The Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure Act (CARD Act) of 2009 restricted several risk management practices of credit card issuers. Using a quasi-experimental design with credit bureau data on consumer lending, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the act's restrictions on risk management practices contributed to a large decline in bank card holding by higher risk, nonprime consumers but had little effect on prime consumers. Looking at consumer finance loans, historically a source of credit for higher risk consumers, we find greater reliance on such loans by nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings following the CARD Act than by nonprime consumers in states with low rate ceilings or by prime consumers. That nonprime consumers in states with high consumer finance rate ceilings relied more heavily on consumer finance loans suggests that consumer finance loans were a substitute for subprime credit cards for risky consumers when rate ceilings permit such loans to be profitable. Consumer finance loans would not be available to many higher risk, nonprime consumers in low rate states because such loans would be unprofitable, and prime consumers would not need consumer finance loans because other less expensive types of credit would generally be available to them.

This paper surveys the growing literature on payments. We begin by presenting a simple model that illustrates the essential function of payments and how this may be implemented through various arrangements. We show how the basic models of payments have been used to address a variety of microeconomic and macroeconomic policy issues. We then discuss the links between payments economics and other fields, including monetary theory, corporate finance, and industrial organization. We conclude with an overview of the empirical literature and directions for future research.

Through textual analyses of 7.7 million patents, we develop a novel intercompany innovation similarity measure which enables us to find that technologically connected firms cross-predict one another’s returns. Investors impound information about firms’ technological connectedness, although not immediately and fully. Buying (shorting) shares of technological peers earning high (low) returns during the previous month yields a 1.29% monthly return. Firms’ return predictability increases with patent complexity or limited technological disclosures but decreases with better information transparency. Results suggest that investor inattention explains technology momentum. Unlike momentum stemming from simpler, class-based technological links, our Big Data text-based return predictability remains active.

Using a sample of long-term supply contracts collected from SEC filings, I show that hold-up concerns and information asymmetry are important determinants of contract design. Asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers leads to shorter term contracts. However, when longer duration contracts facilitate the exchange of relationship specific assets, the parties substitute short-term contracts with financial covenants in order to reduce moral hazard. Covenant restrictions are more prevalent when direct monitoring is costly and the products exchanged are highly specific. Finally, I find that buyers and suppliers are less likely to rely on financial covenants when financial statement reliability is low.