Given that tax‐related critical audit matters (tax CAMs) were prevalent among accelerated filers (18.5% of observations) during the initial year of CAM disclosures, we examine whether an auditor's disclosure of tax CAMs is associated with variation in tax‐related financial reporting quality, tax avoidance, and tax‐related earnings management. Finding an association between tax CAMs and one of these tax outcomes would indicate that the new auditor reporting standard has indirectly affected investors. Examining the first year of CAM disclosures, we do not find that tax CAMs are associated with broad proxies of tax‐related audit or financial reporting quality (e.g., restatements, internal control weaknesses, comment letters) or tax avoidance (e.g., effective tax rates or book‐to‐tax differences). We do find that tax CAMs are associated with a modest increase in tax accrual quality, an increase in the reserve for unrecognized tax benefits, and a reduction in the likelihood of tax‐related earnings management. However, we do not find these tax CAM effects persist into the second year of CAM reporting. Our evidence is consistent with tax CAM disclosures having a modest but short‐lived effect on companies' reporting of tax accounts. Our findings should inform the PCAOB as they conduct their post‐implementation review of the new audit reporting standard.

We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.

We study overconfidence related to financial knowledge among men and women within U.S. households, venturing beyond prior research confined to subsamples such as CEOs, retail investors, and older adults. By expanding our study to the broader U.S. population, we provide evidence that women, on average, exhibit greater overconfidence than men – a discrepancy attributable to the gender difference in financial knowledge. We find a positive association between overconfidence and both investment risk-taking and savings behavior, while it correlates inversely with prudent credit card management. Our findings emphasize the instrumental role of financial literacy in mitigating overconfidence, providing a deeper understanding of the interaction between gender, overconfidence, and financial literacy. Our results carry profound implications for policy interventions and educational strategies.

We propose improved standard errors and an asymptotic theory for two-way clustered panels. Our theory allow for arbitrary serial dependence in the common time effects, which is excluded by existing two-way methods. Our asymptotic distribution theory is the first which allows for this level of inter-dependence. Under weak conditions, we demonstrate that OLS is asymptotically normal, our proposed variance estimator is consistent, and t-ratios are asymptotically standard normal. The results extend to two-way fixed-effect models; we argue that two-way clustering is still necessary even if two-way fixed effects are included. Simulation and empirical illustration are provided.

We provide a simple model of investment by a firm funded with debt and equity and empirical evidence to demonstrate that, once we control for the debt overhang problem with credit spreads, asset volatility is an unambiguously positive signal for investment, while equity volatility sends a mixed signal: Elevated volatility raises the option value of equity and increases investment for financially sound firms, but exacerbates debt overhang and decreases investment for firms close to default. Our study provides a simple unified understanding of the structural and empirical relationships between investment, credit spreads, equity versus asset volatility, leverage, and Tobin's .

In 1966, Southern hospitals were barred from participating in Medicare unless they discontinued their longstanding practice of racial segregation. Using data from five Deep South states and exploiting county-level variation in Medicare certification dates, we find that gaining access to an ostensibly integrated hospital had no effect on Black postneonatal mortality. Similarly, there is little evidence that the campaign contributed to the trend towards in-hospital births among Southern Black mothers. These results are consistent with descriptions of the hospital desegregation campaign as producing only cosmetic changes and illustrate the limits of anti-discrimination policies imposed upon reluctant actors.

Bank lobbying has a bitter taste in most forums, ringing the bell of preferential treatment of big banks from governments and regulators. Using corporate loan facilities and hand-matched information on bank lobbying from 1999 to 2017, we show that lobbying banks increase their borrowers' overall performance. This positive effect is stronger for opaque and credit-constrained borrowers, when the lobbying lender possesses valuable information on the borrower, and for borrowers with strong corporate governance. Our findings are consistent with the theory positing that lobbying can provide access to valuable lender-borrower information, resulting in improved efficiency in large firms' corporate financing.

Few studies have examined the reputational damage of environmental and social (E&S) scandals ex-post. Using an international sample of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) across 18 countries, we examine whether heightened E&S risks arising from acquirers’ E&S incidents affect the cost of acquisition. We find that the severity of the incident increases acquisition premium and this effect is explained by incident acquirers compensating target shareholders for heightened reputation risks, rather than seeking to repair their reputation through the acquisition. At the country level, incident acquirers in countries with stronger E&S standards and policies also experience higher premium. Further analysis shows that E&S incidents reduce shareholder value upon the announcement of an M&A and increase the time taken for M&A completion. Firms are less likely to make acquisitions after experiencing an E&S incident, but this decision depends on the cost of delay. Finally, we show that the adverse impact on acquisitions dissipates after six months.

We document the impact of having a risk committee (RC) and a chief risk officer (CRO) on bank risk using the passage of the Dodd Frank Act as a natural experiment. The Act requires bank holding companies with over 10B of assets to have an RC to oversee risk management, while those with over 50B of assets are additionally required to have a CRO. We use difference-in-difference and regression discontinuity approaches to estimate the change in risk following RC and CRO adoption. Overall, we find no evidence that the RC or CRO have a causal impact on bank risk.