Most bank merger studies do not control for hidden bailouts, which may lead to biased results. In this study we employ a unique data set of approximately 1000 mergers to analyze the determinants of bank mergers. We use undisclosed information on banks’ regulatory intervention history to distinguish between distressed and non-distressed mergers. Among merging banks, we find that improving financial profiles lower the likelihood of distressed mergers more than the likelihood of non-distressed mergers. The likelihood to acquire a bank is also reduced but less than the probability to be acquired. Both distressed and non-distressed mergers have worse CAMEL profiles than non-merging banks. Hence, non-distressed mergers may be motivated by the desire to forestall serious future financial distress and prevent regulatory intervention.

We examine how increased competition stemming from an innovation in financial technology influences sell-side analyst research quality. We find that firms added to Estimize, an open platform that crowdsources short-term earnings forecasts, experience a pervasive and substantial reduction in consensus bias and a limited increase in consensus accuracy relative to matched control firms. Long-term forecasts and investment recommendations remain similarly biased, alleviating the concern that the documented reduction in bias is a response to broad economic forces. At the individual analyst level, we find that bias reduction is more pronounced among close-to-management analysts, and that more biased analysts respond by reducing their coverage of Estimize firms. The collective evidence suggests that competition from Estimize improves sell-side research quality by discouraging strategic bias.

We study turnover and promotions of division managers in multidivisional firms. Turnover is negatively related to divisional accounting performance, positively related to industry performance, but not significantly related to firm performance or the performance of other divisions. Consistent with tournament theory, promotions are significantly related to whether one division is performing better than others, but are not significantly related to the magnitude of any performance difference. A simple performance metric, divisional ROA, appears more closely related to job allocation decisions than several alternatives. Our evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that accounting information is used by firms when evaluating managerial personnel.

This study examines the association between corporate governance and disclosures of material weaknesses (MW) in internal control over financial reporting. We study this association using MW reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Sections 302 and 404, deriving data on audit committee financial expertise from automated parsing of member qualifications from their biographies. We find that a lower likelihood of disclosing Section 404 MW is associated with relatively more audit committee members having accounting and supervisory experience, as well as board strength. Further, the nature of MW varies with the type of experience. However, these associations are not detectable using Section 302 reports. We also find that MW disclosure is associated with designating a financial expert without accounting experience, or designating multiple financial experts. We conclude that board and audit committee characteristics are associated with internal control quality. However, this association is only observable under the more stringent requirements of Section 404.

This paper examines how capital market pressures and institutional factors shape firms' incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance. To isolate the effects of reporting incentives, we exploit the fact that, within the European Union, privately held corporations face the same accounting standards as publicly traded companies because accounting regulation is based on legal form. We focus on the level of earnings management as one dimension of accounting quality that is particularly responsive to firms' reporting incentives. We document that private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings management and that strong legal systems are associated with less earnings management in private and public firms. We also provide evidence that private and public firms respond differentially to institutional factors, such as book-tax alignment, outside investor protection, and capital market structure. Moreover, legal institutions and capital market forces often appear to reinforce each other.

This paper presents a model that relates properties of the analysts' information environment of the properties of their forecasts. First, we express forecast dispersion and error in the mean forecast in terms of analyst uncertainty and consensus (that is, the degree to which analysts share a common belief). Second, were reserve the relations to show how uncertainability and consensus cab be measured by combining forecast dispersion, error in the mean forecast, and the number of forecasts. Third, we show that the quality of common and private information available to analysts can be measured using these same observable variables. The relations we present are intuitive and easily applied in empirical studies.

This paper studies information system design in a model of double moral hazard in which there is both a decision problem and a control problem. If either problem is considered in isolation, an information system that provides more public information is preferred. However, an information system that provides less public information can, in fact, be desirable because of an interaction between the two problems. The benefit of choosing an information system that provides less information is that it serves as a substitute for commitment for the principal. The cost is that neither the principal's decision (act) nor the agent's payments can be conditioned on the information. We provide sufficient conditions under which less information and more information are each optimal.

This paper presents a new approach to the measurement of the effects of spatial mismatch that takes advantage of matched employeremployee administrative data integrated with a person-specific job accessibility measure, as well as demographic and neighborhood characteristics. We focus on a group of job searchers for plausibly exogenous reasons: lower-income workers with strong labor force attachment separated during a mass layoff. Our results support the spatial mismatch hypothesis. We find that better job accessibility significantly decreases the duration of joblessness among lower-income displaced workers, especially for blacks, women, and older workers.

Medicare's prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient's stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a prespecified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to the financial incentives of this system by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities colocated with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare.

Since the work of Robert M. Solow (1957), it has been known that technological change accounts for a significant portion of GNP growth in industrialized economies. This technological change has been measured either by the estimated time trend in regressions of aggregate output on inputs or by indexes of total factor productivity. Since under either method productivity is measured as a residual, it incorporates all factors that influence GNP growth other than the increase in measured inputs. Despite various refinements to the measurement of total factor productivity, there still is no convincing explanation for its source (see Dale W. Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches, 1967; Solow, 1988). Recent literature has suggested a potential source of productivity gains: the creation of new inputs under monopolistic competition. Wilfred Ethier (1982) has argued that the development of new intermediate inputs leads to greater specialization in the use of resources and to higher productivity (see also Markusen, 1989). Subsequent authors, including Paul M. Romer (1990) and Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman (1991), have examined models in which continuous growth is made possible by the creation of new inputs. Romer (1987) has considered the form of the aggregate production function in such an economy and has argued that conventional growth accounting, assuming constant returns to scale, may be incorrect. In this paper we shall examine how to account for growth when new inputs are being created. In particular, we are interested in obtaining a decomposition of growth into that due to a higher quantity of existing inputs, and that due to a greater range of inputs. In Section I, we show how this decomposition can be obtained for a constantelasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function, obtaining an exact quantity index in the presence of new inputs. In Section II we examine the CES cost function, and show how an implicit quantity index is constructed. In Section III we consider an empirical application to the productivity growth of industries within the major business groups (chaebol) of South Korea. We find that productivity is significantly correlated with the entry of new input-producing firms into the chaebol, as expected from our theoretical results.