This paper derives the optimal size of the financial sector using a general equilibrium framework that is an extension of the paper of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 663–691]. We show that the financial sector has a unique optimal size relative to the size of the economy as a whole. Creating and maintaining this sector requires diversion of some physical capital from production of output to monitoring that production. However, the efficiency gain in output production brought about by monitoring warrants the diversion. It is also found that the optimal size of the financial sector is independent of the state of the economy and does not vary over the business cycle.

We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.

In this paper we evaluate the role of sell‐side analysts' long‐term earnings growth forecasts in the pricing of common equity offerings. We find that, in general, sell‐side analysts' long‐term growth forecasts are systematically overly optimistic around equity offerings and that analysts employed by the lead managers of the offerings make the most optimistic growth forecasts. In additional, we find a positive relation between the fees paid to the affiliated analysts' employers and the level of the affiliated analysts' growth forecasts. We also document that the post‐offering underperformance is most pronounced for firms with the highest growth forecasts made by affiliated analysts. Finally, we demonstrate that the post‐offering underperformance disappears once we control for the overoptimism in earnings growth expectations. Thus, the evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the “equity issue puzzle” arising from overly optimistic earnings growth expectations held at the time of the offerings.

I identify the effects of class size on student achievement using longitudinal variation in the population associated with each grade in 649 elementary schools. I use variation in class size driven by idiosyncratic variation in the population. I also use discrete jumps in class size that occur when a small change in enrollment triggers a maximum or minimum class size rule. The estimates indicate that class size does not have a statistically significant effect on student achievement. I rule out even modest effects (2 to 4 percent of a standard deviation in scores for a 10 percent reduction in class size).

The hospital market is served by firms that are private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and government-owned and operated. I use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior. I find that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint of government-owned institutions. The decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals are just as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profit-maximizing facilities. My final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent.

Mistakes give us a window into the brain. Just as optical illusions help us understand visual information processing, mistaken choices help us understand decision-making. The mistakes described below suggest that economics can usefully segregate decision mechanisms into two broad categories - those based on thoughts and those based on feelings. Consideration of these mistakes suggests that economists will be better able to interpret the growing body of seemingly anomalous evidence about human behavior if they treat thoughts and feelings more symmetrically.

The Microsoft case has attracted more attention than perhaps any antitrust case in history - far more than the mammoth IBM case of the 1970's, with which it is sometimes compared. I was the chief economics witness for IBM in U.S. v. IBM and the chief economics witness for the United States in U.S. v. Microsoft. I did not switch sides. Even though both cases involved bundling and charges of leveraging, the facts were different, and the principles of economic analysis led to different outcomes. In particular, Microsoft's actions did what IBM's could not have done -- excluded competitors by protecting an important barrier to entry into the market in which it held monopoly power.

This article presents an application of extreme value theory to compute the value at risk of a market position. In statistics, extremes of a random process refer to the lowest observation (the minimum) and to the highest observation (the maximum) over a given time-period. Extreme value theory gives some interesting results about the distribution of extreme returns. In particular, the limiting distribution of extreme returns observed over a long time-period is largely independent of the distribution of returns itself. In financial markets, extreme price movements correspond to market corrections during ordinary periods, and also to stock market crashes, bond market collapses or foreign exchange crises during extraordinary periods. An approach based on extreme values to compute the VaR thus covers market conditions ranging from the usual environment considered by the existing VaR methods to the financial crises which are the focus of stress testing. Univariate extreme value theory is used to compute the VaR of a fully aggregated position while multivariate extreme value theory is used to compute the VaR of a position decomposed on risk factors.

Using microdata from 1985 to 1994 for fifteen OECD countries, I find that greater union coverage and membership lead to higher relative pay and lower relative employment for less-skilled men, with similar pay effects but only weak evidence of negative employment effects for less-skilled women. Greater economy-wide union coverage or membership leads to lower employment and higher relative wages for young men (with similar but weaker effects for young women), and a greater propensity to attend school for both genders. With few jobs for young people, education may have a low opportunity cost and may enhance one's employability.

This paper uses a VAR approach to investigate the effects of public investment on private-sector performance in the United States. This approach is consistent with the argument that the analysis of these effects requires the consideration of dynamic feedbacks among the different variables. Estimation results suggest that all types of public investment have a positive effect on private output. Core infrastructure investment in electric and gas facilities, transit systems, and airfields, as well as in sewage and water supply systems display the highest rates of return, 16.1% and 9.7%, respectively, closely followed by investment in educational, hospital, and other public buildings with 8.9%.