on average, and they provide investors with relevant information.

We investigate whether aggressive tax planning firms have a less transparent information environment. Although tax planning provides expected tax savings, it can simultaneously increase the financial complexity of the organization. And to the extent that this greater financial complexity cannot be adequately clarified through communications with outside parties, such as investors and analysts, transparency problems can arise. Our investigation of the association between tax aggressiveness and information asymmetry, analysts' forecast errors, and earnings quality suggests that aggressive tax planning is associated with lower corporate transparency. We also find evidence that managers at tax-aggressive firms attempt to mitigate these transparency problems by increasing various tax-related disclosures. Overall, our results suggest that firms face a trade-off between tax benefits and financial transparency when choosing the aggressiveness of their tax planning.

Performance-measure weights for incentive compensation are often determined subjectively. Determining these weights is a cognitively difficult task, and archival research shows that observed performance-measure weights are only partially consistent with the predictions of agency theory. Ittner et al. (2003) have concluded that psychology theory can help to explain such inconsistencies. In an experimental setting based on Feltham and Xie (1994), we use psychology theories of reasoning to predict distinctive patterns of similarity and difference between optimal and actual subjective performance-measure weights. The following predictions are supported. First, in contrast to a number of prior studies, most individuals' decisions are significantly influenced by the performance measures' error variance (precision) and error covariance. Second, directional errors in the use of these measurement attributes are relatively frequent, resulting in a mean underreaction to an accounting change that alters performance measurement error. Third, individuals seem insufficiently aware that a change in the accounting for one measure has spillover effects on the optimal weighting of the other measure in a two-measure incentive system. In consequence, they make performance-measure weighting decisions that are likely to result in misallocations of agent effort.

This study compares samples of publicly and privately held bank holding companies to examine whether the high frequency of small earnings increases relative to small earnings decreases reported by public firms is attributable to earnings management. We expect public banks' shareholders to be more likely than private banks' shareholders to rely on simple earnings-based heuristics in evaluating firm performance, so we expect public banks to have more incentives to report steadily increasing earnings. Consistent with this expectation, we find that relative to private banks, public banks: (1) report fewer small earnings declines, (2) are more likely to use the loan loss provision and security gain realizations to eliminate small earnings decreases, and (3) report longer strings of consecutive earnings increases. These results suggest that the asymmetric pattern of more small earnings increases than decreases, first documented by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), is attributable to earnings management and is not simply a reflection of the underlying distribution of earnings changes.

Myriad environments allow for the possibility of confusion. Agents may appeal to such confusion—or the possibility of making an honest mistake—to justify their behavior. In three sets of experiments involving thousands of subjects, we document evidence of such motivated errors. We document this evidence in a simple environment in which the scope for errors is small and in more complex environments in which subjects display correlation neglect and an anchoring bias.

After World War II, international capital flowed into slow-growing Latin America rather than fast-growing Asia. This is surprising as, everything else equal, fast growth should imply high capital returns. This paper develops a capital flow accounting framework to quantify the role of different factor market distortions in producing these patterns. Surprisingly, we find that distortions in labor markets, rather than domestic or international capital markets, account for the bulk of these flows. Labor market distortions that indirectly depress investment incentives by lowering equilibrium labor supply explain two-thirds of observed flows, while improvement in these distortions over time accounts for much of Asia's rapid growth.

In the United States in the late 19th and early 20th century, large cities had extremely high death rates from infectious disease. Within major cities such as New York City and Philadelphia, there was significant variation at any point in time in the mortality rate across neighborhoods. Between 1900 and 1930 neighborhood mortality convergence took place in New York City and Philadelphia. We document these trends and discuss their consequences for neighborhood quality of life dynamics and the economic incidence of who gains from effective public health interventions.

One in five Zambian children lives with an HIV/AIDS-infected adult. We estimate the effect that the availability of adult antiretroviral therapy (ART) has on the health of such children. Using a triple difference specification, we find that adult access to ART resulted in increased weight-for-age and decreased incidence of stunting among children younger than 60 months who resided with an infected father or other infected adult in an intact household. Because the increased availability of adult ART in sub-Saharan Africa has multigenerational effects, cost-effectiveness estimates restricted to direct recipients understate the economic benefit of the treatment.

We find that households living in California homes built in the 1960s and 1970s had high electricity consumption in 2000 relative to houses of more recent vintages because the price of electricity at the time of home construction was low. Homes built in the early 1990s had lower electricity consumption than homes of earlier vintages because the price of electricity was higher. The elasticity of the price of electricity at the time of construction was -0.22. As homes built between 1960 and 1989 become a smaller share of the housing stock, average household electricity purchases will fall.