A preliminary draft of this paper was presented at the Decemnber, 1971 meetings of the Econometric Society. This paper has benefited from the perceptive comments of a number of readers; I am particularly indebted to Ronald Bodkin, Stewart Gillmor, Zvi Griliches, Sherwin Rosen and the referees. Assistance in data compilation was provided by Peter Brubaker, Maureen Donahoe, Charles Eckert, Marshall E. Goldman, Stephen Kalos, Lawrence Kenny, Richard LeClair, and Thurman Northcross. Computations were executed on the Wesleyan University IBM 1130 computer. Research support has been provided by Wesleyan University and National Science Foundation Research Grant GS 2903.

I would like to extend my thanks to my colleague, Harry G. Johnson, for hi8 helpful comments, to Daniel Wisecarver, for help extending well beyond the normal call of duty for a research assistant, and to Rudiger Dornbusch and Robert Gordon for valuable suggestions given after the first draft of this paper was completed. Needless to add, they do not bear any responsibility for such flaws or deficiencies as may remain in this paper.

Abstract We examine the role private equity (PE) sponsors play in the resolution of financial distress of portfolio companies. PE-backed firms have higher leverage and default at higher rates than other companies borrowing in leveraged loan markets. But, PE-backed firms restructure more quickly, avoid bankruptcy court more often, and liquidate less often compared to other highly leveraged firms experiencing financial distress. PE owners are also more likely to retain control post-restructuring, often by infusing capital as firms approach distress. While default frequencies are higher among PE-backed firms, PE investors appear to manage financial distress at lower cost compared to other owners. (JEL G23, G32, G33)

We examine the effects of structural change in the U.S. banking industry, as well as key regulatory changes, including recently enacted deposit insurance reform legislation, on the resiliency of the FDIC-administered bank insurance fund (BIF) by estimating and comparing the probability of BIF insolvency over time. We do this using a Markov-switching model that relies on historical patterns of BIF disbursements to define the probability of switching among three “states” of the banking industry's financial health. Monte Carlo simulations are then performed to project the financial condition of the BIF over a 50-year period. Our results indicate that the insolvency risk to the bank insurance fund has increased significantly due to industry consolidation, and is mainly due to the concentration of deposits in the 10 largest U.S. banking companies. We also find that recent deposit insurance reforms will cause only a marginal reduction in the risk of BIF insolvency. The increased risk associated with a more concentrated industry structure simply dominates the reform effect.

A fair level of provisions on bad and doubtful loans is an essential input in mark-to-market accounting, and in the calculation of bank profitability, capital and solvency. Loan-loss provisioning is directly related to estimates of loan-loss given default (LGD). A literature on LGD on bank loans is developing but, surprisingly, it has not been exploited to address, at the micro level, the issue of provisioning at the time of default, and after the default date. For example, in Portugal, the central bank imposes a mandatory provisioning schedule based on the time period since a loan is declared ‘non-performing’. The dynamic schedule is ‘ad hoc’, not based on empirical studies. The purpose of the paper is to present an empirical methodology to calculate a fair level of loan-loss provisions, at the time of default and after the default date. To illustrate, a dynamic provisioning schedule is estimated with micro-data provided by a Portuguese bank on recoveries on non-performing loans. This schedule is then compared to the regulatory provisioning schedule imposed by the central bank.

Abstract This paper develops a novel method for classifying oil price changes as supply or demand driven using information in asset prices. Motivated by a simple model, demand shocks are identified as returns to an index of oil producing firms which are orthogonal to unexpected changes in the VIX index, with supply shocks capturing the remaining variation in oil prices. Demand shocks are strongly positively correlated with market returns and economic output, whereas supply shocks have a strong negative correlation. The negative correlation of supply shocks and returns is strongest in industries that produce consumer goods, while the positive correlation of demand shocks is stronger for industries which use relatively large amounts of oil as an input.

Many studies use the book value of debt as a proxy for its market value because most corporate debt does not trade. I call this practice the book value of debt (BVD) approximation, and it appears to be justified by the observation that the average market value of debt is close to its book value. Many corporate bonds, however, trade at values significantly different from their book values, and consequently the BVD approximation can create important biases. I compare the accuracy of the BVD approximation to Merton's option pricing (OPT) model of corporate debt valuation, and find consistent evidence that the Merton model provides more accurate estimates. I also show that this model is an easily estimated alternative to the BVD approximation. In short, the BVD approximation not only creates significant biases, but it is also an unnecessary simplification.

Myers and Majluf [Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187–221.] showed that mispriced securities can lead managers with private information to invest inefficiently. It seems plausible that this problem would disappear in a fully revealing equilibrium, since information asymmetries are resolved and securities are priced correctly. In fact, Constantinides and Grundy [Constantinides, G.M., Grundy, B.D., 1989. Optimal investment with stock repurchase and financing as signals. Review of Financial Studies 2, 445–465.] claim that, in their model, any fully revealing equilibrium has efficient investment. This claim is incorrect, as infinitely many inefficient equilibria exist for the very example they work out. The inefficient outcomes survive the standard signaling-game equilibrium refinements. There are also examples that have fully revealing equilibria with inefficient investment but none with efficient investment.

This paper presents an asymmetric information model of share repurchases when shareholders have heterogeneous reservation values. Consistent with empirical evidence, managers in the model repurchase shares at a premium above the post-repurchase share value — transferring wealth from shareholders who do not tender to those who do — in order to signal that the firm is undervalued. Such dilutive repurchases would not occur under the classical assumption of perfectly elastic share supply; they depend critically on shareholder heterogeneity. It is also shown that repurchases are more efficient signals than other strategies like dividends and ‘burning money’. The model's implications are consistent with much empirical evidence regarding announcement returns, repurchase size, repurchase premiums and expiration-day price drops.