We find evidence consistent with previously unrecognized market manipulation by broker-dealers. Specifically, we show that pre-trade hedging, which is distinct from front-running, alters prices at which derivative trades occur. We show this behavior is intentional by exploiting variation in the design of structured equity products (SEPs). We find positive abnormal returns on SEP pricing dates for which issuers benefit from altering closing stock prices but no such returns on pricing dates of otherwise similar SEPs. We also show that large buy trades near the close of trading are more frequent when SEP issuers have incentives to alter closing stock prices.

Prior research documents that auditors fail to revise audit plans to effectively address identified fraud cues. While auditors may understand what evidence would address such cues, we propose that auditors fail to apply this understanding because they use implemental mindsets when making decisions for themselves (i.e., deciding). However, we also propose that auditors use deliberative mindsets when advising. To test our predictions, we assign auditors to a decider or an advisor role in a realistic case that contains seeded fraud cues and asks them to consider revising last year's plan. We also manipulate whether the case prompts auditors to revise the plan unconventionally . Results indicate decider‐condition auditors use implemental mindsets: Prompted deciders follow the unconventional plan without regard to underlying fraud risk and unprompted deciders stick with the same‐as‐last‐year plan. Advisor‐condition auditors use more deliberative mindsets: In the prompt and no prompt conditions, they identify plans that are strongly linked to their own fraud risk assessments and that better align with experts' recommended plan for effectively addressing the seeded fraud cues. Supplemental analyses suggest deciding and advising auditors both follow the experts' plan when they believe in its potential effectiveness but, after controlling for the influence of perceived effectiveness, deciding auditors follow it to a greater extent simply because they believe the PCAOB wants it. By contrast, advising auditors do not exhibit signs of excessive PCAOB influence. Our findings provide evidence that seeking informal advice (or thinking like an advisor) helps auditors to effectively revise audit plans in response to identified fraud risk—it helps when a prompt is present or not, suggesting it complements rather than merely substitutes for interventions meant to improve auditors' judgment and decision making.

We provide a new framework for using text as data in empirical models. The framework identifies salient information in unstructured text that can control for multidimensional heterogeneity among assets. We demonstrate the efficacy of the framework by reexamining principal-agent problems in residential real estate markets. We show that the agent-owned premiums reported in the extant literature dissipate when the salient textual information is included. The results suggest the previously reported agent-owned premiums suffer from an omitted variable bias, which prior studies incorrectly ascribed to market distortions associated with asymmetric information.

We investigate the effect of regulatory enforcement actions on banks' reputation by estimating the effect of non-compliance with laws and regulations among lead arrangers on the structure of syndicated loans. Consistent with a regulatory reputational stigma, a punished lead arranger increases her loan share to entice participants to continue to co-finance the loan. Consequently, when punished lead arranger initiates a new syndicated loan, then this loan tends to be more concentrated and co-funded by participants with previous collaboration with the lead arranger. However, the observed share increases by punished lead arrangers are seemingly mitigated by extending the loan guarantees, performance pricing provisions, and covenants.

This paper develops an overlapping generations model of optimal rebalancing where agents differ in age and risk tolerance. Equilibrium rebalancing is driven by a leverage effect that influences levered and unlevered agents in opposite directions, an aggregate risk tolerance effect that depends on the distribution of wealth, and an intertemporal hedging effect. After a negative macroeconomic shock, relatively risk-tolerant investors sell risky assets, while more risk-averse investors buy them. Owing to interactions of leverage and changing wealth, however, all agents have higher exposure to aggregate risk after a negative macroeconomic shock and lower exposure after a positive shock.

After decades of supporting free trade, in 2018 the United States raised import tariffs and major trade partners retaliated. We analyze the short-run impact of this return to protectionism on the U.S. economy. Import and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in imports and exports. Prices of imports targeted by tariffs did not fall, implying complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. The resulting losses to U.S. consumers and firms that buy imports was $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP. We embed the estimated trade elasticities in a general-equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. After accounting for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP. Import tariffs favored sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, and the model implies that tradeable-sector workers in heavily Republican counties were the most negatively affected due to the retaliatory tariffs. JEL Code: F1.

Portfolio sorting is ubiquitous in the empirical finance literature, where it has been widely used to identify pricing anomalies. Despite its popularity, little attention has been paid to the statistical properties of the procedure. We develop a general framework for portfolio sorting by casting it as a nonparametric estimator. We present valid asymptotic inference methods and a valid mean square error expansion of the estimator leading to an optimal choice for the number of portfolios. In practical settings, the optimal choice may be much larger than the standard choices of five or ten. To illustrate the relevance of our results, we revisit the size and momentum anomalies.

We study merger policy in a dynamic computational model in which firms can reduce costs through investment or through mergers. Firms invest or propose mergers according to the profitability of these strategies. An antitrust authority can block mergers at some cost. We examine the optimal policy for an antitrust authority that cannot commit to its future policy and approves mergers as they are proposed. We find that the optimal policy can differ substantially from a policy based on static welfare. In general, antitrust policy can greatly affect firms’ investment behavior, and firms’ investment behavior can greatly affect the optimal antitrust policy.

During a look-back analysis, auditors review prior-period evidence to understand estimation inaccuracies and assess the reliability of management's estimation process. We find that evidence specificity moderates the relation between the consistency of an estimation inaccuracy with management's incentives and auditors' reliability assessments. The direction of an estimation inaccuracy has no effect on auditors' reliability assessments when the prior-period evidence is less specific. When prior-period evidence is more specific, auditors report the highest (lowest) reliability assessments of management's estimation process when an estimation inaccuracy is inconsistent (consistent) with management's incentives. Auditors' low reliability assessments in the more specific, consistent condition, however, do not translate to high risk assessments. Instead, specificity has a main effect on auditors' risk assessments. A follow-up experiment reveals, though, an inverse relation between auditors' reliability and risk assessments when auditors are provided procedures to address various levels of assessed misstatement risk.

We examine the relation between insiders’ investment horizon and the information content of their trades with respect to future stock returns. We conjecture that an insider's investment horizon establishes a benchmark for expected patterns of continued trading behavior and thus helps identify unexpected insider trades, which should be more informative in efficient markets. Consistent with this conjecture, the trades of short‐horizon insiders are both more unexpected and more informed, on average, than those of long‐horizon insiders. Short‐horizon insiders and their firms also tend to display characteristics that are associated with a greater focus on short‐termism.