Prior literature predicts a positive relation between firms' expected pre-tax rates of return and investor-level capital gains tax rates. We show that this relation is more nuanced than suggested by prior literature and that in three circumstances the relation can actually be negative. The first circumstance is when a firm's systematic risk is very high. The second circumstance is when the market risk premium is very high. The third circumstance is when the risk-free rate of return is very low. The circumstances arise because, in addition to reducing investors' expected after-tax cash proceeds, capital gains taxes reduce the risk that investors associate with the expected after-tax cash proceeds.

Evidence evaluation in accounting often involves both the assessment of evidence relevance and the combination of its relevance and source to assess overall strength. We decompose this strength-assessment judgment into its components—relevance assessment and source and relevance combination—and consider the effects of experience. Participants in our experiment assess the strength and relevance of tax authorities in relation to a client scenario. Contrary to prior research, we find that more-experienced participants exhibit greater use of analogical reasoning when evaluating tax-authority relevance than do less-experienced participants. We find a similar experience effect in the use of configural information processing to combine authority source and relevance, a judgment not previously considered in tax. The effects of experience are particularly important in the current environment as the tax function is a leading cause of material weaknesses and restatements under Sarbanes-Oxley and tax executives cite increasing difficulty in hiring and retaining qualified professionals. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.

The growth of kidney exchange presents new challenges for the design of kidney exchange clearinghouses. The players now include directors of transplant centers, who see sets of patient-donor pairs, and can choose to reveal only difficult-to-match pairs to the clearinghouse, while withholding easy-to-match pairs to transplant locally. This reduces the number of transplants. We discuss how the incentives for hospitals to enroll all pairs in kidney exchange can be achieved, and how the concentration of hard to match pairs increases the importance of long, non-simultaneous nondirected donor chains.

We examine the relation between pay-performance sensitivity (PPS), the convexity of managerial compensation (Vega), and future stock risk and returns for a large sample of firms between 1992 and 2004. Higher PPS and Vega are both associated with lower future stock returns. Part of this negative relation can be explained by risk-averse managers decreasing equity risk in response to increases in PPS and Vega. However, even after correcting for lower future risk, future stock returns are negatively associated with the magnitude of option sensitivity. This finding is consistent with previous studies that link high option compensation to manager-owner agency problems.

Instrumental variable (IV) methods are widely used to identify causal effects in models with endogenous explanatory variables. Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction. We illustrate the approaches with empirical examples that examine the effect of 401(k) participation on asset accumulation, price elasticity of demand for margarine, and returns to schooling. We find that inference is informative even with a substantial relaxation of the exclusion restriction in two of the three cases.

U.S. exchange‐traded stock options are exercisable before expiration. While put options should frequently be exercised early to earn interest, they are not. In this paper, we derive an early exercise decision rule and then examine actual exercise behavior during the period January 1996 through September 2008. We find that more than 3.96 million puts that should have been exercised early remain unexercised, representing over 3.7% of all outstanding puts. We also find that failure to exercise cost put option holders $1.9 billion in forgone interest income and that this interest is systematically captured by market makers and proprietary firms.

Public policy discussions typically favor greater corporate disclosure as a way to reduce firms' agency problems. This argument is incomplete because it overlooks that better disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and related costs, including executive compensation. Consequently, a point can exist beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. Holding all else equal, we further show that larger firms will adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms and firms with better disclosure will employ more able management. We show that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates.

During recessions, the focus on male job losses may overshadow other important outcome variables. We examine the effects of economic downturns on occupational segregation by gender, using staffing data from over 6 million private-sector US establishments from 1966-2010. Consistent with the literature, we find a downward trend in occupational segregation that is diminishing over time. Drawing upon Rubery's (1988) work on women and recessions, we find support for both the buffer and the segmentation hypotheses. On net, however, the buffer hypothesis appears to dominate providing evidence that in periods of economic decline the trend of decreasing economic dissimilarity is interrupted.

Consumers need information to compare alternatives for markets to function efficiently. Recognizing this, public policies often pair competition with easy access to comparative information. The implicit assumption is that comparison friction—the wedge between the availability of comparative information and consumers' use of it—is inconsequential because when information is readily available, consumers will access this information and make effective choices. We examine the extent of comparison friction in the market for Medicare Part D prescription drug plans in the United States. In a randomized field experiment, an intervention group received a letter with personalized cost information. That information was readily available for free and widely advertised. However, this additional step—providing the information rather than having consumers actively access it—had an impact. Plan switching was 28% in the intervention group, versus 17% in the comparison group, and the intervention caused an average decline in predicted consumer cost of about $100 a year among letter recipients—roughly 5% of the cost in the comparison group. Our results suggest that comparison friction can be large even when the cost of acquiring information is small and may be relevant for a wide range of public policies that incorporate consumer choice.

The financial industry relies on trade secrecy to protect its business processes and methods, which can obscure critical financial risk exposures from regulators and the public. Using results from cryptography, we develop computationally tractable protocols for sharing and aggregating such risk exposures that protect the privacy of all parties involved, without the need for trusted third parties. Financial institutions can share aggregate statistics such as Herfindahl indexes, variances, and correlations without revealing proprietary data. Potential applications include: privacy-preserving real-time indexes of bank capital and leverage ratios; monitoring delegated portfolio investments; financial audits; and public indexes of proprietary trading strategies.