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Institutions and Individuals at the Turn‐of‐the‐Year

Journal of Finance 1997 52(4), 1543-1562
This article evaluates the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis against the window‐dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn‐of‐the‐year anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn‐of‐the‐year effect.

CEO Tournaments: A Cross-Country Analysis of Causes, Cultural Influences, and Consequences

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2017 52(2), 519-551
Using a cross-country sample, we examine the chief executive officer (CEO) tournament structure (measured alternatively as the ratio and the difference of pay between the CEO and other top executives within a firm). We find the tournament structure to vary systematically with firm and country cultural characteristics. In particular, firm size and the cultural values of power distance, fair income differences, and competition are significantly associated with variations in tournament structures. We also establish support for the primary implication of tournament theory in that tournament structure tends to be positively related to firm value, even after controlling for endogeneity.

Corporate ESG Profiles and Investor Horizons

Journal of Finance 2026 81(2), 603-642
We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.

The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors

Review of Financial Studies 2020 33(3), 1067-1111 open access
According to our survey about climate risk perceptions, institutional investors believe climate risks have financial implications for their portfolio firms and that these risks, particularly regulatory risks, already have begun to materialize. Many of the investors, especially the long-term, larger, and ESG-oriented ones, consider risk management and engagement, rather than divestment, to be the better approach for addressing climate risks. Although surveyed investors believe that some equity valuations do not fully reflect climate risks, their perceived overvaluations are not large.

Getting the Incentives Right: Backfilling and Biases in Executive Compensation Data

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(4), 1460-1498
We document that backfilling in the ExecuComp database introduces a data-conditioning bias that can affect inferences and make replicating previous work difficult. Although backfilling can be advantageous due to greater data coverage, if not addressed, the oversampling of firms with strong managerial incentives and higher subsequent returns leads to a significant upward bias in abnormal compensation, pay-for-performance sensitivity, and the magnitudes of several previously established relations. The bias also can lead to one misinterpreting the appropriate functional form of a relation and whether the data support one compensation theory over another. We offer methods to address this issue. Received May 12, 2014; editorial decision May 10, 2016 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

The negativity bias and perceived return distributions: Evidence from a pandemic

Journal of Financial Economics 2023 147(3), 627-657 open access
We hypothesize that the well-documented negativity bias, the psychological tendency to asymmetrically emphasize negative over positive aspects, can help explain several financial market phenomena: why most individuals hold strongly bearish views of both short- and long-term equity return distributions, why individuals exhibit heterogeneous beliefs, and the stock market participation puzzle. Using variation in the perceived risk of mortality from the swine flu pandemic as our primary proxy for an individual's negativity bias, we find strong support for our hypothesis even when controlling for alternative mechanisms including optimism, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and anxiety.

Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

Journal of Financial Economics 2003 68(1), 3-46
We investigate whether institutional investors “vote with their feet” when dissatisfied with a firm's management by examining changes in equity ownership around forced CEO turnover. We find that aggregate institutional ownership and the number of institutional investors decline in the year prior to forced CEO turnover. However, selling by institutions is far from universal. Overall, there is an increase in shareholdings of individual investors and a decrease in holdings of institutional investors who are more concerned with holding prudent securities, are better informed, or are engaged in momentum trading. Measures of institutional ownership changes are negatively related to the likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and that an executive from outside the firm is appointed CEO.

CEO deal-making activities and compensation

Journal of Financial Economics 2014 114(3), 471-492
Using transactions generally overlooked in the compensation literature—joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings (SEOs), and spin-offs—we find that, beyond compensation for increases in firm size or complexity, chief executive officers (CEOs) are rewarded for their deal-making activities. Boards pay CEOs for the core motivation of the deal, as well as for deal volume. We find that compensating for volume instead of core value creation occurs under weak board monitoring and that in deal-making firms, neither CEO turnover nor pay-for-performance responds to underperformance. We introduce an input monitoring explanation for these results: boards compensate for deal volume because of their inability to perfectly monitor outputs.

Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Mutual Fund Asset Allocation Changes

American Economic Review 2015 105(5), 432-436 open access
In this paper we compare changes in asset allocations between mutual funds held in defined contribution pension plans and funds held by other investors. We investigate how flows into equity and fixed income mutual funds depend on macroeconomic conditions. We find that defined contribution plans react more sensitively to these conditions, suggesting effects on mutual fund managers and other investors.

Sentiment Metrics and Investor Demand

Journal of Finance 2019 74(2), 985-1024
Recent work suggests that sentiment traders shift from safer to more speculative stocks when sentiment increases. Exploiting these cross‐sectional patterns and changes in share ownership, we find that sentiment metrics capture institutional rather than individual investors’ demand shocks. We investigate the underlying economic mechanisms and find that common institutional investment styles (e.g., risk management, momentum trading) explain a significant portion of the relation between institutions and sentiment.