We examine whether men and women of the same ability differ in their selection into a competitive environment. Participants in a laboratory experiment solve a real task, first under a non-competitive piece rate and then a competitive tournament incentive scheme. Although there are no gender differences in performance, men select the tournament twice as much as women when choosing their compensation scheme for the next performance. While seventy-three percent of the men select the tournament only thirty-five percent of the women make this choice. This gender gap in tournament entry is not explained by performance and factors such as risk and feedback aversion only play a negligible role. Instead the tournament-entry gap is driven by men being more overconfident and by gender differences in preferences for performing in a competition. The result is that women shy away from competition and men embrace it. * We thank Scott Kinross, who conducted all the experiments reported in this paper, for his excellent research assistance. We thank the editors and the referees who helped us improve the paper. We also

In this paper we develop a strongly stable (L-stable) and highly accurate method for pricing exotic options. The method is based on Padé schemes and also utilizes partial fraction decomposition to address issues regarding accuracy and computational efficiency. Due to non-smooth payoffs, which cause discontinuities in the solution (or its derivatives), standard A-stable methods are prone to produce large and spurious oscillations in the numerical solutions which would mislead to estimating options accurately. The proposed method does not suffer these drawbacks while being easy to implement on concurrent processors. Numerical results are presented for digital options, butterfly spread and barrier options in one and two assets. In addition, the methods are tested on the Heston stochastic volatility model.

We find that in allocating initial public offerings (IPOs), underwriters favor institutions they have previously worked with. Regular investors benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. Relationship participation is more important in the distribution of IPOs with stronger demand, IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals by less reputable underwriters. Overall, our results are consistent with book-building theories of IPOs. Interestingly, for 1999–2000 we find that regular investors receive even more underpriced IPOs relative to previous years while we do not find evidence that they provide additional services in IPOs.

This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors' bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs' incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with “shallow pockets” must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund'sinitial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised.

NYSE and Nasdaq trades increasingly cluster on multiples of 500, 1,000, and 5,000 shares. Such clustering varies over time and across stocks, and tends to increase with the level of trading activity. Furthermore, rounded trades tend to have more persistence both in occurrence and in trade initiation. Finally, medium-sized rounded trades tend to have greater relative price impact than large rounded trades. From these observations we surmise that trade-size clustering is consistent, at least in part, with the actions of stealth traders who tend to use medium-sized rounded transactions in an attempt to disguise their trades.

In the 1980s, Drexel Burnham Lambert dominated the underwriting of junk bonds with close to a 50% market share. In 1990, Drexel went bankrupt and was liquidated, and the percentage underwriting fees for junk bonds subsequently dropped dramatically. We present strong evidence that the exit of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the resulting increase in competition for market share were major contributing factors to the decline in junk bond underwriter fees.

We examine whether spin-offs or divestitures cause improvements in conglomerate investment efficiency. At issue are endogeneity of these restructuring decisions and correct measurement of investment efficiency. Endogeneity is a problem because the factors that induce firms to spin off or divest divisions may also improve investment efficiency; measurement error is a problem because efficiency measures employ Tobin’s q as a noisy proxy for investment opportunities. We find important differences between firms that divest or spin off and a control sample. After accounting for these differences and for measurement error in q, we find no evidence of improvements in investment efficiency.

A price process is scale-invariant if and only if the returns distribution is independent of the price measurement scale. We show that most stochastic processes used for pricing options on financial assets have this property and that many models not previously recognised as scale-invariant are indeed so. We also prove that price hedge ratios for a wide class of contingent claims under a wide class of pricing models are model-free. In particular, previous results on model-free price hedge ratios of vanilla options based on scale-invariant models are extended to any contingent claim with homogeneous pay-off, including complex, path-dependent options. However, model-free hedge ratios only have the minimum variance property in scale-invariant stochastic volatility models when price–volatility correlation is zero. In other stochastic volatility models and in scale-invariant local volatility models, model-free hedge ratios are not minimum variance ratios and our empirical results demonstrate that they are less efficient than minimum variance hedge ratios.

In this paper, we compare option contracts from a traditional derivatives exchange to bank-issued options, also referred to as covered warrants. While bank-issued option markets and traditional derivatives exchanges exhibit significant structural differences such as the absence of a central counterparty for bank-issued options, they frequently exist side-by-side, and the empirical evidence shows that there is significant overlap in their product offerings although options are not fungible between the two markets. The empirical analysis indicates that bid-ask spreads in either market are lowered by 1–2% due to competition from the other market, providing evidence that the benefits of competing market structures are available in the absence of fungibility.

Household investment leads nonresidential business fixed investment over the U.S. business cycle. Because real business cycle theory has not been able to account for this observation, it represents a potent challenge to the view that transitory productivity disturbances are the main source of aggregate fluctuations. This paper reconciles RBC theory with the investment dynamics by extending the traditional home production model to make household capital complementary to business capital and labor in market production. Empirical evidence suggesting that household capital is a complementary input in market production is also presented.