We analyze the relation between comprehensive measures of board quality and the cost as well as the non-price terms of bank loans. We show that firms that have higher quality boards with a greater advisory presence borrow at lower interest rates. This relation exists even after controlling for ownership structure, CEO compensation policy, and shareholder protection, as well as the size and financial characteristics of the borrower and of the loan. We also show evidence that board quality and other governance characteristics influence the likelihood that loans have covenant requirements, but the relations differ by covenant type. When we combine the direct and indirect costs of bank loans we find that firms with large, independent, experienced, and diverse boards and lower institutional ownership borrow more cheaply. Overall, the evidence indicates that board quality impacts the cost of bank debt.

This paper uses dynamic panel data methods to examine the determinants of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the Greek banking sector, separately for each loan category (consumer loans, business loans and mortgages). The study is motivated by the hypothesis that both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables have an effect on loan quality and that these effects vary between different loan categories. The results show that, for all loan categories, NPLs in the Greek banking system can be explained mainly by macroeconomic variables (GDP, unemployment, interest rates, public debt) and management quality. Differences in the quantitative impact of macroeconomic factors among loan categories are evident, with non-performing mortgages being the least responsive to changes in the macroeconomic conditions.

Gray markets arise when a manufacturer's products are sold outside of its authorized channels, for instance when goods designated by a multinational firm for sale in a foreign market are resold domestically. One method multinationals use to combat gray markets is to increase transfer prices to foreign subsidiaries in order to increase the gray market's cost base. We illustrate that, when a gray market competitor exists, the optimal transfer price to a foreign subsidiary exceeds marginal cost and is decreasing in the competitiveness of the domestic market. However, a multinational's discretion in setting transfer prices may be limited by mandatory arm's length transfer pricing rules. Provided gray markets exist, we characterize when mandating arm's length transfer pricing lowers domestic social welfare relative to unrestricted transfer pricing. We also demonstrate that gray markets can lead to higher domestic tax revenues, even when gray market firms do not pay taxes domestically.

In this study, we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an incomplete contract setting, in which the incentive contract does not govern all tasks for which the agent is responsible, the agent's trust in the principal is relevant. In this setting, we predict that bonus contracts create a more trusting environment, and this effect spills over to tasks not governed by the incentive contract, such that bonus contracts elicit greater effort on these tasks as compared to penalty contracts. We develop and experimentally validate a theoretical model of the effects of contract frame on trust and effort in this incomplete contract setting. The main intuition behind the model is that the framing of an incentive contract affects the degree to which the contract terms are interpreted by the agent as a signal of mistrust. More specifically, penalty contracts engender greater distrust than do bonus contracts and, therefore, when contracts are incomplete, penalty contracts lead to lower effort on tasks not governed by the contract than do bonus contracts.

In this paper we study identification and estimation of a correlated random coefficients (CRC) panel data model. The outcome of interest varies linearly with a vector of endogenous regressors. The coefficients on these regressors are heterogenous across units and may covary with them. We consider the average partial effect (APE) of a small change in the regressor vector on the outcome (cf. Chamberlain (1984), Wooldridge (2005a)). Chamberlain (1992) calculated the semiparametric efficiency bound for the APE in our model and proposed a √N-consistent estimator. Nonsingularity of the APE's information bound, and hence the appropriateness of Chamberlain's (1992) estimator, requires (i) the time dimension of the panel (T) to strictly exceed the number of random coefficients (p) and (ii) strong conditions on the time series properties of the regressor vector. We demonstrate irregular identification of the APE when T = p and for more persistent regressor processes. Our approach exploits the different identifying content of the subpopulations of stayers—or units whose regressor values change little across periods—and movers—or units whose regressor values change substantially across periods. We propose a feasible estimator based on our identification result and characterize its large sample properties. While irregularity precludes our estimator from attaining parametric rates of convergence, its limiting distribution is normal and inference is straightforward to conduct. Standard software may be used to compute point estimates and standard errors. We use our methods to estimate the average elasticity of calorie consumption with respect to total outlay for a sample of poor Nicaraguan households.

The primary objective of the current study is to empirically reexamine the relation between material weaknesses in internal control (MW) and cost of equity (CE). We direct particular emphasis to the way non-remediation, as well as remediation, of MW affects a firm's CE. This study utilizes a dataset that contains a large sample of second-year MW non-remediation cases, as well as third-, fourth-, and fifth-year non-remediation cases. The findings provide evidence that reporting MW, absent any remediation, in multiple consecutive years has a significant negative impact on CE. However, the current study also shows that the market views favorably a reduction in the number of MW (i.e., partial remediation). Our study helps to reconcile conflicting results in the literature devoted to the relation between MW and CE. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: Available from sources identified within the article.

The literature disagrees on the link between so-called busy boards (where many independent directors hold multiple board seats) and firm performance. Some argue that busyness certifies a director’s ability and that such directors are value enhancing. Others argue that “over-boarded” directors are ineffective and detract from firm value. We find evidence that (1) the disparate results in prior work stem from differences in both sample composition and empirical design, (2) on balance the results suggest a negative association between board busyness and firm performance, and (3) the inclusion of firm fixed effects dramatically affects the conclusions drawn from, and the explanatory power of, multivariate analyses. We also explore alternative empirical definitions of what constitutes a busy director and find that commonly used proxies for busyness perform well relative to more complex alternatives.

As both a regulator and an academic, Fred Kahn argued that end-use electricity consumers should face prices that reflect the time-varying marginal costs of generating electricity. This has been very slow to happen in the US, even in light of recent technological advances that have lowered costs and improved functionality for meters and automated demand response technologies. We describe these recent developments and discuss the remaining barriers to the proliferation of time-varying electricity pricing.

Using data from the United States Sentencing Commission, we examine how judicial biases may have influenced sentences during the era of the Federal criminal sentencing guidelines. Our utility maximization model of judicial sentencing preferences leads to a partially censored ordered probit model that accounts for mass points in the sentencing distribution that occur at the upper and lower guideline limits and at sentences involving no prison time. Our results indicate that racial- and gender-based discrepancies exist, even after controlling for circumstances such as the severity of the offense and past criminal history.

Using cross-state variation in minimum wages, we observe a positive relationship between the minimum wage and the number of alcohol-related accidents involving teen drivers. A similar effect is not observed when examining accidents among adults. The results are consistent with a positive income elasticity for alcoholic beverages and driving activities among young people, in particular for consumption out of discretionary income accorded by higher minimum wages. Evidence of a sizable impact of beer taxes on alcohol-related accidents among youths suggests that beer taxes are one avenue for policymakers to consider in counteracting this unintended consequence of minimum wages.