We examine the impact of shared auditors, defined as audit firms that provide audit services to a target and its acquirer firm prior to an acquisition, on transaction outcomes. We find shared auditors are observed in nearly a quarter of all public acquisitions and targets are more likely to receive a bid from a firm that has the same auditor. Moreover, these shared auditor deals are associated with significantly lower deal premiums, lower target event returns, higher bidder event returns, and higher deal completion rates. These results are driven by bids in which targets and acquirers share the same practice office of an audit firm and in which the target is small. Overall, our evidence suggests that bidders benefit from sharing an auditor with the target. Our results are robust to controls for alternative explanations and for selection bias in the shared-auditor effect.

We investigate whether management's decision regarding the recognition of the valuation allowance (VA) for deferred tax assets provides incremental information about the persistence of accounting losses. We introduce a classification scheme that assigns loss firm‐years into three categories based on whether management appears to have recognized a material change in the VA, and whether or not the firm has positive taxable income (e.g., a net operating loss). The results of our study show that our tax categories contain information about the persistence of accounting losses over the following three years beyond variables previously identified to predict loss persistence. This incremental information is consistent with management using private information about the firm's future prospects in setting the VA. Finally, we find that investors’ pricing of the VA varies with the saliency of the tax signal and the information environment of the firm.

The objective of this study is to examine managerial involvement in auditor selection decisions when audit committees are “directly responsible” for auditor relationships, including selection of the audit firm. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of (2002) requires fully independent audit committees to be “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm” (Section 301). This statutory requirement is a regulatory attempt to eliminate management influence over the external auditor and align auditor incentives with those of the board and shareholders.1 While regulators largely assume that audit committees take responsibility for auditor selection in the post‐SOX period (Doty 2011), there exists no archival analysis testing this assumption. Therefore, the effectiveness of this regulation (SOX Section 301) remains uncertain. In this paper, we examine (a) whether contrary to the intent of SOX, managers continue to influence auditor selection decisions in the post‐SOX period, and (b) whether this influence subsequently impairs auditor independence as presumed in the legislation.

We examine the relationship between disclosure of nonfinancial information and analyst forecast accuracy using firm-level data from 31 countries. We use the issuance of stand-alone corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports to proxy for disclosure of nonfinancial information. We find that the issuance of stand-alone CSR reports is associated with lower analyst forecast error. This relationship is stronger in countries that are more stakeholder-oriented—i.e., in countries where CSR performance is more likely to affect firm financial performance. The relationship is also stronger for firms and countries with more opaque financial disclosure, suggesting that issuance of stand-alone CSR reports plays a role complementary to financial disclosure. These results hold after we control for various factors related to firm financial transparency and other potentially confounding institutional factors. Collectively, our findings have important implications for academics and practitioners in understanding the function of CSR disclosure in financial markets. Data Availability: The data are publicly available from the sources identified in the paper.

We examine a potential benefit associated with the initiation of voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities: a reduction in firms’ cost of equity capital. We find that firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year tend to initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year and that initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. Further, initiating firms with superior social responsibility performance attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage. Moreover, these analysts achieve lower absolute forecast errors and dispersion. Finally, we find that firms exploit the benefit of a lower cost of equity capital associated with the initiation of CSR disclosure. Initiating firms are more likely than non-initiating firms to raise equity capital following the initiations; among firms raising equity capital, initiating firms raise a significantly larger amount than do non-initiating firms.

This study examines the relation between auditors and their clients' investment efficiency. We hypothesize and find that auditor characteristics that proxy for an auditor's knowledge and resources are associated with higher client investment efficiency, after controlling for the auditor's effect on financial reporting quality. This result is consistent with auditors providing informational advantages to their clients in a generalized investment setting. We find that this auditor effect is more pronounced for clients who have a higher demand for information as measured by client size, industry competition, and client complexity. The effect is also more pronounced for clients of longer-tenured auditors. Overall, the results suggest that auditors may be one component to the management information environment and, as such, appear to influence capital investment behavior. JEL Classifications: M4; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.