The authors develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time. Strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption. Such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable. They are an important part of the authors' analysis be-cause even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention. Their theory also impies that "cold turkey" is used to end strong addictions, that addicts often go on binges, that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods, and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction.

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.

Using data from the March Current Population Survey, the authors document an increase over the past 30 years in wage inequality for males. Between 1963 and 1989, real average weekly wages for the least skilled workers declined by about 5 percent, whereas wages for the most skilled workers rose by about 40 percent. The authors find that the trend toward increased wage inequality is apparent within narrowly defined education and labor market experience groups. Their interpretation is that much of the increase in wage inequality fro males over the last 20 years is due to increased returns to the components of skill other than years of schooling and years of labor market experience.

We consider the link between parents’ influence over the preferences of children, parental investments in children’s human capital, and children’s support of elderly parents. It may pay for parents to spend resources to “manipulate” children’s preferences in order to induce them to support their parents in old age. Since parents invest more in children when they expect greater support, manipulation of child preferences may end up helping children and parents. A new result, which we call the “Rotten Parent Theorem,” demonstrates that if children are altruistic, then even selfish parents will make the optimal investment in their children’s human capital.

The Economics of Copyright "Fair Use" in a Networked World by Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner and Kevin M. Murphy. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 205-208 of American Economic Review, May 2002

This paper explores the implications for risk‐taking behavior and the equilibrium distribution of income of assuming that the desire for status positions is a powerful motive and that it raises the marginal utility of consumption. In contrast to previous analyses, we consider the case in which status positions are sold in a hedonic market. We show that such a complete hedonic market in status positions can be perfectly replicated by a simpler arrangement with a “status good” and a social norm that assigns higher status to those that consume more of this good. The main result is that for a wide range of initial conditions the equilibrium distribution over income, status, and consumption is the same, that this allocation requires inequality of income and consumption, and that this allocation coincides with the optimum of a utilitarian planner.

U.S. beef cattle stocks are among the most periodic economic time series. A theory of cattle cycles is constructed on the basis of breeding stock inventory decisions. The low fertility rate of cows and substantial lags and future feedback between fertility and consumption decisions cause the demographic structure of the herd to respond cyclically to exogenous shocks in demand and production costs. Known demographic parameters of cattle imply sharp numerical benchmarks for the resulting dynamic system and closely compare with independent econometric time-series estimates over the 1875-1990 period. The model fits extremely well.

Our analysis of growth assumes endogenous fertility and a rising rate of return on human capital as the stock of human capital increases. When human capital is abundant, rates of return on human capital investments are high relative to rates of return on children, whereas when human capital is scarce, rates of return on human capital are low relative to those on children. As a result, societies with limited human capital choose large families and invest little in each member; those with abundant human capital do the opposite. This leads to two stable steady states. One has large families and little human capital; the other has small families and perhaps growing human and physical capital.

We provide fresh evidence regarding the relation between compensation consultants and CEO pay. First, firms that employ consultants have higher-paid CEOs—this result is robust to firm fixed effects and matching on economic and governance variables. Second, while this relation is partly due to consultant conflicts of interest, it is largely explained by the impact consultants have on the composition and complexity of CEO pay plans; notably, this impact fully mediates the consultant-CEO pay relation. Third, firms with higher-paid CEOs and more complex pay plans are more likely to hire a consultant. Last, Say-on-Pay voting patterns suggest shareholders view positively the advice consultants provide, but only when consultants provide no other services. We also find suggestive evidence of boards “layering” new equity incentive plans over existing ones, thereby increasing the impact of composition and complexity on CEO pay beyond the premium the CEO would demand for bearing additional compensation risk. JEL Classifications: J33; M12; M52; M48. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.