This paper develops a model of sectoral labor mobility and tests its main implications. The model nests two distinct hypotheses on the origin of mobility: (a) sectoral shocks and (b) worker-employer mismatch. We estimate the relative importance of each hypothesis and find that the bulk of labor mobility is caused by mismatch rather than by sectoral shift. We then try to put a value on society's match-specific information. That is, we ask to what extent the availability of the option to change jobs raises GNP. We find that the mobility option raises expected earnings by roughly between 8.5 percent and 13 percent of labor earnings, which translates to an increase in GNP of between 6 percent and 9 percent.

A paradigm is presented in which both the extent of financial intermediation and the rate of economic growth are endogenously determined. Financial intermediation promotes growth because it allows a higher rate of return to be earned on capital, and growth in turn provides the means to implement costly financial structures. This financial intermediation and economic growth are inextricably linked in accord with the Goldsmith-McKinnon-Shaw view on economic development. The model also generates a development cycle reminiscent of the Kuznets hypotheses. In particular, in the transition from a primitive slow-growing economy to a developed fast-growing one, a nation passes through a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor widens.

This paper compares monopsonistic and competitive search equilibria. While the competitive equilibrium is efficient, the monopsonistic equilibrium is not: there is too much search, and the employment rate is too low.

If bidding in a pure common-value auction is costly and bidders do not know how many others are also bidding, all equilibria are in mixed strategies. Participation is probabilistic, and bid prices are dispersed. The symmetric equilibrium is unique and yields simple analytic expressions. We use them to, for example, show that bid prices exhibit negative skewness. The expressions are further used to estimate the model based on bidding on a Standard & Poor’s 500 security. We find that the number of bidders declined over time, making liquidity supply fragile.

Is the capitalist function distinct from the entrepreneurial function in modern economies? Or does a person have to be wealthy before he or she can start a business? Frank H. Knight and Joseph A. Schumpeter held different views on the answer to this question. The authors' empirical findings side with Knight: liquidity constraints bind, and a would-be entrepreneur must bear most of the risk inherent in his venture. The reasoning is roughly this: the data show that wealthier people are more inclined to become entrepreneurs. In principle, this could be so because the wealthy tend to make better entrepreneurs, but the data reject this explanation. Instead, the data point to liquidity constraints: capital is essential for starting a business, and liquidity constraints tend to exclude those with insufficient funds at their disposal.