The article focuses on the proceedings of the twelfth annual convention of the American Association of University Instructors in Accounting, held at Washington D.C., between December 28 and 29, 1927. After some introductory remarks by the organizers, papers were read by W. W. Nissley of the American Institute of Accountants, John R. Wildman of the company Haskins and Sells, David Himmelblau of Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, William A. Paton of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, and J. L. Dohr of Greene and Hurd and of Columbia University, New York, New York. The second program meeting was given over to a discussion of various features of the federal income tax law. Johns Hopkins University's, Baltimore, Maryland, professor presided at the session and opened it with a brief statement introducing the speakers of the afternoon, all of whom were representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The third program session consisted of a joint meeting with the American Association of Collegiate Schools of Business. The general topic for discussion was "The Place of Accounting in Commerce Curriculum."

Workers plan and save for retirement throughout their careers. Individuals must navigate complex financial instruments and understand public and employer-provided retirement plan characteristics. Beginning when a worker is first hired, most employers provide the option to contribute to retirement saving plans. As workers near retirement, they face many choices that have considerable consequences for their retirement income security. At these two important periods, employers can provide timely information assisting workers in making choices that optimize lifetime wellbeing. Our research, conducted in cooperation with several large employers, illustrates the importance of employer-provided education in increasing worker understanding of several retirement-related issues.

This laboratory experiment explores the extent to which impersonal exchange emerges from personal exchange with opportunities for long-distance trade. We design a three-commodity production and exchange economy in which agents in three geographically separated villages must develop multilateral exchange networks to import a good only available abroad. For treatments, we induce two distinct institutional histories to investigate how past experience with property rights affects the evolution of specialization and exchange. We find that a history of unenforced property rights hinders our subjects' ability to develop the requisite personal social arrangements to support specialization and effectively exploit impersonal long-distance trade.

Efficiency in the Use of Technology in Economic Education: Some Preliminary Results by Kim Sosin, Betty J. Lecha, Rajshree Agarwal, Robin L. Bartlett and Joseph I. Daniel. Published in volume 94, issue 2, pages 253-258 of American Economic Review, May 2004

Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise: Reply by David L. Carr, James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus. Published in volume 93, issue 3, pages 995-1001 of American Economic Review, June 2003

Estimating the Knowledge-Capital Model of the Multinational Enterprise by David L. Carr, James R. Markusen and Keith E. Maskus. Published in volume 91, issue 3, pages 693-708 of American Economic Review, June 2001

We examine the consequences of the 2020 amendment to Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, which exempted low-revenue issuers from the ICFR audit requirement and reignited the debate among regulators, issuers, auditors, and academics about the costs and benefits of ICFR audits. We find that exempt issuers rarely obtain ICFR audits voluntarily, indicating they generally do not view such audits as cost beneficial. We also find that exempt issuers report fewer MWs than nonexempt issuers, although this effect is driven by a recent increase in MWs for nonexempt issuers rather than a decline in MW for exempt issuers. We find no evidence that exempt issuers misstate more frequently or that they have less informative control effectiveness disclosures. Overall, our findings suggest that the exemption was welcomed by affected issuers and did not materially impair reporting quality, informing the literature and ongoing policy discussions regarding the appropriate scope of ICFR audit requirements. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the text.

Audits of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) are typically “integrated” with the audit of the financial statements (FSs)—both audits are conducted by the same audit firm, which designs procedures to satisfy the objectives of both audits simultaneously. A common assumption is that integrating the two audits is more effective and efficient than performing them separately. However, this assumption has not been tested empirically. Using a sample of Chinese companies that employ different audit firms for their FS and ICFR audits (i.e., nonintegrated auditors), we find evidence that challenges this assumption. Specifically, we find ICFR audit quality is higher for nonintegrated audits compared to integrated audits. Moreover, total audit fees are lower for nonintegrated audits, despite higher ICFR audit fees.

Research suggests that employees work harder under penalty contracts than under economically equivalent bonus contracts. We build on this literature by examining how the motivational advantage of penalty contracts depends on a common aspect of real-world contracts: payoff ambiguity. With payoff ambiguity, employees provide effort without knowing how much pay they will receive for a given level of performance. According to our theory, this ambiguity opens the door for employee optimism, which has contrasting effects under each contract frame. Results from an experiment support this theory, with an increase in ambiguity leading to less employee effort with penalty contracts (as employees optimistically expect small penalties) and more effort with bonus contracts (as employees optimistically expect large bonuses). We also find that these effects are stronger for more dispositionally optimistic employees. Overall, our results suggest that bonus contracts may be more motivating and penalty contracts less motivating than previously thought.

We test whether mandatory IFRS adoption affects firm-level “crash risk,” defined as the frequency of extreme negative stock returns. We separately analyze nonfinancial firms and financial firms because IFRS is likely to affect their crash risk differently. We find that IFRS adoption decreases crash risk among nonfinancial firms, especially among firms in poor information environments and in countries where IFRS adoption results in larger and more credible changes to local GAAP. In contrast, IFRS adoption has no effect on crash risk for financial firms, on average, but decreases crash risk among firms less affected by IFRS's fair value provisions, and increases crash risk among banks in countries with weak banking regulations. Overall, our results are consistent with the increased transparency from IFRS adoption broadly reducing crash risk among nonfinancial firms, but more selectively among financial firms, and with financial regulations playing a complementary role in implementing IFRS among financial firms.