This study provides the first large-scale study of the performance of expected-return proxies (ERPs) internationally. Analyst-forecast-based ICCs are sparsely populated and not robustly associated with future returns. Earnings-model-forecast-based ICCs are well-populated, but are unreliable outside the U.S. We adapt and extend the log-linear and present-value (LPV) framework—combining an accounting valuation anchor, its expected growth, and market prices—for estimating ERPs internationally, and implement a correction for the use of stale accounting data. An LPV ERP anchored on the book value of equity is positively associated with future returns in 26 of 29 equity markets, and largely subsumes the predictive ability of a broad set of firm characteristics previously shown to be associated with expected returns.

Auditors often face situations in which acting on their professional obligations comes with potential personal costs. Drawing upon the Theory of Reputation in Organizations, we predict that perceived costs associated with these actions are lower for auditors with positive reputations, which, in turn, influences their actions. In our first experiment, participants perceive that auditors with negative reputations face a more constrained choice set when anticipating a budget overage. Further, participants perceive that those with positive reputations are more likely to proactively report the overage and less likely to underreport hours worked, a result mediated by the anticipated impact on evaluations for “speaking up.” In a second experiment, we manipulate reputation in a live simulation and demonstrate a causal link between reputation and auditors' skeptical action. Taken together, our experiments provide evidence that an auditor's perceived reputation influences their choice to engage in audit quality enhancing behaviors.

This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the team manager—who may use such information for rewarding individual team members—is affected by differences in the type of mutual monitoring information available to team members. We predict and find that team performance is higher when team members can observe only each other's effort than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels; conversely, team performance is lower when team members can observe only each other's output than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels. The intuition behind these results is that the type of observable mutual monitoring information creates different degrees of ambiguity regarding what should be considered a fair reward allocation for team members' contributions. Such ambiguity reduces the usefulness of team member communication to the manager for allocating rewards, resulting in lower team performance. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Conventional economics assumes workers provide the same effort under penalty contracts and economically equivalent bonus contracts. However, prior research finds that although workers prefer bonus contracts, they provide more effort under penalty contracts. Given these findings, the prevalence of bonus contracts in practice is puzzling. If penalty contracts yield more worker effort, why would employers not use them more often? We conduct experimental labor markets to test whether the prior finding of more effort under penalty contracts than bonus contracts (i.e., the contract frame effect) persists when workers can choose their contract and know that their employer intentionally offered the contract they choose. As predicted, these features of labor markets eliminate the difference in effort between penalty and bonus contracts reported in prior studies. This finding suggests employers may use bonus contracts more often than penalty contracts because they can offer the contract most workers prefer without sacrificing worker effort.

This study investigates whether subjective communication from team members to a manager responsible for allocating performance-based bonuses increases team performance and whether the efficacy of such communication is reduced in heterogeneous teams. We draw on both economic and behavioral theories to predict that communication content, even though subjective, provides information that enables the manager to allocate bonuses so as to enhance the relation between individuals' contributions and rewards, thereby increasing individuals' effort and team performance. However, we also predict that the positive effect of team member subjective communication is more muted when team members' abilities are heterogeneous compared to homogeneous. We test these predictions via an experiment. Consistent with our predictions, team member subjective communication has a positive effect on team performance, and the positive effect is more muted for heterogeneous teams. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by enhancing our understanding of the role of subjective communication from team members to team managers in motivating effort in teams and, particularly, how its efficacy is affected by team composition. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

Recent research reveals that accruals-based earnings management (AEM) is decreasing while real earnings management (REM) is increasing, suggesting the correlation is due to regulatory scrutiny. However, based on Correspondent Inference Theory, we predict and find that when management uses REM, auditors are more restrictive of management's subjective estimates, making it more difficult for management to use income-increasing AEM. Our experiment manipulates the presence versus absence of REM, and whether the audit difference potentially impacts the client's ability to meet an earnings target. Using a serial mediation model, we find that when auditors observe REM, they perceive these operating decisions as aggressive, leading them to perceive management as aggressive, ultimately causing greater proposed adjustments on an unrelated audit difference. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that when auditors observe REM, their altered perceptions about management can cascade, affecting how they respond to management estimates in unrelated financial statement accounts.

While researchers and practitioners alike estimate firms' exposures to systematic risk factors, the disclosure literature typically assumes that exposures are common knowledge. We develop a model where the firm's exposure to a factor is unknown, and analyze the effects of factor-exposure uncertainty on share price and the effects of disclosure about the exposure. We find that: (1) factor-exposure uncertainty introduces skewness and excess kurtosis in the cash flow distribution relative to the commonly used normal distribution; (2) risk-factor disclosure affects all moments of that distribution; and (3) the pricing of higher moments affects the price response of disclosure and the incentives to disclose. For example, factor-exposure uncertainty may actually increase price when the uncertainty implies positive skewness in the cash flow distribution. Hence, a reduction in uncertainty through disclosure may increase cost of capital. We also extend our model to multiple firms and show that factor-exposure uncertainty manifests as uncertainty about a firm's CAPM beta.

Deloitte's 2007 PCAOB Part II report identifies, among other issues, concerns related to the audit firm's quality controls with respect to auditing income tax accounts. We investigate whether Deloitte's actions to remediate the PCAOB's concerns are associated with changes to their clients' financial reporting for income taxes. We find that Deloitte's clients increased the reported valuation allowance on deferred tax assets and increased the reported reserve for uncertain tax benefits (UTBs) in response to increased auditor scrutiny over income tax accounts. Additionally, we find that in subsequent periods, Deloitte's clients report valuation allowances and UTB balances that are not significantly different than other annually inspected auditors, consistent with Deloitte changing the quality controls related to audits of income tax accounts after the failed remediation of the 2007 Part II report.

This study examines the audit pricing effects when auditors specialize in industries conducive to transferable audit processes. Our results indicate that industry specialists charge incrementally lower fees in industries with homogenous operations, and particularly in industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices. Moreover, we discover that audit quality is no lower for clients audited by these specialists offering fee discounts, consistent with a conclusion that the reduction in fees indicates cost efficiencies rather than lower-quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the shared economies of scale only occur in a subsample of client firms with relatively high bargaining power. When considered in conjunction with prior research using a survivorship approach, our study provides evidence that certain industries lend themselves to specialization because auditors generate cost-based competitive advantages without compromising service quality. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

Using hand-collected carbon emissions data for 2006 to 2008 that were voluntarily disclosed to the Carbon Disclosure Project by S&P 500 firms, we examine the effects on firm value of carbon emissions and of the act of voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions. Correcting for self-selection bias from managers' decisions to disclose carbon emissions, we find that, on average, for every additional thousand metric tons of carbon emissions, firm value decreases by $212,000, where the median emissions for the disclosing firms in our sample are 1.07 million metric tons. We also examine the firm-value effects of managers' decisions to disclose carbon emissions. We find that the median value of firms that disclose their carbon emissions is about $2.3 billion higher than that of comparable non-disclosing firms. Our results indicate that the markets penalize all firms for their carbon emissions, but a further penalty is imposed on firms that do not disclose emissions information. The results are consistent with the argument that capital markets impound both carbon emissions and the act of voluntary disclosure of this information in firm valuations. JEL Classifications: G14, Q51, M14. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources identified in the study.