This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines the influence of uncertainty about the probability that a future loss will occur ("ambiguity") on auditors and financial statement users' judgments about appropriate reference to contingent losses in audit reports. Application of Einhorn and Hogarth's (1985) ambiguity model suggests that, with respect to losses of tow (high) probability, both auditors and users will act as if an ambiguous probability of loss is higher (lower) than a precise probability of the same magnitude, thus demonstrating a conservative (unconservative) reaction to ambiguity. In addition, since auditors may jeopardize client relations when they unnecessarily make audit report reference to contingent losses, auditors may react less conservatively to ambiguity than do users. The results of the experiment support these predictions.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that examines the influenceof uncertaintyabouttheprobabilitythatafuturelosswilloccur (ambiguity) on auditors' and financial statement users' judgments about appropriate reference to contingent losses in audit reports. Application of Einhorn and Hogarth's (1985) ambiguity model suggests that, with respect to losses of low (high) probability, both auditors and users will act as if an ambiguous probability of loss is higher (lower) than a precise probability of the same magnitude, thus demonstrating a conservative (unconservative) reaction to ambiguity. In addition, since auditors may jeopardize client relations when they unnecessarily make audit report reference to contingent losses, auditors may react less conservatively to ambiguity than do users. The results of the experiment support these predictions.

In a recent article, Edward B. Deakin and Michael H. Granof " demonstrated how regression analysis, coupled with Bayesian statistical procedures, can be used to provide the auditor with assistance in selecting those accounts for investigation that are most likely to result in significant audit findings. The article encourages audit model development and experimentation by independent auditors with the application of these and other techniques which make use of additional information. The independent auditor's ultimate concern with respect to a reported account balance of a client, is whether it is "fairly presented." Suppose that the auditor has evaluated the design of an internal control subsystem and has conducted tests of compliance of system operation with system design. Substantive tests include analytical review of significant ratios and trends and resulting investigation of unusual fluctuations and questionable items and tests of details of transactions and balances. Without the refinement, the sample sizes required after using regression analysis to revise priors often will be substantially smaller than the 163 required under classical, unrestricted random sampling.

Information relevance advisory services offer growth opportunities for accountants in CPA firms, but we know little about the types of knowledge needed to provide high-quality advice. In a two-stage experiment, accountants with different management and public accounting experiences (that we suggest lead to different types of knowledge) receive task information in alternative formats, and develop relevant information for a client's decision. We find that participants are more likely to choose an appropriate problem representation when they receive an appropriate task format or when they have more management or public accounting experience (stage one). Also, when participants choose an appropriate problem representation, more management accounting experience improves their development of relevant information, but more public accounting experience does not (stage two). Our results suggest that tailored task presentation and domain experience that facilitates acquisition of multiple knowledge types improve accountants' information relevance advice.

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may yield benefits through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity. We use unaudited pre–SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect firm risk and cost of equity. After controlling for other risk factors, we find that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity. Our change analyses document that auditor‐confirmed changes in internal control effectiveness (including remediation of previously disclosed internal control deficiencies) are followed by significant changes in the cost of equity that range from 50 to 150 basis points. Overall, our cross‐sectional and intertemporal change test results are consistent with internal control reports affecting investors' risk assessments and firms' cost of equity.

Reviews the book "Statistical Auditing," by Donald M. Roberts.

This paper investigates the effect of internal control deficiencies and their remediation on accrual quality. We first document that firms reporting internal control deficiencies have lower quality accruals as measured by accrual noise and absolute abnormal accruals relative to firms not reporting internal control problems. Second, we find that firms that report internal control deficiencies have significantly larger positive and larger negative abnormal accruals relative to control firms. This finding suggests internal control weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentional errors that add noise to accruals than intentional misstatements that bias earnings upward. Third, we document that firms whose auditors confirm remediation of previously reported internal control deficiencies exhibit an increase in accrual quality relative to firms that do not remediate their control problems. Finally, we find firms that receive different internal control audit opinions in successive years exhibit changes in accrual quality consistent with changes in internal control quality. Collectively, our cross-sectional and intertemporal change tests provide strong evidence that the quality of internal control affects the quality of accruals.

Many U.S. private firms choose either a financial statement compilation or review rather than the higher assurance provided by an audit, yet little is known about these choices. We explore economic aspects of private firm choice of less-than-audit levels of assurance applied to GAAP-based financial statements. We find that CPA fees more than double for each increment in assurance. Commonly used financial reporting quality proxies are higher for both reviews and audits relative to compilations but are statistically indistinguishable on average between reviews and audits. Cost of debt is significantly lower for reviews than for compilations and significantly lower for audits than for reviews. Finally, we find that assurance level choices are associated with bank debt, trade credit, and potential internal information reliability and control concerns.