We develop a model of financial contracting under imperfect enforcement. Financial contracts are designed to keep entrepreneurs from diverting project returns, but enforcement is probabilistic and penalties are limited. The model rationalizes the prevalence of straight debt and common stock, and its predictions are consistent with a host of empirical capital structure regularities.

This paper documents the existence of a slowly evolving trend in the log dividend-price ratio, DP t , determined by a demographic variable, MY t : the middle-aged to young ratio. Deviations of DP t from this long-run component explain transitory but persistent fluctuations in stock market returns. The relation between MY t and DP t is a prediction of an overlapping generation model. The joint significance of MY and DP t in long-horizon forecasting regressions for market returns explains the mixed evidence on the ability of DP t to predict stock returns and provide a model-based interpretation of statistical corrections for breaks in the mean of this financial ratio.

This paper positions the pure-play internet banking model (PPI) as a hybrid business model that combines features of both relationship and transaction banking. Although in terms of customer orientation PPI banks may partly resemble relationship banks, they lack their comparative advantage in generating borrower-specific information. Instead, the characteristic features of PPI banks are low costs and easy scalability. While the latter may enable PPI banks to quickly capture market share, it may also generate overexposure in risky markets. We present a case study on ING Direct, one of the leading global PPI banks and address the sustainability of the PPI business model by comparing the ING Direct foreign operations. The findings for ING Direct are validated using data for E-Trade Bank. We conclude that managing growth appears to be the prime challenge to PPI banks.

Research to date does not demonstrate a causal chain from financial education to welfare-enhancing financial behavior, in part due to biases, heuristics, and emotional influences on decisions. Yet the search for effective financial education continues. But it is time to ask whether giving every person effective financial education would make us better off. Two reasons it might not are discussed here. First, the time, expense, and invasion of privacy required would be enormous. Second, such a world would entail a decrease in individual autonomy. Alternative tools could potentially increase household financial welfare and security at lower social and individual expense.

In a market-clearing economy, declines in demand from one sector do not cause large declines in aggregate output because other sectors expand. The key price mediating the response is the interest rate. A decline in the rate stimulates all categories of spending. But in a low-inflation economy, the room for a decline in the rate is small, because of the notorious lower limit of zero on the nominal interest rate. In the Great Depression, substantial deflation caused the real interest rate to reach high levels. In the Great Slump that began at the end of 2007, low inflation resulted in an only slightly negative real rate when full employment called for a much lower real rate because of declines in demand. Fortunately, the inflation rate hardly responded to conditions in product and labor markets, else deflation might have occurred, with an even higher real interest rate. I concentrate on three closely related sources of declines in demand: the buildup of excess stocks of housing and consumer durables, the corresponding expansion of consumer debt that financed the buildup, and financial frictions that resulted from the decline in real-estate prices.

This paper estimates the effect of the early childhood environment on a large array of social and economic outcomes lasting almost 60 years. To do this, we exploit variation in the living conditions experienced by Yemenite children after being airlifted to Israel in 1949. We find that children who were placed in a more modern environment ( i.e. with better sanitary and infrastructure conditions) were more likely to obtain higher education, marry at an older age, have fewer children, and work at age 55. They were also more likely to be assimilated into Israeli society, to be less religious, and have more worldly tastes in music and food. However, these effects are found mainly for women and not for men. We also find an effect on the next generation—children who lived in a better environment grew up to have children with more education.

We study the price-setting problem of a firm in the presence of both observation and menu costs. The firm optimally decides when to “review” costly information on the adequacy of its price. Upon each review, the firm chooses whether to adjust its price, one or more times, before the next price review. Each price adjustment entails paying a menu cost. The firm's choices map into several statistics: the frequency of price reviews, the frequency of price adjustments, the size distribution of price changes, and the hazard rate of price adjustments. The simultaneous presence of observation and menu costs produces complementarities that change the predictions of simpler models featuring one cost only. For instance, infrequent observations may reflect a high menu cost rather than high observation costs: in spite of these complementarities, we show that the ratio of the two costs is identified by several statistics on price observations and adjustments.

We take advantage of a natural experiment in the state of Indiana to estimate the effect of daylight saving time (DST) on residential electricity consumption. Our main finding is that, contrary to the policy's intent, DST increases electricity demand. The findings are consistent with simulation results that identify a trade-off between reducing demand for lighting and increasing demand for heating and cooling. We estimate a cost to Indiana households of $9 million per year in increased electricity bills. We also estimate social costs of increased pollution emissions between $1.7 to $5.5 million per year.

Motivated by recent cartel practices, a stable collusive agreement is characterized when firms' prices and quantities are private information. Conditions are derived whereby an equilibrium exists in which firms truthfully report their sales and then make transfers within the cartel based on these reports. The properties of this equilibrium fit well with the cartel agreements in a number of markets including citric acid, lysine, and vitamins.

We examine how experience affects the decisions of individual investors and institutions in IPO auctions to bid in subsequent auctions, and their bidding returns. We track bidding histories for all 31, 476 individual investors and 1, 232 institutional investors across all 84 IPO auctions during the period from 1995 to 2000 in Taiwan. For individual bidders, (1) high returns in previous IPO auctions increase the likelihood of participating in future auctions; (2) bidders' returns decrease as they participate in more auctions; (3) auction selection ability deteriorates with experience; and (4) those with greater experience bid more aggressively. These findings are consistent with naïve reinforcement learning wherein individuals become unduly optimistic after receiving good returns. In sharp contrast, there is little sign that institutional investors exhibit such behavior. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.