We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on the cost of debt through its effect on the reliability of financial reporting. Using Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads and a structural CDS pricing model, we calibrate a firm-level corporate opacity parameter in the pre- and post-SOX periods. Our analysis shows that corporate opacity and the cost of debt decrease significantly after SOX. The median firm in our sample experiences an 18bp reduction on its five-year CDS spread as a result of lower opacity following SOX, amounting to total annual savings of $ 844million for the 252 firms in our sample. Furthermore, the reduction in opacity tends to be larger for firms that in the pre-SOX period have lower accrual quality, less conservative earnings, lower number of independent directors, lower S& P Transparency and Disclosure ratings, and are more likely to benefit from SOX-compliance according to Chhaochharia and Grinstein’s (2007) criteria.

This paper introduces and analyzes a new form of contingent convertible: a call option enhanced reverse convertible (COERC). If an issuing bank’s market value of capital breaches a trigger, COERCs convert to many new equity shares that would heavily dilute existing shareholders, except that shareholders have the option to purchase these shares at the bond’s par value. COERCs have low risk: They are almost always fully repaid in cash. Yet, they reduce government bailouts by replenishing a bank’s capital. COERCs’ design also avoids problems with market-value triggers, such as manipulation or panic, while reducing moral hazard and debt overhang.

We model the impact of public and private ownership structures on firms' incentives to invest in innovative projects. We show that it is optimal to go public when exploiting existing ideas and optimal to go private when exploring new ideas. This result derives from the fact that private firms are less transparent to outside investors than are public firms. In private firms, insiders can time the market by choosing an early exit strategy if they receive bad news. This option makes insiders more tolerant of failures and thus more inclined to invest in innovative projects. In contrast, the prices of publicly traded securities react quickly to good news, providing insiders with incentives to choose conventional projects and cash in early.

This paper shows that jumps in financial asset prices are often erroneously identified and are, in fact, rare events accounting for a very small proportion of the total price variation. We apply new econometric techniques to a comprehensive set of ultra high-frequency equity and foreign exchange tick data recorded at millisecond precision, allowing us to examine the price evolution at the individual order level. We show that in both theory and practice, traditional measures of jump variation based on lower-frequency data tend to spuriously assign a burst of volatility to the jump component. As a result, the true price variation coming from jumps is overstated. Our estimates based on tick data suggest that the jump variation is an order of magnitude smaller than typical estimates found in the existing literature.

To understand the thinking process in private information games, we use “Mousetracking” to record which payoffs subjects attend to. The games have three information states and vary in strategic complexity. Subjects consistently deviate from Nash equilibrium choices and often fail to look at payoffs which they need to in order to compute an equilibrium response. Choices and lookups are similar when stakes are higher. When cluster analysis is used to group subjects according to lookup patterns and choices, three clusters appear to correspond approximately to level-3, level-2, and level-1 thinking in level-k models, and a fourth cluster is consistent with inferential mistakes (as, for example, in QRE or Cursed Equilibrium theories). Deviations from Nash play are associated with failure to look at the necessary payoffs. The time durations of looking at key payoffs can predict choices, to some extent, at the individual level and at the trial-by-trial level.

This study seeks to determine whether earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium. We find that investors anticipate some earnings announcements to convey news that increases market return volatility and pay a premium to hedge this non-diversifiable risk. In particular, we find evidence of risk premiums embedded in prices of firms' traded options that are significantly positively associated with the extent to which the firms' earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk. In addition, we find that volatility risk premiums are concentrated among bellwether firms and result in predictable variation in option straddle returns around earnings announcements. Taken together, our findings show that some earnings announcements pose non-diversifiable volatility risk that commands a risk premium.

This paper performs a thorough statistical examination of the time-series properties of the daily market volatility index (VIX) from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). The motivation lies not only on the widespread consensus that the VIX is a barometer of the overall market sentiment as to what concerns investors’ risk appetite, but also on the fact that there are many trading strategies that rely on the VIX index for hedging and speculative purposes. Preliminary analysis suggests that the VIX index displays long-range dependence. This is well in line with the strong empirical evidence in the literature supporting long memory in both options-implied and realized variances. We thus resort to both parametric and semiparametric heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) processes for modeling and forecasting purposes. Our main findings are as follows. First, we confirm the evidence in the literature that there is a negative relationship between the VIX index and the S&P 500 index return as well as a positive contemporaneous link with the volume of the S&P 500 index. Second, the term spread has a slightly negative long-run impact in the VIX index, when possible multicollinearity and endogeneity are controlled for. Finally, we cannot reject the linearity of the above relationships, neither in sample nor out of sample. As for the latter, we actually show that it is pretty hard to beat the pure HAR process because of the very persistent nature of the VIX index.

China launched a pilot scheme in March 2010 to lift the ban on short-selling and margin-trading for stocks on a designated list. We find that stocks experience negative returns when added to the list. After the ban is lifted, price efficiency increases while stock return volatility decreases. Panel data regressions reveal that intensified short-selling activities are associated with improved price efficiency. Short-sellers trade to eliminate overpricing by selling stocks with higher contemporaneous returns following a downward trend, and their trades predict future returns. In contrast, we find intensified margin-trading activities for stocks with lower contemporaneous returns, and these trades have no return predictive power.

The federal tax code provides preferential treatment for the production and use of renewable energy. We report estimates of the subsidies' effects on greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions developed in a recent National Research Council (NRC) Report. Due to lack of estimates of the impact of tax provisions on GHG emissions, new modeling studies were commissioned. The studies found, at best, a small impact of subsidies in reducing GHG emissions; in some cases, emissions increased. The NRC report also identified the need to capture the complex interactions among subsidies, pre-existing regulations, and commodity markets.

We examine the effect of CEO pensions and deferred compensation (inside debt) on firm cash holdings and the value of cash. We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and firm cash holdings. This positive effect is magnified by firm leverage and mitigated by the presence of financial constraints. We further find that the marginal value of cash to shareholders declines as CEO inside debt increases. Our evidence supports the view that inside debt tilts managerial incentives toward bondholders and helps balance the competing interests of stockholders and bondholders. The evidence also suggests, however, that inside debt can harm shareholder value by encouraging excess cash holdings.