Knowledge that Transforms

In contrast to nonunion workers, reemployment wages of workers displaced from unionized jobs decline with tenure on the lost job. This finding cannot easily be explained by firm‐ or industry‐specific human capital accumulation, deferred‐pay policies, standard matching models, or a correlation between tenure and reentry rates into unionized jobs. Possible explanations include negative selection of senior union workers and a negative causal effect of unionism on workers' alternative skills. Despite a much flatter predisplacement tenure‐wage profile, displaced union workers' wage losses increase with tenure at a rate comparable to or higher than those of nonunion workers.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this article examines the impact of employer‐provided training on the wage profile and on the mobility of young workers. The main results are that (i) training with the current employer has a positive effect on the wage; (ii) employers seem to reward skills acquired through training with previous employers as much as skills they provide themselves; and (iii) part of the skills acquired through training programs provided by the current employer seem to be fairly specific as they are shown to reduce mobility, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.

Recent work on the economic effects of minimum wages has stressed that the standard economic model, where increases in minimum wages depress employment, is not supported by empirical work in some labor markets. We present a general theoretical model whereby employers have some degree of monopsony power, which allows minimum wages to have the conventional negative impact on employment but which also allows for a neutral or positive impact. Studying the industry-based British Wages Councils between 1975 and 1992, we find that minimum wages significantly compress the distribution of earnings but do not have a negative impact on employment. I.

This article examines the effects of unemployment compensation finance in a labor market in which firms pay efficiency wages. Two self‐financing unemployment compensation systems are compared: one in which benefits are financed by a proportional payroll tax and another in which experience rating is introduced by taxing firms in proportion to their separations. We find that experience rating leads to less unemployment, less shirking, and higher output.

This article provides new evidence about the impact of Social Security Disability Insurance on male labor force participation decisions based on estimates from a structural model of applications, awards, and state‐contingent lifetime income flows. The lifetime framework makes it possible to consider long‐term opportunity costs associated with early labor force withdrawal and the disincentive to applications resulting from the statutory waiting period before benefits may be received. Estimation techniques account for the self‐selected nature of the pool of applicants when predicting the individual‐specific probability of acceptance and the opportunity costs of applying.

The pattern of effort and wages is derived in a multisector efficiency wage model. Firms choose effort endogenously. Easily monitored or low‐turnover jobs have high effort and may have low wages in equilibrium. Empirical wage differentials from a measure of supervision are smaller than observed industry differentials that have been attributed to efficiency wage models and are closer to those predicted by the model. Workers can search for and avail of on‐the‐job offers. If sectors grow at different rates or the unemployment rate changes, the pattern of wage differentials is unaffected.

We use microlevel data on employers and employees from a sample of establishments in four major metropolitan areas in the United States to investigate whether Affirmative Action leads to the hiring of minority or female employees who are less qualified. Our measures of qualifications include the educational attainment of the workers hired and a variety of outcome measures related to worker performance on the job. We find evidence of lower educational qualifications among women and minorities hired under Affirmative Action. However, we do not find evidence of weaker job performance among most groups of minority and female Affirmative Action hires.

Data and measurement problems have complicated the debate over trends in job instability in the United States. We compare two cohorts of young white men from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS), construct a rigorous measure of job change, and confirm earlier findings of a significant increase in job instability. We then benchmark the NLS against other main data sets in the field and conduct a thorough attrition analysis. Extending the analysis to wages, we find that the wage returns to job changing have both declined and become more unequal for young adults, mirroring trends in their long‐term wage growth.

Using data on union certification elections, we estimate the impact of unionization on firms' investment behavior. Employing both a standard q model and an “investment surprises” technique, we find that union certification significantly reduces investment in the year following the election. We find that a winning certification election has, on average, about the same effect on investment in the year following the event as would—given the elasticity measures taken from the public finance literature—a 33 percentage‐point increase in the corporate tax. The magnitude of the response in years further away from the election is less certain.

This article estimates the effects of changes in pension plans and social security in the 1970s and 1980s on the steady state retirement of men. Work incentives associated with pension coverage and plan characteristics are calculated primarily from the 1969–79 Retirement History Study and the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances. Simulations with a structural retirement model suggest that the long‐run effects of changes in pension plans and social security account for about a quarter of the reduction in full‐time work by men in their early sixties but cannot explain the reduction by those age 65.