This paper analyzes how different levels of debtor protection across US states affect small firms’ access to credit, as well as the price and non-price terms of their loans. We use an individual-specific measure of debtor protection that has its maximum value when the borrower’s home equity is lower than the state homestead exemption (the debtor’s home equity is fully protected), and is decreasing in the difference between the home equity and the homestead exemption (the amount that the creditor can seize). We find that unlimited liability small businesses have lower access to credit in states with more debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws. In addition, these businesses face tighter loan terms – they are more likely to pledge business collateral, have shorter maturities, and borrow smaller amounts. For limited liability small businesses, we also find a reduction in credit availability, but of smaller magnitude, together with an increase in the loan rate.

Theory suggests that government aid to banks may either reduce or increase systemic risk. We are the first to address this issue empirically, analyzing the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). Analysis suggests that TARP significantly reduced contributions to systemic risk, particularly for larger and safer banks, and those in better local economies. This occurred primarily through a capital cushion channel that reduced market leverage by increasing the value of common equity. Results are robust to endogeneity and selection bias checks. Findings yield policy conclusions about whether to aid banks, the best targets for future assistance, and short-term versus long-term effects.

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank ownership type—foreign, state-owned, and private domestic banks—in banking relationships. Our application uses data from India, an important developing nation. The empirical results are consistent with all of our hypotheses with regard to foreign banks. First, these banks tend to establish relationships with relatively transparent firms. Second, firms that have relationships with foreign banks are more likely to enter into multiple banking relationships and to maintain a larger number of such relationships. Finally, firms banking with foreign banks are more likely than others to diversify relationships across bank ownership types. The data are also consistent with the hypotheses that firms with relationships with state-owned banks are relatively unlikely to maintain multiple banking relationships, tend to interact with a smaller number of banks, and less often diversify across ownership types.

The U.S. bank stress tests aim to improve financial system stability. However, they may also affect bank credit supply. We formulate and test opposing hypotheses about these effects. Our findings are consistent with the Risk Management Hypothesis, under which stress-tested banks reduce credit supply−particularly to relatively risky borrowers−to decrease their credit risk. The findings do not support the Moral Hazard Hypothesis, in which these banks expand credit supply−particularly to relatively risky borrowers that pay high spreads−increasing their risk. Results are generally stronger for safer banks, banks that passed the stress tests, and the earlier stress tests.

An important theoretical literature motivates collateral as a mechanism that mitigates adverse selection, credit rationing, and other inefficiencies that arise when borrowers have ex ante private information. There is no clear empirical evidence regarding the central implication of this literature – that a reduction in asymmetric information reduces the incidence of collateral. We exploit exogenous variation in lender information related to the adoption of an information technology that reduces ex ante private information, and compare collateral outcomes before and after adoption. Our results are consistent with this central implication of the private-information models and support the economic importance of this theory.

We test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. We also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus multiple banks. Our results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Bank distress appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, raising borrowing costs and destroying some relationship benefits.

This article designs a framework for evaluating the causes, consequences, and future implications of financial services industry consolidation, reviews the extant research literature within the context of this framework (over 250 references), and suggests fruitful avenues for future research. The evidence is consistent with increases in market power from some types of consolidation; improvements in profit efficiency and diversification of risks, but little or no cost efficiency improvement on average; relatively little effect on the availability of services to small customers; potential improvements in payments system efficiency; and potential costs on the financial system from increases in systemic risk or expansion of the financial safety net.

In providing financial services jointly, banks may reduce costs due to complementarities in production (cost economies of scope) or raise revenues from complementarities in consumption (revenue economies of scope). Cost economies of scope between bank deposits and loans have been found to be small. Revenue economies of scope are investigated here for the first time and found to be insignificant over 1978–1990 for both small and large banks and for those on or off the revenue-efficient frontier. The lack of complementarities between deposits and loans — where benefits are most likely to occur — suggests that claims of important synergies from an expansion of banking powers be taken with caution.