The concept of materiality provides a basis for auditors to ignore small misstatements, but the definition of “small” in this context is ambiguous. The issue of “materiality-standard-setting” has been raised recently by Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. We examine how materiality uncertainty affects the auditor's evaluation of audit evidence and a manager's choice of earnings overstatement in a strategic auditing model where earnings misstatements also include unintentional system error. We find that when the expected cost of accepting financial statements that are materially misstated, which we refer to as an audit failure, is relatively large, an increase in materiality uncertainty results in a more conservative auditor evaluation of the audit evidence and a decrease in the amount of intentional overstatement. Alternatively, if the auditor's expected cost of extending audit procedures is relatively high, then an increase in materiality uncertainty results in a less conservative auditor evaluation of the audit evidence and an increase in the manager's earnings overstatement. The auditor also becomes increasingly conservative as the report increases when the information system is sufficiently noisy. Finally, when the expected cost of audit failure is large, the equilibrium audit risk can increase or decrease in materiality uncertainty despite the corresponding increase in auditor conservatism and decrease in intentional overstatement. Audit risk is the average probability of audit failure across all possible evidence outcomes.

In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

The accuracy of sell-side analysts' forecast revisions is related to a number of factors, including characteristics of the analyst and the age of the forecast. In this study we examine whether there are differences in how sophisticated and unsophisticated investors use these factors to predict the relative accuracy of forecast revisions. We adapt the lens model methodological approach from the judgment and decision-making literature to investigate these differences in an archival setting. Our results suggest that sophisticated investors have greater knowledge overall about the relation of the factors to forecast accuracy. Further, our evidence is consistent with sophisticated investors relying more on the specific factors that provide the most benefits (relative to their costs) for predicting relative forecast accuracy.

This paper reconciles two widely used decompositions of GDP into trend and cycle that yield starkly different results. The Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition implies that a stochastic trend accounts for most of the variation in output, whereas the unobserved-components (UC) implies cyclical variation is dominant. Which is correct has broad implications for the relative importance of real versus nominal shocks. We show the difference arises from the restriction imposed in UC that trend and cycle innovations are uncorrelated. When this restriction is relaxed, the UC decomposition is identical to the BN decomposition. Furthermore, the zero-correlation restriction can be rejected for U.S. quarterly GDP, with the estimated correlation being -0.9.

We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980’s, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade. The results highlight a perverse effect of price regulation.

This study examines the role of auditor industry expertise in the pricing of Big 5 audits in Australia. We test if the audit market prices an auditor's firm-wide industry expertise, or alternatively if the audit market only prices office-level expertise in those specific cities where the auditor is the industry leader. We document that there is an average premium of 24 percent associated with industry expertise when the auditor is both the city-specific industry leader and one of the top two firms nationally in the industry. However, the top two firms nationally do not earn a premium in cities where they are not city leaders. We further document that national leadership rankings are, in fact, driven by the specific offices where accounting firms are city leaders. Thus, the overall evidence supports that the market perception and pricing of industry expertise in Australia is primarily based on office-level industry leadership in city-specific audit markets.

We assemble bank-level and other data for Fed member banks to model determinants of bank failure. Fundamentals explain bank failure risk well. The first two Friedman-Schwartz crises are not associated with positive unexplained residual failure risk, or increased importance of bank illiquidity for forecasting failure. The third Friedman-Schwartz crisis is more ambiguous, but increased residual failure risk is small in the aggregate. The final crisis (early 1933) saw a large unexplained increase in bank failure risk. Local contagion and illiquidity may have played a role in pre-1933 bank failures, even though those effects were not large in their aggregate impact.

The consequences of bank distress for the economy during the Depression remain an area of unresolved controversy. Since John M. Keynes (1931) and Irving Fisher (1933), macroeconomists have argued that bank distress magnified the extent of the economic decline during the Depression. As the intermediaries controlling money and credit, banks were in a special position to transmit their distress to other sectors. But the mechanism through which banking distress mattered for the economy has been hotly contested.

We exploit cross‐temporal differences in capital gains tax rates to test whether shareholder‐level capital gains taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. We model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price‐setting shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Consistent with a lock‐in effect for acquisition premiums, results suggest a unique positive association between shareholder capital gains taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions, which is mitigated by target institutional ownership.